The Military Philosopher

Hold the Highest Ground

2012-01-17T14:08:00.002-05:00

Every student of military history is familiar with the ancient adage “Hold the high ground.” The high ground offers better visibility over the battlefield. Defending on the high ground forces your opponent to make the tiring upwards climb to get at you, which can open gaps in his ranks that you can exploit. It offers the opportunity to place a part of your force where your opponent cannot see it, concealing your real total strength. The U.S. Air Force has long claimed a critical role for itself within the American armed forces based upon its possession of the ultimate high ground, the air over the battlefield. I am convinced that a battlefield also possesses a moral high ground that offers real strength and advantages to the force that holds it. The moral high ground is highly desirable and not to be lightly yielded to an enemy.

As human beings evolved and began living as members of a larger society that was but one among many societies, violence amongst this population evolved into war and warfare. But even at this stage of civilization’s development, it was understood that war meant killing and that unlicensed lethal violence could mean the death of that society. Consequently, society surrounded its warriors with rules and rituals that embody an unwritten contract between society at large and the warriors or soldiers who fight that society’s wars, often reinforced by the invocation of a higher power or Supreme Being worshiped by that society.

This unwritten contract allows chosen individuals to break the most basic rule against taking a human life when they act in the defense of that society and grants them continued full membership in that society without prejudice as long as they abide by the terms of this contract. The visible manifestations of the contract are the rituals with which we surround our warriors – today our soldiers – and the sacred places dedicated for their burial and even their veneration. In more practical terms, it is manifest in the benefits granted beyond simple salary and in the recognition regularly accorded to them and their families in our daily public life. Thus, the contract serves multiple purposes – it protects society’s members from violence, it protects the individual warrior’s place within that society by sanctioning acts of violence committed on behalf of that society, and it ensures that the warrior who fights in battle consistent with society’s rules and rituals will retain the support of the society being defended.

But the existence of such contracts also empower society to hold other societies responsible for the behavior of its warriors on the battlefield, just as it charges each society with responsibility for the behavior of its own warriors. Each society may seek redress for behaviors not consistent with the accepted practices of war, whether set down in custom or written agreement or law.

History shows, and societies long ago learned, that over a long enough period of time battle coarsens and desensitizes warriors to things that would be unacceptable in the civil society they are defending. This goes beyond the mere physical discomforts to the individual’s very interactions with and responses to death, whether of comrades or enemies. This desensitization could well be a survival mechanism, the body and mind’s attempt to preserve the individual’s mental well-being in the face of the extreme experiences of battle.

Thus, society’s contract with its warriors includes the stricture that their battlefield behavior will not embarrass, dishonor, or shame the society for which they fight or themselves as warriors. This stricture protects society in its interactions with other societies and protects it from warriors whose battlefield behavior has so greatly exceeded the limits of what is acceptable as to render them unable, in society’s eyes, to readjust to the limits and norms of civil society. The non-warrior members of society are not only empowered with but entrusted with the responsibility for declaring when warrior behavior exceeds acceptable norms – it’s in the contract.

It’s a contract that protects society from the violence that is a necessary part of war and holds all members of that society to the prohibitions against killing that help preserve society. It’s a contract that binds together society and its warriors and ensures the warrior’s place in that society once the war is over. It’s a contract that supports the warrior’s ability to return from the war with honor and accept again the constraints of life within society. It’s a contract that ensures that the warriors’ actions in battle will not dishonor or shame society or prevent it from the fullest exchange of goods, people, and ideas that are an essential element of modern civilization. And it’s a contract that, when honored, will enable the warrior to hold the highest ground on the battlefield – and in society – the moral high ground.

The Burden of Command

2012-01-04T16:09:00.003-05:00

“General, soldiering has one great trap: to be a good soldier you must love the army. To be a good commander, you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love. We do not fear our own death you and I. But there comes a time... We are never quite prepared for so many to die. Oh, we do expect the occasional empty chair. A salute to fallen comrades. But this war goes on and on and the men die and the price gets ever higher. We are prepared to lose some of us, but we are never prepared to lose all of us. And there is the great trap General. When you attack, you must hold nothing back. You must commit yourself totally.”

Michael Shaara wrote the above speech in its original form for General Robert E. Lee speaking to General Longstreet in his novel “The Killer Angels.” The above version is the way it was rewritten for the film “Gettysburg” based upon Shaara’s book. In both book and film, Lee goes on to tell Longstreet that he must not expose himself too dangerously in the coming battle because of his (Longstreet’s) importance to the army.

This speech came to mind as I was finishing William Philpott’s brilliant “Three Armies on the Somme, The First Battle of the Twentieth Century” after recently read several First World War memoirs by junior officers (Robert Graves, Guy Chapman, Siegfried Sassoon, among others). The First World War marked an extreme between the way the soldiers and their generals experienced war.

Veterans of combat, if and when they are willing to speak honestly about it, will generally tell you that ‘combat is a bitch.’ If you look at previous wars, in fact, you will find many generals offering rather similar sentiments that reflected how much more closely their combat experience echoed that of the private soldier. The day after his “near-run” victory over Napoleon at Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Lady Frances Shelly, “I hope to God I have fought my last battle. It is a bad thing to be always fighting. While in the thick of it I am too much occupied to feel anything; but it is wretched just after. It is quite impossible to think of glory.” Robert E. Lee reportedly spoke in similar spirit to General Longstreet in the aftermath of the Confederate lopsided victory at Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, “It is well that war is so terrible—we should grow too fond of it.”

Long after their experiences in the American Civil War, commanders on both sides would make similar statements. General Sherman told a Columbus, Ohio audience in 1880, that “There is many a boy here today who looks on war as all glory, but, boys, it is all hell.” Confederate partisan leader John Singleton Mosby would write in his memoirs, “War loses a great deal of its romance after a soldier has seen his first battle.”

The truth that the individual soldier fights more for those around him than for any higher cause is today so widely accepted as to have become a Hollywood movie cliché (and in the process proving again that even clichés often conceal a hard truth). The physical and emotional toll of close combat is heavy and post-traumatic stress syndrome is not a new phenomenon, though soldiers of earlier wars might have referred instead to battle fatigue, battle-happy, cannon fever, chicken-heart disease, combat-happy, gangplank fever, or shell-shock, among other labels used.

The commander, however, even during the time of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, Lee, and Grant, fights with his mind far more than with his body and individual weapons. The old pre-Nazi German army was aware of this and several senior officers offered the following commentary, though I came across it as from General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord who reportedly wrote in 1933:

“I divide officers into four classes – the clever, the lazy, the stupid, and the industrious. Each officer possesses at least two of these qualities. Those who are clever and industrious are fitted for the high staff appointments. Use can be made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who is clever and lazy is fit for the very highest command. He has the temperament and the requisite nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious must be removed immediately.”

Notice the idea that the commander, the decision-maker, must remain calm and contrast this with the battle experience of the individual soldier who often fights with emotion or even passion when the nature of the battle demands it. In the film, “Gettysburg” it is Lee who gives in to his emotions in making his fateful decisions while the frustrated Longstreet finds that his cooler rationality cannot persuade Lee to act differently – and disaster results just as it did in the actual battle. Here, Hollywood and Michael Shaara have reflected if not fully embraced the idea that an army commander needs to avoid making decisions based upon emotion rather than cold, hard truths.

What remains to be addressed here is the further truth that while the commander needs to remain cool and collected, as a leader of soldiers he also needs to be aware of, to connect with, and even to tap that emotion found in those soldiers. That leadership role requires a connection at the personnel level, and that requires a commander who can still find his/her emotions and harness them (because as in the old joke, “it’s all about sincerity, once you can fake that you’ve got it made). I am certain that in the face of the compound strains of maintaining a cool head for command decisions and supporting the soldiers’ morale via that important emotional bond, many commanders must silently echo the wishes of Lt. Gonville Bromhead in the film “Zulu” who as he watched the approaching Zulu, said, “Right now I wish I were a damned ranker.”

Clausewitz, Mars, and Murphy

2011-03-22T16:33:00.002-04:00

In 1831, a Prussian Major-General died at the age of 51 having never commanded an army or even a battlefield during his military service. However, his legacy would be his lifelong effort to examine and even dissect that phenomena that defined his life – war itself. Carl von Clausewitz had served Prussia and briefly Russia through the wars with first revolutionary and then Napoleonic France, studying both these and earlier wars seeking to fully understand war and warfare. The fruits of this effort were written, edited, and re-written throughout his life and would be published after his death by his widow as “Vom Krieg” or “On War.”

Over the fifty-odd years that I have studied military history, war, and warfare, I didn’t actually get around to reading Clausewitz for about half that time. This was actually a good thing since the Michael Howard/Peter Peret translation wasn’t published until 1976 and for my money this is the English-language version you want to use - unless you actually read German and can think like a 19th Century German philosopher.

When I first began to read “On War” during my time in the Naval War College’s Command and Staff Course, was the realization that Clausewitz recognized just how much of a gamble war was and remains. I would summarize his approach very much as, “Okay, guys, going to war is really, really not a good idea primarily because of the infinite number of things that can and will go wrong – and it never, ever comes out the way you expect it to. However, that said and if you are still absolutely determined to go to war – here’s how it works.” It’s almost as if Clausewitz believed that the real name of the God of War wasn’t Mars but rather Murphy.

“On War” has been mined by many people for epigrams and quotes, which were all too often taken out of context in hopes of overawing critics of whatever hobbyhorse was being advocated, much as people borrow from the Bible to prop up a weak argument. But like its subject, “On War” is a complex work whose true value and meaning come from the interactions between the various ideas – just as war is truly defined by the sum total of the interactions between its numerous elements. Despite such abuses, some of the work’s ideas are of particularly relevance as the United States and some friends and allies begin air (and possibly other) military operations over Libya.

The first thought that comes to mind is that starting a war is a lot easier than ending it, something pretty clearly on many peoples’ minds and reflected in much of the public commentary. The corollary second thought is that no war ever ends the way you expected it to when it started and this is true of just about every war I have studied. There are several reasons for this; in particular there is what Clausewitz called friction. Friction is Clausewitz’s label for the innumerable little things that will go wrong when you try to translate a military plan into reality – think of the old children’s rhyme “for want of a nail” and you get a glimmer of the idea. Also, you can try to move any large number of people around and get them to do what you want them to do when and where you want to do it. All of the little problems, questions, confusions, etc. that keep it from happening constitute “friction.”

Clausewitz was also aware of the problem often referred to as “mission creep” in the ongoing discussions on Libya. He knew from experience the reality that a country would go to war with a certain goal in mind – perhaps to seize a city or a province, recapture a city or province lost in the last war, punish a rival ruler or country by destroying all or part of its territory or its armed forces, or just old fashioned raid, loot, and pillage the enemy countryside for a while. This happens because most of the people deciding about whether or not to go to war are politicians – who may at best take the advice of the people who will be doing the fighting, but at least as often do not.

The most important contribution that the generals make in their explanation to the politicians is to set before them the all important relationship between ends and means; “If you give me this much military force, I can do this; if you give me this much more military force, I can do that.” As we have seen in recent years, political leaders who ignore such advice, almost always regret it.

Once the war has begun it either goes better than expected or worse. Either way, this raises a new challenge to the politicians,

– if the war is going worse or is not achieving the goals originally set out for it the politicians must decide whether to settle for less than victory or increase the military forces committed to the war,

– and with the required increase in military forces they will consider whether not the greater forces involved also entails setting out a new and larger goal;

- if the war is going better than expected, there is always the temptation to set out a new and bigger goal to replace the original one and “cash in” on the success. However, seeking an expanded, larger goal may in turn spark increased resistance from an enemy who now can expect to lose more than was originally at risk.

So the politicians (in the Middle East, in Washington, London, Bonn, Rome, Paris, etc) declare that Gadhafi must not be allowed to fly his aircraft over Libya. The generals use a mix of bombers and missiles to destroy the Libyan radars and command and control centers for its air defenses so that their planes may now fly unencumbered and unchallenged as they keep pro-Gadhafi aircraft on the ground. And then the politicians declare, "That’s not what we meant!" Sometimes, you have to believe that the generals all wish they had decided to be professional athletes or street musicians instead of generals.

Televised Revolutions as the Newest Form of Reality TV Show

2011-03-07T22:15:00.004-05:00

One hundred and fifty years ago, the United States had just sworn in its new President, Abraham Lincoln, while seven states had declared themselves no longer a part of that country and had already sworn in their own President, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi. The United States was already preparing for a civil war that would last for more than four years while the European powers watched from a distance with varying degrees of political, military, and economic interest. The Prussian military dismissed this war when it began as the clash of armed mobs that offered no insights or important new knowledge of war and warfare and thus not worth their attention.

This is approximately the situation now confronting the two sides in Libya. The Libyan Armed Forces, such as they were, have fragmented. Qadhafi has introduced the use of non-Libyan mercenaries to back up his selected units made up of tribal supporters and others with a vested interest in the regime's survival to beat back the growing armed popular revolt. The rebels are made up of angry young men and elements of the fragmenting Libyan armed forces that have defected to the rebels.

In essence, we are presented with two armed mobs confronting each other. The Libyan military, with limited capabilities before this uprising, have some slight advantage in that they are still generally organised and equipped according to the Army table of equipment. This means that they should have the communications, intelligence gathering, and logistics support normally part of the functioning of a regular army. Their weaknesses are that these will not really be fully effective nor fully integrated and linked across the full spectrum of pro-Qadhafi forces.

The rebels in their turn will have only the advantage of larger overall numbers and youthful and/or revolutionary enthusiasm. Unfortunately, they are still a good ways from being able to operate effectively as military forces even at a limited level equivalent to that of the pro-Qadhafi forces. They lack sufficient trained military leadership, reconnaissance, logistics, communications, heavy weapons, and most importantly air support. That said, their numbers, determination, and enthusiasm suggest that ultimately they can and should win this conflict.

The most important need and potentially the one must susceptible to a favorable resolution is the rebel need for effective leadership. Right now it appears that the Libyan revolutionaries/rebels are dependent upon the historical pattern in which previously unknown and unrecognized leaders will emerge on the battlefield as the militants continue to clash with Qadhafi loyalists. These leaders will not fit a single profile, but are likely to be a mix of both trained military officers who have defected to the rebels and previously unsuspected charismatic leaders with a knack for the kind of knockabout combat that will make up most of the conflict.

The biggest challenge for both the rebels and for outside powers wanting to support or at least recognize these anti-Qadhafi forces is that the battlefield leaders that emerge are less likely to have the political skills essential to the creation of a new regimen and political order. This lack will prolong the period of real uncertainty as to the ultimate direction of Libya's revolution. While it will be difficult for the Libyan rebels to pull off a battlefield victory and then a political success in the face of this and other challenges, it will be even more challenging for interested outside powers to make an early identification of these emerging leaders and then to work with them as this new political order itself develops. It's likely to be along process with numerous steps backward and forward as the situation develops first on the battlefield and then in the political arena. It's outcome is not likely to be successfully predicted by either Libyans or the interested powers.

Final Rendezvous

2011-03-03T20:58:00.004-05:00

By way of noting the passing this week of Frank Buckles, the last American veteran of the First World War, I offer the following poem written by another American who did not survive that war.

I Have A Rendezvous with Death

Alan Seeger (1888-1916)

I have a rendezvous with Death
At some disputed barricade,
When Spring comes back with rustling shade
And apple-blossoms fill the air--
I have a rendezvous with Death
When Spring brings back blue days and fair.

It may be he shall take my hand
And lead me into his dark land
And close my eyes and quench my breath--
It may be I shall pass him still.
I have a rendezvous with Death
On some scarred slope of battered hill,
When Spring comes round again this year
And the first meadow-flowers appear.

God knows 'twere better to be deep
Pillowed in silk and scented down,
Where Love throbs out in blissful sleep,
Pulse nigh to pulse, and breath to breath,
Where hushed awakenings are dear. . .
But I've a rendezvous with Death
At midnight in some flaming town,
When Spring trips north again this year,
And I to my pledged word am true,
I shall not fail that rendezvous.

{Alan Seeger graduated from Harvard in 1910 and went to Paris at the start of World War I, enlisting in the French Foreign Legion. He was killed in the Battle of the Somme at Beloy-en-Santerre, on July 4, 1916. His death came before the United States entered the war and his poetry does not yet show the bitter anger that came to mark many of the later poems of those authors who outlived him. I believe the sentiment, however, was shared by many of the participants in that war including many survivors who perhaps thought of every day of life after the war had ended as a gift that would yet someday be taken away and they would finally join their comrades who had fallen during that "war to end all wars."}

Author James Bradley on a Sea Cruise

2011-01-21T15:01:00.009-05:00

The Imperial Cruise, A Secret History of Empire and War, James Bradley, Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Company, © 2009 James Bradley ISBN: 978-0-316-01400-7

That handful of people who read my book reviews may have noticed that I frequently make distinctions regarding non-fiction works that are something other than histories, and memoirs that are not autobiographies. James Bradley’s latest book again raises the need to make such a distinction as he presents the reader with a well-researched account of a little known historical episode – the 1905 voyage of the largest official U.S. delegation ever sent abroad (at least before the advent of modern summitry and bilateral joint commissions!).

From July to September 1905, then-Secretary of War William Howard Taft led seven (of 90) senators and twenty-three (of 386) congressman (plus presidential wild child Alice Roosevelt) on a trans-Pacific tour, stopping in the new U.S. territories of Hawaii and the Philippines, in addition to Japan, Korea, China, and Hong Kong. The author’s principal purpose is to explore how President Roosevelt’s actions with regard to the Pacific Ocean and the Far Eastern countries set into motion events that would led to the climactic battle of Iwo Jima between the forces of the United States and Imperial Japan (the subject of the author’s first book, Flags of Our Fathers).

However, this is not a history, having more the tone of an expose, especially given the author’s criticism of a number of TR’s biographers. It could be argued, in fact, that in this book Bradley was channeling a 19th Century muck-racking journalist, a type with whom the principal subject of his book, Theodore Roosevelt, would have been very familiar. The author’s TR only superficially resembles that figure normally depicted and recognizable in other histories and biographies as well as, for example, in films such as “The Wind and the Lion” and “Newsies”, or even as parodied in the “Night at the Museum” films or the play/film “Arsenic and Old Lace.”

This is evidently the very point that Bradley wants to make, Teddy Roosevelt wasn’t necessarily so. Much of what Bradley presents here with regard to Roosevelt’s ties to Japan and his racial attitudes is not new, at least not to academic historians nor even to a number of his contemporary critics, but much of it is likely to surprise the general reader. Theodore Roosevelt was very much a product of his times and even more so of his family and upbringing, as the author makes amply clear in his early chapters. The first part of the book also makes evident the degree to which Roosevelt could claim to be a self-made man in both person and reputation. Bradley’s Teddy comes across as every bit as image conscious as his younger cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, though the older Roosevelt did not face the technological challenges of radio and film that confronted FDR.

The fact that Roosevelt shared the racial attitudes of many of his peers is not news, especially to the historians who have explored his punitive decisions against Black soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Regiment after they clashed in a racially charged atmosphere with the white sheriff and other residents of Brownsville, Texas in the summer of 1906. [I can only conclude that the author deliberately skipped over Taft’s infamous turn of phrase when as Governor of the Philippines he referred to “our little brown brothers” in assuring then President McKinley that they would not be ready for self-government in 150 years.] Nor is it likely to surprise the more attentive readers to find that the United States government in this period (and not uniquely in its history) often said one thing and then did something other than what it had previously committed itself to do. Today one can read these attitudes expressed in Theodore Roosevelt’s own words by looking up his works accessible via Google Books. (Those interested in TR’s Japanese friend, Baron Kentaro Kaneko, will also find many of whose writings available for reading today via Google Books, among other resources.)

Unfortunately, Bradley keeps stumbling over bad history. It may be that in his apparent determination to deliver a black and white case he has skipped over the reality that most historically controversial episodes come in shades of grey rather than stark black and white, or in the recent catchphrase, “it’s complicated.” In one example he states that President Polk decided that the Rio Grande marked the border between Mexico and Texas, as the latter became the newest state in the United States, instead of “the internationally recognized border between Mexico and the United States…the Nueces River.”

The reality is more complicated. After his defeat at San Jacinto by Sam Houston’s army, Mexico’s dictator General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna signed the Treaty of Velasco which recognized the independence of Texas and placed the border between Mexico and the new Republic of Texas on the Rio Grande River. However, a new government in Mexico rejected this treaty because it was signed while Santa Anna was being held captive and because he had been deposed while absent from Mexico City pursuing his war in Texas. With the border thus in dispute in the absence of any agreement between Mexico City and what it considered a rebellious province, the issue is further complicated by the fact that Britain, France, and the United States recognized the newly independent Republic of Texas, such action at the very least implying recognition of the claimed border along the Rio Grande River. Most historians today would at the very least the situation with the words “it’s complicated.”

In a second example, Bradley recounts how the United States came to liberate the Philippines only to keep it as a U.S. governed territory in the far Pacific Ocean. He summarizes the Battle of Manila Bay as a turkey shoot between the modern steel ships of Admiral Dewey’s U.S. Asiatic squadron and “Spain’s creaky, wooden ships conveniently tied up in a row” to be smashed “into kindling.” Again, the reality is “complicated” since while the U.S. force was clearly superior, five of the six Spanish ships lost were in fact steel hulled vessels. Furthermore, the two protected (armored) cruisers Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon were scuttled by the Spanish as it became clear that there was no escaping defeat at the hands of a larger and more capable American force.

Despite some passing moments of historical weakness, James Bradley has presented us with an interesting and challenging rebuff of some American historical myths, and may spark some profitable debate among historians as well as his general readership. His account of how during this period the U.S. and the American people related to Chinese and Japanese immigrants to the United States, as well as how the governments of the US, UK, Spain, France, Germany, Russia, China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Cuba, among others, interacted with each other offers some useful insights for today as Americans adapt themselves to the continuing rise of China in a rapidly changing Far East and Pacific community.

A Prescient View of the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862

2010-12-10T09:51:00.003-05:00

Charles Carleton Coffin, Army Correspondent of The Boston Journal, wrote the following letter to his newspaper from Chatham house on December 9, 1862 (excerpted from "Four Years of Fighting" by Charles Carleton Coffin):

"It is a clear, cold morning. The sky is without a cloud. Standing near General Sumner's quarters, I have a wide sweep of vision. The quarters of the veteran general commanding the right grand division are in a spacious mansion, newly constructed, the property of wealthy planter, whose estate is somewhat shorn of its beauty by the ravages of war. The fences are all gone, the forests are fast disappearing, the fine range of cedars which lined the Belleplain road are no longer to be seen. All around are the white tents of the command, the innumerable camp-fires sending up blue columns of smoke. The air is calm. You hear the rumbling of distant baggage-trains, the clatter of hundreds of axes felling the forests for fuel,--the bugle-call of the cavalrymen, and the rat-a-plan of the drummers, and mingling with all, the steady, constant flow of the falling waters of the winding stream.

Looking far off to the southeast, across the intervals of the river, you see a white cloud of steam moving beneath the fringe of a forest. It is a locomotive from Richmond, dragging its train of cars with supplies for the Rebel camps. The forests and hills beyond are alive with them. Resting my glass against the side of the building to keep it steady, I can count the men grouped around the camp-fires, turning at times to keep themselves warm. Others are bringing in wood. An officer rides along. A train of wagons is winding down the hill toward the town. All along the range of hills are earthworks with sandbag embrasures, and artillery behind,--not quaker guns, I think, but field artillery, so ranged that a movement directly across the river would be marching into the jaws of death,---as hazardous and destructive as the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava.

I know that there is a clamor for an onward movement, a desire and expectation for an advance; but I think there are few men in the country who, after taking a look at the Rebel positions, would like to lead in a movement across the stream.

Looking into the town of Fredericksburg we see but few smokes ascending from chimneys, but few people in the streets. It is almost wholly deserted. The women and children have gone to Richmond, or else are shivering in camp. Close upon the river-bank on either side face the pickets, within easy talking distance of each other. There has been no shooting of late. There is constant badinage. The Rebel picket asks the Yankee when he is going to Richmond. The Yankee asks the Rebel if he don't want a pair of boots. I am sorry to say that such conversation is mixed with profane words. Each party seems to think that hard words hit hard.

Last night the southern sky was red with the blaze of Rebel camp-fires. Far off to the southeast I see a hazy cloud, and columns of smoke, indicating the presence of a large army. I do not doubt that if we attempt to cross we shall meet with terrible opposition from a force nearly if not quite as large as our own.

If the President or General Halleck insist upon Burnside's making the movement, it will be made with whatever power, energy, determination, and bravery the army can exhibit. I am as anxious as any one can be to see a great blow given to the Rebellion; but I am not at all anxious to see the attempt made against such disadvantages as are apparent to the most casual observer from this position."

Today you can still visit Fredericksburg, Virginia, and in particular Chatham House (aka Lacey House) and find much of the same scenery and the same scenes that would have presented themselves to those present at the battle. This weekend in Fredericksburg the anniversary of the battle will be marked by reenactors and citizens retelling the story of the battle and on Sunday you will be able to follow the march of the Irish Brigade through the streets of the city to their fatal engagement on Marye's Heights and NPS historian and author Frank O'Reilly narrates.

The Iwo Jima Creed

2010-11-29T08:56:00.004-05:00

In one of my past commentaries here, I stated that the American military would inevitably accept the service of LGBT persons. It now appears that only the U.S. Marine Corps is still resisting this decision. I recently found, courtesy of author Robert Coram, evidence that some Marines do "get this." In his new biography of Victor "Brute" Krulak, Coram included the following sermon given by Rabbi Gittelsohn (5th Marine Division) at the Jewish memorial service conducted on the island of Iwo Jima in the battle's aftermath.

Here lie men who loved America because their ancestors generations ago helped in her founding, and other men who loved her with equal passion because they themselves or their own fathers escaped from oppression to her blessed shores. Here lie officers and men, Negroes and whites, rich men and poor...together. Here are Protestants, Catholics and Jews together. Here no man prefers another because of his faith or despises him because of his color. Here there are no quotas of how many from each group are admitted or allowed. Among these men, there is no discrimination. No prejudices. No hatred. Theirs is the highest and purest democracy...

Whosever of us lifts his hand in hate against a brother, or who thinks himself superior to those who happen to be in the minority, makes of this ceremony and the bloody sacrifice it commemorates, an empty, hollow mockery. To this, then, as our solemn duty, sacred duty do we the living now dedicate ourselves: to the right of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, of white men and Negroes alike, to enjoy the democracy for which all of them have here paid the price.

We here solemnly swear that this shall not be in vain. Out of this and from the suffering and sorrow of those who mourn this will come, we promise, the birth of a new freedom for the sons of men everywhere.

Semper Fidelis

The Great War, The War to End All Wars, The First World War, but especially The Ultimate Infantry War

2010-09-13T08:37:00.006-04:00

Many scholars, including myself, spent many years carefully avoiding much of what had been written about the First World War. After all, what could you learn about a muddy bloodbath in which armies of lions were led by donkeys as line after line of infantry marched blindly into massed rows of machine guns?

Of course, in recent years we have discovered that there is actually a great deal to learn from study of the Great War as both revisionists and counter-revisionists conducted new research, old manuscripts and books were rediscovered, and a more thorough and professional study and analysis of the subject emerged. This re-assessment came with new attention to first hand material – the memoirs written by the actual combatants.

I have three such works on my shelf and recently read them as a part of a study of the changing life and evolving times of the modern (20th and 21st Century) infantryman. Two are the memoirs of British officers and the third is an English translation of a German officer’s memoirs. I strongly recommend always reading sources from both sides of any battle, campaign, war, or conflict as the best possible way to get a complete and well rounded understanding of the subject. While none of these fully reflects the experience of the enlisted soldier, as officers their authors are in a better position to tell us not only what happened but what was supposed to have happened.

Good-bye to All That, Robert Graves, © 1985 Robert Graves, Anchor Books Edition, 1998, New York, ISBN: 0-385-09330-6

A Passionate Prodigality, Guy Chapman, © 1966 Guy Chapman, Fawcett Publications, Greenwich,

The Storm of Steel, From the Diary of a German Storm-Troop Officer on the Western Front, Ernst Jünger, 1996 printing, Howard Fertig, New York

Robert Graves served as a rather un-regular Army officer in a very regular army battalion of the Royal Welch Fusiliers. Guy Chapman was one of Kitchener’s New Army volunteers in a wartime battalion of The Royal Fusiliers. As a result, the two memoirs reflect the differing attitudes and atmosphere between these two British Army communities and their sometimes-strained relationship. Ernst Jünger served in the 73rd Hanoverian Fusiliers. The Hanoverians were a regular army regiment though not Prussians. The 73rd Hanoverian Fusiliers, in fact, wore a “Gibraltar” battle ribbon on their coat sleeves commemorating their role as one of the defenders of that British outpost during the period of the American Revolution when both realms were under the rule of the House of Hanover. This gave them a peculiar relationship with their British foe and offered British Army personnel a surprise either on the battlefield or when encountering Hanoverian prisoners or captors.

Graves was a prolific novelist, poet, and translator, which is reflected in particular in this memoir by its treatment of his life both before and after the war and his many encounters with other British literary figures in and out of the Army. Chapman, who would go on to a writing career of his own as a historian and publisher, concentrates more on the war and his experiences in it. The former entered the war directly from school at about the age of 20 while the latter was in his mid-20s. Their initial experiences of army life were fairly similar as they completed officers’ training and then fulfilled various brief temporary duty billets before finally reporting to their respective regiments in France.

Both memoirs are replete with detailed accounts of battle and descriptions of life in the trenches, every bit as harrowing and at times monotonous as we might expect, as well as those often extended interludes behind the lines. Many of these anecdotes and episodes will not belie the traditional view of the war as one of bloody, mindless slaughter in the mud – but both officers also describe their efforts and the efforts of their superiors (at most levels) to try and find other, new ways of war that would protect the lives of the men under their charge (and their own for the front line officers as the deaths among the officer ranks are more frequently reported in detail).

Ernst Jünger, by contrast to our two British amateurs, was an accomplished soldier as well as subsequently successful author, earning Germany’s highest decoration – the Pour le merite – for his First World War service. He was a leader of the "storm trooper" assault formations that were critical to Germany's late war successes, though he does not go in to great detail on their training. He was also a recognized conservative and nationalist, though one who was never comfortable with or reconciled to the Nazis and their regime. Nevertheless, these war memoirs were very popular in both Weimar and Nazi Germany, with their air of youthful ardor and emphasis upon the manly martial virtues.

All three books capture the boredom of trench life and its punctuating moments of terror, as well as the frenzied ennui of life behind the trenches, usually soothed by alcohol. Jünger makes a particular emphasis upon the amount of drink consumed during these rear area respites from the horrors of war, but all three authors make it clear that Post-traumatic Stress was not an unknown reality during the First World War.

Fathers and Sons, Flags and Soldiers

2010-07-25T13:33:00.002-04:00

In keeping with my recently established theme, there is another not so recently published book that speaks eloquently about the experiences of the American infantryman during World War II – in this instance primarily the experiences of the Marine rifleman in the Pacific theater. I avoided reading James Bradley’s “Flags of Our Fathers” for years because I underestimated both this book and the author. I claimed the historian’s skepticism of an unknown author writing on a topic of which I already knew a good deal from my own studies (including the controversy and allegations that the photo was posed), and more personally I expected a sentimental and even emotionally overwrought tale of father-son bonding left too late. I think that in admitting my error I can safely claim that at least I have only rarely been this wrong about something. Read this book.

James Bradley has presented us in “Flags of Our Fathers” with what is in fact a rather complex work. It is the story of a son reaching out to know more of the untold story of a father, it is a military history of one of our bloodiest battles in one of our bloodiest conflicts – the war with Japan that crossed the Pacific Ocean and back, it is the story of how the experience of war and close combat can and does effect men and in turn their families, it is the story of the power of an image and how we relate to that powerful image individually and as a society or as institutions within that society. As a historian, I enjoyed Bradley's ability to work with documents, people, places, and the artifacts of war to present as complete an account as possible of a moment in history – tracing back to its earliest roots and carrying the story forward to examine its lasting impact on individuals and even the nations represented.

As in the other theaters of war that we place together in that intellectual box we label World War II, combat in the Pacific was not a constant unchanging reality. The fighting on Guadalcanal, in the Philippines, on Tarawa, and on Iwo Jima, for example, shared only the reality of men fighting and dying. Bradley’s narrative does a good job of identifying and discussing this evolution that in simplest terms went from fighting off banzai charges to the hard slog of digging a hidden enemy out of his bunkers, caves, spider holes, and trenches – an enemy whose from was invisible even as he laid down a deadly fire with every weapon at his disposal. The author also places this experience of the ground war in its proper context within a war that called upon the full range of combined arms – artillery, tanks, naval gunfire, and aircraft – to which was ultimately added a new, ultimate weapon in the atomic bomb.

Flags of Our Fathers, by James Bradley, (c) 2000 James Bradley and Ron Powers, Bantam, New York

The Universal Soldier – the mud-rain-frost-and-wind boys of the infantry

2010-07-10T20:23:00.003-04:00

Having recently written a blog about books on tanks and armored vehicles, my more recent readings have focused on the infantry, so I will now present several postings on books on the subject. (And don’t worry tread heads and tankisti, I will return to the subject of tanks for I am also fond of the great metal monsters myself.)

Ultimately, every individual who goes to war is an infantryman (or infantrywoman where applicable and accepted) for the individual soldier and his personal weapon is the fundamental building block of the military. The lot of an infantry soldier of any army of any period of history is recognizable to any of his counterparts, comrades, or foes who are also infantry. Some years ago, a colleague shared a text that illustrates this point as it describes the lot of an Egyptian infantryman (it was reportedly used as a practice text for Egyptian scribes learning their art and perfecting their craft):

Come, [let me tell] you the woes of the soldier, and how many are his superiors: the general, the troop-commander, the officer who leads, the standard-bearer, the lieutenant, the scribe, the commander of fifty, and the garrison-captain. They go in and out in the halls of the palace, saying: "Get laborers!" He is awakened at any hour. One is after him as [after] a donkey. He toils until the Aten sets in his darkness of night. He is hungry, his belly hurts; he is dead while yet alive. When he receives the grain-ration, having been released from duty, it is not good for grinding.

He is called up for Syria. He may not rest. There are no clothes, no sandals. The weapons of war are assembled at the fortress of Sile. His march is uphill through mountains. He drinks water every third day; it is smelly and tastes of salt. His body is ravaged by illness. The enemy comes, surrounds him with missiles, and life recedes from him. He is told: "Quick, forward, valiant soldier! Win for yourself a good name!" He does not know what he is about. His body is weak, his legs fail him.

When victory is won, the captives are handed over to his majesty, to be taken to Egypt. The foreign woman faints on the march; she hangs herself [on] the soldier's neck. His knapsack drops, another grabs it while he is burdened with the woman. His wife and children are in their village; he dies and does not reach it. If he comes out alive, he is worn out from marching.
Be he at large, be he detained, the soldier suffers. If he leaps and joins the deserters, all his people are imprisoned. He dies on the edge of the desert, and there is none to perpetuate his name. He suffers in death as in life. A big sack is brought for him; he does not know his resting place.

The American GIs, whom Ernie Pyle referred to as “the mud-rain-frost-and-wind boys,” would recognize themselves and their lot in the lament of this ancient predecessor. Ernie was with and reported on the GIs in North Africa, Italy, and France and then moved on to report on the war in the Pacific. He was killed on April 18, 1945 by a Japanese machine gun on the small island of Ie Shima near Okinawa. Perhaps the most indicative comment on how well Ernie Pyle told the story of the American infantryman of World War II came from the soldiers themselves for they posted a sign board on Ie Shima bearing the following words: “At this spot, the 77th Infantry Division lost a Buddy, Ernie Pyle, 18 April 1945.”

You can read what Ernie Pyle wrote about the American soldier in the two published collections of his wartime columns. Since these were meant for newspaper syndication, Ernie did clean things up a little bit for the home front audience but you can still get a sense of what it was like from his writing and I highly recommend them.

This presents Ernie’s columns from the North African campaign, Algeria to Tunisia.

Here is Your War by Ernie Pyle, Consolidated Book Publishers, Chicago, 1944 © 1943, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York

The second volume presents Ernie’s columns from Sicily (June-September, 1943), Italy (December, 1943-April, 1944), and France (June-September, 1944) including a column actually written while he was in the Pacific as the war in Europe ended but that was not published. It was found when he was killed and not printed because its tone was considered too depressing at the time.

Brave Men, by Ernie Pyle, Bison Books Edition, University of Nebraska Press, © 2001, University of Nebraska Press (originally published 1944, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York)

There are other memoirs relating experiences of GIs that should be easy to track down. However, one of the best and now a classic standard work for those studying the WWII GI was written by an infantry officer:

Company Commander, Charles B. MacDonald, Ballantine Books, New York, © 1947 Charles B. MacDonald.

In September, 1944, at the age of 22, the author took command of Company I, an infantry company of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division. He was wounded in January, 1945 and after two months convalescence was placed in command of a different infantry company, which he led until the end of the war in Europe. He received the Silver Star and the Purple Heart. His memoirs describing this experience were first published in 1947 but have remained available ever since. This book is widely considered a classic text for the study of command in the 20th Century and especially the American Army of the Second World War. After the war, MacDonald would rise to become Deputy Chief Historian at the Army Center for Military History at his retirement in 1979. Highly recommended.

Roll Me Over, An Infantryman’s World War II, by Raymond Gantter, Ivy Books, New York, © 1997 The Estate of Raymond Gantter.

Ray Gantter was a 30 year old draftee, after turning down his third draft deferment. As a result, he his jobs playing jazz piano and working as a program manager for a Syracuse New York radio station to join the army as a private, becoming an acting squad leader, and then acting buck sergeant, serving with the 1st Infantry Division where he earned the Silver Star and a battlefield commission. This book is based upon the wartime journal he kept from September 1944 to the end of the war and which he turned into a book manuscript in June 1949. The author’s wartime experiences covered northern France, Belgium, the Bulge, Germany, and finally Czechoslovakia. He also intersperses his descriptions of combat with discussions of the soldier’s daily life and its more mundane and less dramatic aspects. Recommended.

Night Drop, The American Airborne Invasion of Normandy, S.L.A. Marshall, © 1962 S.L.A. Marshall, published in 1962 by The Battery Press, Inc, Nashville, and in 1984 by Jove/The Berkeley Press, New York.

This work differs from the others discussed because it is neither a memoir nor autobiographical, and covers only one single combat operation rather than a longer period of the war. Noted military historian S.L.A. Marshall, Brigadier General, USAR, (ret.), based this book on the after action reports and his interviews with participants in the operation to tell the story of the American Airborne (parachute and glider) assaults in Normandy. Critics and scholars have found fault with some of Marshall’s work and you can find a great deal of material on that debate elsewhere on the internet and in the academic journals. Nevertheless, this is still a harrowing account of the confusion, chaos, courage, and desperation that surrounded the American paratroopers and glider troops in the D-Day operation. Recommended, with a caveat that Marshall’s methods as used in researching for this work have been challenged in connection with other books by him.

Tanks for the Memories -

2010-02-10T16:52:00.002-05:00

While humans have toyed with armored vehicles of one kind or another it seems since they first invented vehicles, the tank as a modern armored vehicle is only now approaching its centenary. So, with that 100th anniversary to look forward to, I have pulled a few of my own favorite books on tanks off the shelves and compile this list of recommended volumes on those marvelous machines. [Not all of the books on my shelves relating to tanks made the cut, but that is a reflection of just how many books on the subject there are, so I hope that at least some of you will find my contributions and comments useful.]

Tank Facts and Feats, A record of Armoured Fighting Vehicle Achievement, edited and compiles by Kenneth Macksey. © Guinness Superlatives Limited 1973. New York, The Two Continents Publishing Group, Ltd. ISBN 0-8467-0006-9.

Although a bit dated by its 1973 publication date, this remains one of the most useful single volume references on the history of tanks and armored fighting vehicles, so I recommend you seriously consider picking this up if you are interested in the subject. Also, if anyone knows of a more recent similar volume, I would be glad to hear of it – and if they don’t, then a shout out to aspiring experts on the subject to get cracking on a modern equivalent work!

King of the Killing Zone, by Orr Kelly. (c) 1989 by Orr Kelly. Berkley Books, New York. ISBN 0-425-12304-9.

The King of the Killing Zone refered to in the title is the M-1 Abram Main Battle Tank, and herein the author tells the tale of the two decades spent by the US to get it. This includes the wrong turns, bad decisions, and how it finally turned out a right. A tour-de-force description of how the USG's defense procurements can go wrong and can go right.

Death Traps, The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II, by Belton Y. Cooper. © 1998 by Belton Y. Cooper. Ballantine Books, New York. ISBN 0-89141-814-8.

The author, Belton Y. Cooper, served with the 3rd Armored Division Maintenance Battalion as a liaison officer whose duties took him back and forth across the battlefield to identify and arrange the recovery of damaged tanks and other vehicles belonging to 3rd Armored. As a result he saw a great deal more of both the results of front line combat and of how US tank crews responded to the conflict and to the challenges of meeting German veterans in the vulnerable Shermans. This is an outstanding book and a must read for anyone wanting to know how tanks actually functioned in World War II Europe. This was originally published in hardback by Presidio Press.

Flame Thrower, by Andrew Wilson. © 1956 by Andrew Wilson. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-24533-3.

I believe that this is possibly a unique account of the British Army’s Churchill Mk VII Crocodile flamethrower tanks of World War II. Andrew Wilson was an officer and Crocodile tank commander with the 141st Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps (The Buffs), serving in Normandy up to the end of the war along the Rhine.

With Pennants Flying, The Immortal Deeds of the Royal Armoured Corps, David Masters. 1943, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London.

As you can see, this 1943 volume focuses upon the early war experiences of British tank crews first in France, then Greece, Crete, Burma, the Dieppe raid, and in North Africa. Since it is the story of the whole of the Royal Armoured Corps, it includes information on various British tank units during this part of the war and a great many insights on the early lessons of tank warfare.

The Gods Were Neutral, Major Robert Crisp. © 1960 by Robert Crisp. Ballantine Books, New York.

Brazen Chariots, An Account of Tank Warfare in the Western Desert November-December 1941, by Robert Crisp. © 1959 by Robert Crisp. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-24163-X

Although the latter work was published first, together these two volumes cover Robert Crisp’s war service in the 3rd Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment in North Africa, Greece, Crete, and again in North Africa from January 1941 to the end of the year. He began this interval in the A-10 and then A-13 Cruiser tank s and ended it in the M3 Light Cavalry Tank popularly called Honeys or Stuarts. Both books abound with excellent tactical level details and insights into the tank fighting of this period.

The Golden Carpet, Somerset de Chair. © 1945 by Somerset de Chair. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-29580-2.

This is a firsthand account of the little known (at least in the US) and oft-forgotten 1941 invasion of Iraq via Syria, by 750 men of His Majesty’s Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards and of the Arab Legion under John Glubb Pasha – already becoming the stuff of legend. This mixed force traveling in heavy and light trucks, armed at most with machine guns, escorted by eight Royal Air Force Rolls Royce armored cars, supported by 2 pounder anti-tank guns, bested Iraqi police elements and a German supported Iraqi Army of 40,000 troops defending Baghdad in a one month campaign. The author was a Royal Horse Guards 2nd Lieutenant serving as intelligence officer to Brigadier Joe Kingstone who commanded “Kingcol” as the entire force was called. After taking Baghdad, they then turned back to take on French and Syrian troops at Palmyra, Syria that were loyal to Vichy France.

By Tank into Normandy, A Memoir of the Campaign in North-West Europe from D-Day to VE Day, Stuart Hills. © Stuart Hills 2002. Cassell, London. ISBN 0-304-36640-4.

The author served as an officer in the Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry from the D-Day landings on Gold Beach to VE Day which found him across the River Wesser heading for Hamburg. Stuart Hill was a crewmember and tank commander on Sherman tanks, including the Sherman DD (Duplex Drive) swimming tanks built specifically for the invasion. From this vantage point, he offers a good many tactical and technical insights into the challenges facing Allied Sherman tanks confronted by superior German Mark V Panthers and Tiger tanks, as well as the deadly 88 mm guns frequently deployed in anti-tank roles.

The Game is Afoot: Advice from The Sage of Baker Street for Intelligence Analysts and Television Pundits

2010-01-07T17:10:00.003-05:00

While the world has been preoccupied with underwear bombers and other modern horrors, I went to see the latest incarnation of Sherlock Holmes in the new movie starring Robert Downey, Jr. This is not the first time that the great detective has been reshaped for a new generation, though rarely as dramatically as in this version (anyone remember The 7 Percent Solution). I was nevertheless gratified to recognize elements of the canon in the new film, including the “patriotic V.R.” bullet-hole monogram in his Baker Street flat. While much attention has been given to this new athletic ‘action-man’ portrayal, I also enjoyed the reference to the detective’s intellectual side as he called for “data” that would enable him to attack the ongoing mystery.

Reading the adventures of Sherlock Holmes was my earliest introduction to the disciplined use of reason and logic. These lessons, in addition to other more formal instruction, later proved valuable during a career that included several tours of duty as an analyst either in Washington or overseas, whether the problem was diagnosing local politics or analyzing the international gray/black market trade in missile technology and other sensitive advanced technologies and hardware. For example, it was Holmes who first introduced me to Occam’s razor, though he didn’t so identify it at the time: “How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?” Holmes was so fond of this bit of advice that he actually stated it twice in the same adventure, The Sign of the Four, “Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth.”

In A Study in Scarlet, Holmes responds to Watson’s observation, as their cab carries them to the scene of a possible investigation, that Holmes didn’t seem “to give much thought to the matter in hand.” The world’s first consulting detective replied, “No data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.” Watching the recurring appearances by expert talking heads on the television news and commentary programs revealed that far too many of these individuals had forgotten that bit of advice. Speculation runs rampant and the sound bite rules as they ignored Holmes’s further cautionary advice that “It is an error to argue in front of your data. You find yourself insensibly twisting them round to fit your theories.”

As a public service, therefore, I offer some additional bits of Sherlockian wisdom from my own small collection in the hopes that analysts, pundits, experts, and the general reader will benefit.

“…I make a point of never having any prejudices and of following docilely wherever fact may lead me…” The Reigate Squires. [Don’t prejudge where the information will lead you before you have accumulated the information necessary to support a conclusion.]

“One should always look for a possible alternative and provide against it. It is the first rule of criminal investigation.” The Adventure of the Black Peter. [In other words, always look for possible alternative explanations of the available data.]

“When you follow two separate trains of thought, you will find some point of intersection which should approximate the truth.” The Disappearance of Lady Frances Carfax. [Evidence is always subject to multiple interpretations or explanations, but as you accumulate additional evidence the correct interpretation emerges.]

“Who is it that profits by it?” The Naval Treaty. [A rephrasing of the classical cui bono? Answer the question of who benefits or profits most directly from an action, event, or outcome and you always have the starting point for your analysis or investigation, and sometimes, it will also give you the end point.]

And the most famous of all, “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” “That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes. The Silver Blaze. [A reminder never to examine an event or incident in isolation, but to remember that it is but one moment on a time line that strings together a series of events or incidents and to look for how they are connected or fail to be connected. In this instance, it was presumed that a stranger had entered the farm – but if it had been a stranger, why didn’t the dog bark at him? And if the dog didn’t bark at this “intruder” could the “intruder” in fact not have been a stranger to the dog and thus it didn’t bark at him.]

Of course, neither Sherlock Holmes nor Dr. Watson would concede that simply reading the great detective’s adventures would enable anyone to fully absorb his methods and achieve anything like his degree of success. Nevertheless, anyone interested in learning how to be an intelligence analyst (or perhaps even to play at one on television) or anyone wanting to brush some rust of their analytical skills now has some basic concepts with which to start. But both critics and advocates of Holmes’ methods must remember that not even Sherlock Holmes cracked every case nor captured every miscreant or criminal.

Corporals' Guards, Sergeants' Wars, and Field Marshal's Batons

2009-12-04T16:08:00.002-05:00

President Obama has made his decision regarding Afghanistan and shared it with the American People (after briefing President Karzai and our allies). In simplest terms, he will use U.S. and Allied forces, and available Afghan forces, to push back against recent gains made by Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies. The hope is that these efforts will buy time during which the Kabul government’s police, army, and other security forces can built up enough to at least begin to take on the responsibility of prevent the rebirth of Al Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan. Confronted by dwindling popular support in the US for this conflict after almost nine years, the President is calling for these government forces to start taking over that mission in some 18 months, allowing for the beginning of a withdrawal of US and Allied (at least combat) forces within three years.

This is an operational model that has been used before and has no guarantee of success. The plan depends upon several critical factors:

Enough battlefield success to sustain US popular support over the life of this operation (and to support the necessary fiscal expenditures during a time of economic hardship at home).
The degree of support and participation by our NATO and other Allies will be a critical factor here since the lack of such support will immediately raise questions about why the US is shouldering the burden alone.
The preservation, at least, and preferably the development of greater popular support in Afghanistan for the Karzai government in Kabul. [The history of Afghanistan repeatedly shows that governments popularly perceived as having been imposed by outside powers do not last long against traditional clan and tribal and today Mujahidin leadership.]
The successful expansion and improved effectiveness of Kabul’s own forces as the currently 95,000 man Afghan army is increased to 240,000 by 2013, and the 92,000 man police force grows to 160,000.
Continued and effective efforts by Pakistani forces to prevent the use of its territory as a secure ‘rear area’ by forces fighting against the US-led coalition/Kabul government forces.

As difficult as it will be to achieve goals one, two, and four, the toughest challenge may well be the effective expansion of the Afghan’s own security forces. The major challenge of this effort is the need to identify, recruit, and train the non-commissioned officers (corporals and sergeants) who make up the backbone of 20th Century armies based upon our own experience throughout that century and into the present conflict.

The US has experienced this kind of expansion of its own forces several times in history. On January 1, 1861, the United States Army consisted of 16,367 men (1,704 of whom were absent from duty). On May 1, 1865, after the surrender of the Confederacy and its armies, the United States Army (counting both Regulars and Volunteers) numbered 1,000,516 men (202,709 of whom were recorded as absent from duty). Under President Lincoln’s leadership, the US Army had increased to more than 60 times its pre-war size. A critical element of that expansion was the necessity of identifying men to fill the non-commissioned ranks of this rapidly growing army – each 1,000 man Civil War Union Army regiment included more than 130 sergeants and corporals in that number – meaning that the Army as a whole needed 130,000 non-commissioned officers.

The Army manuals of the period, from which most of the newly minted Union Army officers learned their trade, encouraged the selection of NCOs for the regiment from among the ranks of what were called “intelligent soldiers,” i.e., men who demonstrated more awareness and understanding of what needed to be done and when as compared to those many soldiers who simply awaited orders. These NCOs also had to be able to read and write to fulfill the full range of their duties and many of them rose into the officer ranks as the war continued.

With changes in war and warfare since then, standards for and what is expected of NCOs has risen considerably. Historian Michael Doubler in his Closing With The Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, described how American Generals called the urban warfare encountered by US troops in Europe in 1944 and 1945 “a corporal’s war.” This reflected the reality that in warfare in an urban setting, the battle was fought and decided by the decisions of the corporals leading sections of men as they fought street by street, building by building, and room by room – not a style of warfare in which divisions, corps, and armies and their commanding generals could affect the outcome as effectively.

Most of the fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan is in many ways similar as both of these wars are fought by small units operating in patrols or manning outposts, rather than by the grander formations of battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies usually depicted by those big arrows on the maps. The burden of leading these new Afghan army and police units into the hills and onto the streets of Afghanistan will fall to the newly trained NCOs [and junior officers - lieutenants and captains], but most of them will have only a little bit more (if any more) training than the men they are leading. The US attempted something similar with “Vietnamization” during the conflict in Vietnam, with well known results.

So many of the Emperor Napoleon's Marshals and senior General officers had served in the ranks of the non-commissioned officers of the old French Royal Army that it was said that in his Grande Armee the corporals marched with a Field Marshal's baton in their knapsacks. It will be critical in Afghanistan for a sufficient number of its recruits and soldiers carry corporals' and sergeants' stripes in their packs, pockets, or persons.

Veteran's Day - November 11, 2009

2009-11-10T21:54:00.003-05:00

Grass

Pile the bodies high at Austerlitz and Waterloo.

Shovel them under and let me work--

I am the grass; I cover all

And pile them high at Gettysburg

And pile them high at Ypres and Verdun.

Shovel them under and let me work.

Two years, ten years, and passengers ask the conductor:

What place is this?

Where are we now?

I am the grass.

Let me work.

Carl Sandburg

“It Feels a Shame to Be Alive”

It feels a shame to be Alive—
When Men so brave – are dead—
One envies the Distinguished Dust—
Permitted—such a Head—

The Stone—that tells defending Whom
This Spartan put away
What little of Him we—possessed
In Pawn for Liberty—

The price is great—Sublimely paid—
Do we deserve –a Thing—
That lives—like Dollars—must be piled
Before we may obtain?

Are we that wait—sufficient worth—
That such Enormous Pearl
As life—dissolved be—for Us—
In Battle’s—horrid Bowl?

It may be—a Renown to live—
I think the Men who die—
Those unsustained—Saviours—
Present Divinity—

Emily Dickinson

Mesopotamia

1917

They shall not return to us, the resolute, the young,
The eager and whole-hearted whom we gave;
But the men who left them thriftily to die in their own dung,
Shall they come with years and honour to the grave?

They shall not return to us, the strong men coldly slain
In sight of help denied them from day to day;
But the men who edged their agonies and chid them in their pain,
Are they too strong and wise to put away?

Our dead shall not return to us while Day and Night divide—
Never while the bars of sunset hold.
But the idle-minded overlings who quibbled while they died,
Shall they thrust for high employment as of old?

Shall we only threaten and be angry for an hour?
When the storm is ended shall we find
How softly but how swiftly they have sidled back to power
By the favour and contrivance of their kind?

Even while they soothe us, while they promise large amends,
Even while they make a show of fear,
Do they call upon their debtors , and take counsel with their friends,
To confirm and re-establish each career?

Their lives cannot repay us—their death could not undo—
The shame that they have laid upon our race.
But the slothfulness that wasted and the arrogance that slew,
Shall we leave it unabated in its place?

Rudyard Kipling

To the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade

Say of them

They knew no Spanish

At first, and nothing of the arts of war

At first,

How to shout, how to attack, how to retreat

How to kill, how to meet killing

At first,

Say they kept the air blue

Grousing and griping,

Arid words and harsh faces. Say

They were young;

The haggard in a trench, the dead on the olive slope

All young. And the thin, the ill and the shattered,

Sightless, in hospitals, all young.

Say of them they were young, there was much they did not

Know,

They were human. Say it all; it is true. Now say

When the eminent, the great, the easy, the old,

And the men on the make

Were busy bickering and selling,

Betraying, conniving, transacting, splitting hairs,

Writing bad articles, signing bad papers,

Passing bad bills,

Bribing, blackmailing,

Whimpering, meaching, garroting,--they

Knew and acted

understood and died.

Or if they did not die came home to peace

That is not peace.

Say of them

They are no longer young, they never learned

The arts, the stealth of peace, this peace, the tricks of fear;

And what they knew, they know.

And what they dared, they dare.

Genevieve Taggard

Fight the Battle, Not the Game

2009-10-26T10:14:00.002-04:00

In his discussion of the desirable attributes for a battlefield commander, Clausewitz wrote of the importance of “coup d’oiel” – perhaps best described as the ability to quickly recognize a truth that would ordinarily be missed or perhaps only perceived after long study and reflection. Whatever his other virtues, President Obama’s approach to his decision about what to do in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that he is not choosing to rely on any personal sense of coup d’oiel in this instance. Given that we are already in October and what Clausewitz would have called the campaigning season is nearly over in Afghanistan, this deliberative process need not be considered a fatal flaw.

This morning (October 26), the Washington Post and other news sources are reporting that Obama’s deliberative process has included at least two war games exploring different US troop commitment levels. Given that the history of war gaming as a tool of military study and analysis (as well as an entertainment) is strewn with tales of political and military decision-makers mislead by war games, one can only hope that the decision makers have actually heard the cautionary voices of any professionals associated with these games.

In the most infamous war game incident, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) tried out its plan for the attack on the island of Midway in a war game in which the “American” side sank four JN aircraft carriers. The game directors restored the four carriers to the IJN side and the game proceeded to the anticipated Japanese victory. However, as naval historians and others will recall, at the actual Battle of Midway, the US Navy – aided by its ability to read Japanese communications – did go on to sink four IJN carriers and turn back the invasion force. (Many tellers of this story fail to point out that the game directors were not wrong in restoring the carriers because every war game has a whole list of questions to examine and in this case the game had to go on to examine them. The error would have been in the IJN failing to take note of the fact that the USN was still a potentially dangerous foe.)

However, this story also reflects a harsh reality about war games as an analytical tool – no matter how much data is piled up and analyzed for inclusion in the game, the war game is not predictive or prescriptive. A well planned and well conducted war game can clarify issues associated with a proposed course of action, but it cannot guarantee a specific real world outcome. In fact, the Prussian Kriegsspiel, a common ancestor of modern war games was no more than a tool that allowed Prussian officers to practice decision-making. It was not considered a valid or useful tool of analysis or for predicting the outcome of a military operation or campaign. (History also tells us, however, that even the Prussians would eventually attach almost mystical faith in their war gaming of various military plans and options.)

There are several reasons for limits upon what war games can tell us. One can be described in a paraphrase of the words of Chief of the General Staff Count Helmut von Moltke – “No war game scenario survives contact with the war gamer.” Or in the words of many a modern field grade American officer, “The enemy gets a vote.” No matter how well educated, informed, and talented they are, the war gamer will not exactly replicate the battlefield decisions that will be made by the real opponent. I know that many hobby and professional war gamers have designed a war game or a war game scenario only to find their expectations for that design shredded by the completely unforeseen and unexpected decisions of a war gamer seeing it for the first time.

Designers of (both hobby and professional) war games are familiar with the limits upon any attempt to model battlefield reality. Every one of them can tell of having presented the latest and most complex simulation to date, only to have someone point out how the design overlooks the extremely important factor of “X.” The reality is that there are just too many factors affecting and influencing a battle and its related decision making process to be captured in any war game.

I do wonder whether these war games factored in what is likely to be the real “schwerpunkt” or decision point of any renewed or expanded American military effort in Afghanistan: American public opinion. The Administration will have to do a very good job of selling its Afghan war strategy to the American people if it is to be given time for that strategy to bear fruit. Clearly, ongoing events in Iraq will color popular reaction to plans for Afghanistan. The US has the option to try and push the reset button in Afghanistan but they will not be able to reset public opinion on the conflict in Afghanistan without the investment of major political assets.

Note: Similar stories can be found about the use of war games during World War II by the German High Command as it pondered decisions on the Eastern Front. In a related note, it is ironic that as the Allies began the D-Day invasion of France at Normandy, many senior German commanders were out of position because of a scheduled German Army kriegsspiel on the subject of a possible Allied invasion.

A Rock and a Hard Choice

2009-09-24T22:27:00.003-04:00

Last week the CATO Institute held its conference on the subject of Afghanistan and what the U.S. should do in the ongoing war there. The panel and conference were moderated by Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. Panel members included Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute and co-author of Escaping the 'Graveyard of Empires': A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan; Celeste Ward, Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corp.; Patrick M. Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University; Robert Naiman, National Coordinator, Just Foreign Policy; and Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, and co-author of Escaping the 'Graveyard of Empires'. You can see a podcast of the event at the CATO website. The two most striking points of the conference were the surprising degree of civility and the agreement that we need to do something different in Afghanistan (though without unanimity on what we should do differently) and we needed to start doing this something different soon.

My own thinking on the subject has recently been influenced by Death of a Myth by Bob Snelson on General Custer’s defeat at the Little Bighorn, published in 2005. I was struck by the author’s point that Custer’s battlefield decisions reflected how little he in fact knew or understood (beyond the tactical level) about the Native American peoples against whom he was making war. The army’s objective in this expedition was to attack the Sioux and the Cheyenne until they either moved onto the established U.S. government Indian reservations, or were annihilated. In essence, the U.S. Government had decided to use its military resources to compel these tribes to abandon their traditional way of life and its associated values and mores. Custer knew that the Indians would attempt to evade contact and combat with his force unless they perceived some advantage in fighting or a strong threat to the village and tribe that had to be countered. This understanding appears to be what led Custer to keep dividing his small command in order to cast a wide net that would force the warriors to come out fight.

The conflict between America’s Native peoples fighting to preserve their traditional way of life and an American government determined to see them acculturated or eliminated lasted for decades. It in fact resulted in the destruction of much of the traditional ways of Native Americans while many of the survivors were denied full membership in American society and ended up marginalized in their own homeland.

The United States deployed military forces to Afghanistan in pursuit of Al Qaeda and its Taliban protectors. Having brought down the Taliban regime, the efforts of the U.S. and its Allies moved away from military confrontation with and defeat of residual Taliban and Al Qaeda forces and forces were even removed from Afghanistan and sent to Iraq for the new war there. Our forces and assets remaining in Afghanistan became increasingly focused on social engineering and national building issues with the general ambition of building up a modern western-style nation state – to the detriment of Afghan elements still clinging to the more traditional system based upon clan and tribe. In the view of many Afghans, the U.S. goal is to compel them to abandon their traditions, their religion, and their entire culture.

It is increasingly clear that eight years after U.S. forces arrived in Afghanistan, the American people are unwilling to see the U.S. increase or prolong its commitment of time and resources to further push for any long term reshaping of that country. The Afghans themselves appear at least if not more reluctant to accept the sweeping changes pushed for by the U.S. and its allies, such as the elimination of poppy cultivation and full equality for women, among other things. Against the background of conflict between Al Qaeda/Taliban and the U.S. and its allies, too many Afghans are choosing the former as being less of a threat to traditional values and way of life. We need to decide that our most important objective is to deny Al Qaeda any sanctuary or presence in Afghanistan that would contribute to its terrorist plans and operations. Everything else must be considered a secondary and more long term goal. For the immediate future, the U.S. needs to decide now exactly what resources and forces it can commit and for how long – and adjust its goals accordingly.

Walking the Battle Ground -The Modern Staff Ride

2009-08-25T21:41:00.003-04:00

During the 19th Century, the Prussian Army led the way in the field of military education for its officers and future commanders. The Prussians introduced institutions of formal higher military education, the use of map or terrain table based war games to hone decision-making skills, and they introduced the staff ride – a guided tour of an historical battlefield to included examination and discussion of what happened during the battle fought on that ground and why. This practice is one of the reasons for the existence today of our own National Battlefield and National Historical Parks and Sites maintained by the underfunded National Park Service. Originally intended for the training of America’s military officers, these parks are now part of a larger system intended to introduce the American people and others visiting the United States to the complicated history that created and shaped this nation.

Officers on a military staff ride would be expected to have read about and studied the battle before the ride. During the actual staff ride, the director of the ride might challenge one of the participating officers with a question about what actions he might take to attack or defend a given position on the battlefield, or whether the original attack might have been better executed or supported perhaps resulting in a different outcome. In my experience, there is still no better way to really understand a battle than to visit and walk over the ground upon which it was fought. I am happy to say that I have had the good fortune to be able to personally visit many battlefields, fortifications, castles, etc. during my travels and have been cataloging my collection of such visits on Google Maps: Battlefields, Castles, and Forts I Have Visited.

The importance of terrain and its impact on a battle is an aspect of warfare not often explained to the general public and not easily accessible to those not professional soldiers. Jeff Shaara’s “Killer Angels” included several references to the importance of “good ground” and how it shaped the battle of Gettysburg – highlighted by General George Meade’s question (as a new and still nervous commander of the Army of the Potomac) arriving at the battlefield during the night, “Is this good ground?” meaning, can this army fight and possibly win here against Robert E. Lee? He was quickly assured that, “This is good ground!” There are today a few books that explain how terrain and climate affect military operations, historically and today. These include:

"Military Geography for Professionals and the Public" by John M. Collins (ISBN 1-57906-002-1),

"Battlegrounds, Geography and the History of Warfare" edited by Michael Stephenson (ISBN 0-7922-3374-3), and

"Battling the Elements, Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War" by Harold A. Winters (ISBN 0-8018-5850-X).

I recently viewed a cable TV documentary program on the battle of Antietam that did succeed in illustrating the importance of terrain on a battle and upon the men who are fighting it. A couple of participating researchers and a cameraman stood in the sunken lane position held by Confederate troops. As they watched from this vantage point, a second group of researchers walked towards them along the route followed by Thomas Francis Meagher’s Irish Brigade during its original attack on the lane. Viewers clearly saw the approaching researchers appear and disappear in the undulations and irregularities of the ground which would have protected the advancing Irish from much of the Confederate fire until they were very close. This meant that despite the distance of the open ground they had to cross, the men of the Irish Brigade were actually protected in great degree against Confederate fire by the undulating nature of the ground leading up to the Confederate position in the sunken lane. Such insights into why a battle was fought or ended in a particular way can only be obtained on the actual ground.

The modern day equivalent of the Staff Ride can be achieved with a good guide book or a good guide and some preparation before you visit the battlefield. It is also possible to download complete staff ride guides for a number of U.S. battlefields that have been prepared by the Center for Military History. You can start with a booklet that explains the Staff Ride itself and what goes into the planning of a staff ride called "The Staff Ride." You can also download Adobe pdf versions of the staff ride guide books to several battlefields in the United States from the Army Command and General Staff School website.

The available ones include:
The Battle of Cowpens (South Carolina)

First Bull Run (Virginia)

The Battle of Antietam (Maryland)

The Battle of Balls Bluff (Virginia)

You can also find useful maps for visiting Civil War battlefields at the website of The Civil War Preservation Trust which hosts a collection of maps prepared by the organization. A number of these are even presented on the website with animation and discussion of the battle. The Osprey Campaign Series of books published in the UK and the US are a series of books on wars, campaigns, and battles that include good maps and information useful in walking a battlefield. Also from the UK comes the publication After The Battle “Then and Now” which publishes books and magazine collections of photos showing many battlefields as they appeared in period photographs and images alongside photos of how they appear today (or at least as of the date of publication given how long this magazine has been around).

In addition to the research and reading before the battle, you will want to make sure that everyone dresses appropriately, wears good walking shoes, and has easy access to plenty of water. Many successful staff rides include a planned picnic and/or an evening dinner over which the day’s trip can be discussed further. Optional but often useful items would also include binoculars (or a telescope if you want an idea of how an 18th and many 19th Century generals viewed a battlefield), a compass or handheld GPS receiver that will also give you compass points and bearings.

So, got everything you need? En avance!

Ernie Pyle and the mud-rain-frost-and wind boys – The Poor Bloody Infantry

2009-07-27T07:36:00.002-04:00

This past week I had one of those travel experiences that seems to happen all too often with modern airline travel. However, the fifteen hours I spent shuttling between four airports and two different airplanes gave me an opportunity to read “Ernie’s War: The Best of Ernie Pyle’s World War II Dispatches” compiled and edited by David Nichols. I picked up this book as I left the house for this trip because I had just seen the bio-pic made about Ernie during World War II – “The Story of G.I. Joe” starring Burgess Meredith as Ernie Pyle (based upon Ernie’s first World War II book, “Here is Your War”). I can only say that if you really want to find some insight into the world and the experiences of the infantry soldier, you have to read Ernie’s columns. His World War II writings were compiled into two books – the already mentioned “Here is Your War” recounting his experiences and those of the American G.I.s in North Africa, while “Brave Men” was based upon his reports from his time in Europe. (And by the way, reading of their experiences in war makes the obstacles and challenges of modern air travel fade into at worst minor annoyances!)

I feel a close kinship with the infantry, even though my own limited military training was as an armored scout observer. However, my training company captain may have known something more about the subject than I did at the time. I once in jest asked him why in the age of mechanized infantry (such as my home National Guard unit) we had to walk so much. He explained that in the U.S. Army, being mechanized infantry meant that you got to carry a P-38 (this P-38 being the Army issue can opener essential to opening the tins that our C-rations came in). Having come relatively late in life to reenacting, I find I have come home to the infantry whether it be Billy Yank, Johnny Reb, Tommy Atkins, or G.I. Joe.

Ernie Pyle wrote that “I love the infantry because they are the underdogs. They are the mud-rain-frost-and wind boys. They have no comforts , and they even learn to live without the necessities. And in the end they are the guys that wars can’t be won without.” Ernie Pyle spent much of his time as a war correspondent during World War II with the infantry in Europe and in the Pacific (with the Marines). While he spent time with the other services and branches of our armed forces, his writings make evident his bond with and affection for “the poor bloody infantry” whether G.I.s or Marines.

Years ago, a friend shared with me a short text he had found that also spoke of the infantry that I was reminded of while reading Ernie’s columns. The links between its words and those of Ernie seemed to speak of the universal and eternal experience of the infantry soldier. It was reportedly written as a practice piece for Egyptian scribes learning the art of writing in hieroglyphics, while also serving as a warning of what might befall them if they were not diligent in that practice and failed to win a scribe’s position.

“Come, [let me tell] you the woes of the soldier, and how many are his superiors: the general, the troop-commander, the officer who leads, the standard-bearer, the lieutenant, the scribe, the commander of fifty, and the garrison-captain…..He is awakened at any hour…..His march is uphill through mountains. He drinks water every third day; it is smelly and tastes of salt. His body is ravaged by illness. The enemy comes, surrounds him with missiles, and life recedes from him. He is told: "Quick, forward, valiant soldier! Win for yourself a good name!" He does not know what he is about. His body is weak, his legs fail him…..Be he at large, be he detained, the soldier suffers. If he leaps and joins the deserters, all his people are imprisoned. He dies on the edge of the desert, and there is none to perpetuate his name. He suffers in death as in life. A big sack is brought for him; he does not know his resting place.”

Even in the 21st Century, the poor bloody infantry (in a phrase whose origin is almost as ancient and obscure) constitute the sub-atomic particles of the military machine. Ultimately, each and every individual in uniform with their personal weapon is an infantryman. Any armed force that fails to remember this will find itself at a serious disadvantage when confronted by another force that did not thus fail.

It's Not Just Art Historians That Plague Museums

2009-06-11T21:36:00.007-04:00

I may have left the impression in my last posting that the only problems museums have are with art experts and historians who fail to do proper research on military and war related exhibits. However, the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of American History has had a similar problem now for several years. In the year before it closed for renovations, the Museum unveiled an exhibition called "The Price of Freedom: Americans at War, this presents a survey of America's conflicts and their costs. This exhibition is again on display, unchanged, after these renovations.

An obvious element in such an exhibit would be the American Civil War, described by many historians as the conflict that defined America. The photo included with this article is one that I took earlier this year after the museum was re-opened. I took an almost identical photo before the closure for renovation and attempted to alert museum curators to the errors thus illustrated. Whoever placed the equipment upon the mannequin did it backwards - a fact that as an active reenactor of a Civil War Union soldier immediately struck me when I first visited the exhibit.

The most visible item of equipment is the canteen covered in brown blanket cloth. This is resting on the mannequin's left leg when it should be resting on top of the oilskin cloth haversack and both lying atop the left hip, out the way yet still accessible. The haversack on this mannequin has been reversed from its proper position and can be made out hanging close to the body at the right front.

On the mannequin's left hip, resting approximately where the haversack should be is the black leather cartridge box which would have carried the soldier's rounds of ammunition. This should be resting on the right hip where the soldier can easily use his right hand to reach back, open the pouch, and pluck out a single paper cartridge containing both one bullet and the black powder that when the weapon is fired would propel the bullet towards the chosen target.

The next most important accessory is the cap pouch, a small coin purse sized leather pouch that contains the soldier's percussion caps. After the soldier has poured the black powder down the barrel of his musket, dropped in the bullet, and then used his ramrod to force all of this down to the bottom of his weapon's barrel, he would hold the musket in his left hand while his right hand would reach down to remove a single cap from this pouch which should be just the right side of the buckle of his waist belt. This cap is placed upon the cone or nipple of the musket where it will be struck by the weapon's hammer when the trigger is pulled. The hammer's blow should set off the fulminate of mercury contained in the percussion cap which should create enough of a spark to ignite the black powder already poured down the barrel, firing the weapon. In this instance, the mannequin's pouch is in approximately the right position though the haversack being incorrectly placed just below it makes it difficult to reach.

It would be reasonable to surmise that neither the mannequin nor the curator or individual who kitted out this mannequin was ever dressed down by a sergeant major or any kind of sergeant for being a "slovenly soldier" because their kit was all a scramble. It is not impossible that the individual was using an original image of an actual Civil War Union soldier as a reference aid when placing the equipment on the mannequin. If this is the case, the individual was either unaware or had forgotten that in some forms of photographs or images from this period, the image is in fact a mirror image of the original subject, i.e., backward or reversed so that the real person's right side is on the leftside of the image. The sad result is that the exhibition misinforms the public and leads knowledgable visitors to conclude that the museum is ignorant on this subject and reluctant to admit that fact.

Military Art and the Art of War: Can We Get Art Historians to Study Military History?

2009-05-08T11:22:00.005-04:00

One of my favorite past-times at home or on the road is to visit art galleries in search of artwork that might offer some insights about war, warfare, and its practioners. However, I have learned that these excursions also present the risk of coming within earshot of art museum docents, guides, and experts as they explain the military scenes and subjects depicted, all too often exposing gaps in their knowledge of military history, war, and warfare.

One my first such experiences was at the National Gallery of Art exhibition Winslow Homer in the National Gallery of Art. This exhibit brought together a small selection of works tracing the career of this American artist, including some of his Civil War drawings and paintings. Of particular interest to me was “Home Sweet Home”, depicting two Union Army soldiers in a moment or relaxation in camp. Also in this exhibit was “The Sharpshooter on Picket Duty”. This image first appeared as an engraving in Harper’s Weekly, November 15, 1862. It depicts a Union Army sharpshooter in a tree drawing a bead on a long-range target, a scene captured during McClellan’s Peninsular campaign which sought but failed to capture the Confederate capitol of Richmond, Virginia.

As I was studying the two paintings, a National Gallery guide led a group of visitors into the small gallery. The guide presented a general and not inaccurate description of the two paintings, though he skipped over a number of details that I had found particularly interesting and was clearly not as immersed in the Civil War. He was apparently unaware that the sharpshooter in the painting was an image from the Peninsular campaign and insisted on linking it to the later Battle of Antietam fought in western Maryland, apparently not knowing that Winslow Homer was actually present during the former campaign. As for the campfire scene in the first-named painting, my examination of the canvas quickly convinced me that one of the soldiers had placed his tin cup on the fire to make himself a cup of coffee – something I had myself done as a Civil War Reenactor and Living Historian. I also knew from my study and from my reenacting experience that the Union Army (and most modern reenactors) almost literally ran on coffee.

As the guide continued to examine “Home Sweet Home,” he referred to the tin cup on the fire as a small pot and declared that the soldiers were making stew. At this point I was unable to restrain myself and said loudly enough to be heard by the guide and the small group of visitors that actually the soldier was making himself some coffee in his tin cup. The guide ignored my comment even when I repeated it more briefly, refusing to even acknowledging my existence. I listened a little longer to his discussion of the paintings before leaving the room unacknowledged and apparently unheard, though I surrendered enough to impulse to tell one of the museum guards that “this fellow may know art but he knows next to nothing about the Civil War.”

The National Gallery’s web site presents this painting for online viewing (link above) with a zoom feature that allows the viewer to enlarge details of the image for closer examination. Using this feature I have found that you can actually make out the curve of the top of the handle of the tin cup just above the rim at the back of the cup as it sits on the fire. You can take advantage of this capability to conduct your own examination of the image and draw your own conclusion. I should add, however, that in the catalog for the 1988 San Francisco exhibition Winslow Homer: Paintings of the Civil War there are citations from a number of critics’ comments upon “Home Sweet Home” dating from its first public showing in 1863. Among these, T.B. Aldrich wrote in The New York Illustrated News (16 May 1863) that this work:

“…shows a Federal camp at supper time. The band in the distance is playing ‘Home Sweet Home’ in the immediate foreground are two of the boys, one warming the coffee at the camp fire, and the other dreamily watching the operation….”

More recently I found myself in similar circumstances at the Seattle Arts Museum where I went to see the traveling exhibit Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness: American Art from the Yale University Art Gallery. This is a great exhibit of selected works from the Yale University collections that have been put on the road instead of into storage while their permanent home is undergoing renovations. The exhibition included two works of particular interest: “The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker's Hill,” painted by John Trumbull, and a photograph of unfinished pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg, Virginia, taken during the American Civil War. Examining the placard describing the photograph of the pontoon bridges I found that it referred to the “unsuccessful siege of Fredericksburg,” described as unsuccessful because the bridges were never completed – according to the caption writer. Unfortunately for the Union troops involved, the “siege” actually did succeed as the bridges were completed, the Army of the Potomac crossed the river, and on December 13, 1862, engaged the Confederates entrenched on the heights beyond the town of Fredericksburg. The Civil War Preservation Trust website hosts an excellent presentation on the campaign and battle that goes into detail both on the bridges and the resulting battle.

As disappointing as I found the erroneous caption, it wasn’t until I returned to examine the photo again that I had another of those encounters with a guide. A Seattle Art museum guide was discussing John Trumbull’s painting “The Death of General Warren” (aka “The Battle of Bunker’s Hill”) depicting the battle fought on Breed’s and Bunker’s Hills in Charlestown opposite the city of Boston on 17 June 1775. At the approximate center of the canvas, the American patriot General Warren is lying in the arms of a comrade who is pushing away the bayonet of a British soldier attempting to thrust it into the dying American’s body. That soldier is also restrained by a British officer, Colonel John Small, who reportedly recognized the prominent American rebel and actually called out to him to surrender to avoid being killed in the final moments of the battle.

The guide attributed the British colonel’s act of restraint to a sense of community and kinship between the British and the American colonials. However, other accounts of the battle make it clear that such a sense of kinship was not universally shared among the British. As the leader of the Massachusetts Committee of Public Safety, Warren was a recognized leader among American patriots and his death was welcomed by many British officers. General Gage is reported to have said Warren’s death alone was worth the death of 500 other rebels. Another British officer, Captain Lane, who had been engaged in the running battle between Concord and Lexington and Boston before participating in the repeated assaults on the American positions, boasted that he had happily buried Warren in an unmarked common grave and hoped that he would never be found and identified. Finally, while elaborating on this point, the guide never chose to mention that the artist John Trumbull actually painted this work while in London, England a few years after the revolution and while studying there under the British artist Benjamin West – known for his own dramatic portrayals of British Army victories – a fact that can reasonably be concluded to have had some influence on how John Trumbull chose to portray the British Army on his own canvas.

These experiences have not totally dampened my enjoyment of these military scouting trips in the world of the fine arts. Just recently I toured a now closed National Gallery of Art exhibition – Dutch Cityscapes of the Golden Age – which brought together a collection of 17th century Dutch works focused upon the cities and urban scenes of the then newly independent United Provinces. These presented great views of the extensive fortifications that protected many of these cities from the forces of Spain during their independence struggle. There were also several canvases that presented the Dutch soldiers and militia in full regalia and kit, offering excellent information regarding their armaments, uniforms (such as they were), and even their level of drill and military training. But the sum total of my experience in such excursions is to tread warily when an art expert or even art historian describes for you the details of military history, war, warfare, etc. based upon the art work presented by that expert. Try doing some research of your own or find a military historian or expert on the war or period presented and compare the museum works to what these experts can tell you about the relevant military art.

Note: For the works of Winslow Homer, I have found two especially good sources: Winslow Homer, Paintings of the Civil War, by Marc Simpson with contributions by others, published by The Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco and the publishers Beford Arts, to accompany the 1988 exhibit of the same name (ISBN 0-88401-060-0 paper/ISBN 0-938491-15-6 cloth). For his engravings, I have The Wood Engravings of Winslow Homer, edited by Barbara Gelman, published in 1969 by Crown Publishers (LoC 73-75096).

A Napoleonic Hat Trick: Three Basic Readings on the Life and Career of Napoleon Bonaparte, Europe’s Greatest Soldier

2009-04-22T22:01:00.003-04:00

Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography by Vincent Cronin

The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History’s Greatest Soldier by David G. Chandler

A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars prepared by Brigadier General Vincent J. Esposito and Colonel John Robert Elting

I recently finished reading Vincent Cronin’s Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography and realized that having done so, I now had the answer to a common question of what should you read if you don’t know anything about Napoleon. This biography in combination with the two other works listed above would provide the reader with a basic knowledge of who Napoleon was, what he tried to accomplish in his political and military careers (and personal life), and why in the end he failed.

Published in the early 1970s, I long resisted reading Vincent Cronin's biography because of the work's reputation as too sympathetic to the subject. However, as part of an ongoing reading program on military history I finally picked up Cronin's volume as the first of a series of biographies of Napoleon that I will be reading. Having completed it, I really wonder now how well the others will match up against this book. Cronin is sympathetic to his subject but he does not hide this from the reader and only in the later chapters did I find myself in disagreement or at least questioning his account of Napoleon's intentions, thoughts, and/or feelings.

The author subtitled this "An Intimate Biography" and in a general way he meant it. The work is not limited to or even focused solely upon Napoleon's military career nor to his entanglements with women, but touches upon all aspects of the life of a man who in his 52 years was a soldier, general, head of state, statesman, lawmaker, lover, pater familias to an extended family, and a father several times over. No one aspect of Napoleon's life dominates the narrative but instead each in turn is made the central focus of the story as that part of his life comes to the fore. This is an especially appealing element of Cronin's book given these many varied roles filled by Napoleon.

And yet the word "intimate" does not offer either empty titillation nor guarantee that we are really and completely inside this man's head at any moment. I believe that this reflects the above-mentioned flaw of being too sympathetic to Napoleon Bonaparte. The author often steps forward to declare what Napoleon thought or felt at a particular moment or about a specific subject, issue, or event and yet I found myself resisting these claims. Vincent Cronin provides neither footnotes nor endnotes, though he does offer a section on Sources and Notes that goes chapter by chapter to identify and explain the basis for his statements and conclusions in the text. There is also an interesting and not un-useful essay "Memoir-Writers and Napoleon" that reviews the background and history of the most important and/or frequently used first-person memoirs from Napoleon Bonaparte's contemporaries.

If you are not a military historian and really only wish to read one book about Napoleon Bonaparte, this biography would be an excellent choice - with the understanding up front that you will find herein a favorable and even sympathetic image of a man who during his life inspired bitter and prolonged opposition and even hatred among Frenchmen as well as others in Europe and the world.

. . . . . .

David Chandler’s book is the best single volume English-language military history focused upon Napoleon’s military career. He begins with an introductory essay “Napoleon – The Man and the General: Qualities and Defects” in which the author presents a summary view of Napoleon and sets the stage for the complete work. The rest of the book is a generally chronological account and review of Napoleon’s military career. Chandler starts with Napoleon Bonaparte’s education and early military career, capped by his service in Italy. The chronological narrative is then interrupted by a section presenting Napoleon’s “philosophy of war” and his methods of making war at both the tactical and strategic level including a discussion of the sources and inspirations for these. The author then proceeds to present Napoleon’s entire military career, devoting a section to each conflict or major campaign – always focused upon those theatres in which Napoleon was personally active. (Therefore, theatres such as the Peninsula receive significant attention only for the period in which Napoleon was present.)

The narrative of Napoleon’s military career is rounded out via 10 appendices addressing the orders of battle for the Army of Italy and the Grande Armée of successive campaigns among others, as well as notes on various battles and on the Empire’s aristocrats and a Glossary of Military terms. There are also over 15 pages of end notes and a five page bibliography.

In his treatment of Napoleon Bonaparte, Chandler is not unsympathetic to his subject but is not as uncritical perhaps as Cronin is in his biography. Perhaps this is because a discussion of Napoleon’s military activities is always founded as much on what he actually did and what happened as it is on Napoleon’s explanations of his intentions. This allows both the author and the reader to more readily draw conclusions from the facts rather than from the he-said and then he-said of after the fact memoirs
.
. . . . .

The final contribution to this triad is A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars which presents both a military history and some 169 maps of the campaigns and battles that occurred between France and the other nations of Europe during this period – 1796-1815. This work is focused upon the strategic and what today we call the operational levels of war and therefore its maps only present the engaged armies down to the Corps, division, and occasionally brigade level. However, its comprehensive treatment of Napoleon’s campaigns and battles makes this a unique work in English.

This atlas has appeared in a modified form in more recent years whereas my copy is one the original 1965 edition (Second Printing) examples. However, both versions are in a 13 inches by 10 inches landscape format which gave the editors a good canvas upon which the sketch out the movements of the armies across Europe’s battlefields. The atlas includes a set of biographical sketches of the major military and political figures of the Napoleonic era. There is also a 10 page list of recommended readings in various languages, each accompanied by a one sentence description of that work’s contents and thrust. Although a bit dated today having been compiled in 1965, this list is a useful resource for any scholar, student, or even casual reader who wants to know more about a particular individual, battle, or campaign.

A Review - The First Tithe by Israel Eldad

2009-03-05T20:21:00.002-05:00

The First Tithe, Israel Eldad, translated and with a Foreword and Notes by Zev Golan. Jabotinsky Institute, Israel, 2008. Originally published in Hebrew as Maaser Rishon, © 1950, 1963, 1975 by the author

Israel Eldad was as a member of the three-man Central Command of the underground Lehi organization and its principal ideologue. The publisher of this English version of his memoirs emphasizes Eldad’s shared experiences with figures such as Menachem Begin and Golda Meir, among others, and with underground organizations such as the Irgun and the Hagana. His story includes escape from Nazi-occupied Europe, imprisonment by the British authorities in Palestine, escape from prison, and life in the underground resistance to that British authority while evading recapture until the end of the British mandate and Israel’s independence. Eldad’s account of these experiences has reportedly never before appeared in English.

What author Israel Eldad has presented here, in Zev Golan’s translation into English from the original Hebrew, is neither history nor autobiography, but rather a memoir in a rather classic sense. While generally chronological, Eldad’s narrative is not bound by clock or calendar or limited by objective reality. Rather Israel Eldad tells the story of his life and his work as he recalls it – and as it occurs to him in the telling. He also writes with few concessions to any readership that does not read Hebrew or which might disagree with his views – an attitude that appears consistent with his lifelong struggle to see realized the vision of an independent Jewish state as conceived by him and the Lehi movement. As a result this narrative often challenges but rarely bores the reader.

Eldad’s story is set within Israel’s struggle for independence. That struggle and the subsequent fight for the survival of the young state were first brought to my attention by the 1967 Six Day War. Still in high school at the time, my friends and I immersed ourselves in the details of the dramatic outcome of that remarkable conflict. This interest lead to more reading and research into the historical background of Israel’s existence; the international conflicts, negotiations, and deals; the wars, its military forces and their weapons, the history of persecution, and the Holocaust, etc. This included such modern popular novels as John Hersey’s The Wall and Leon Uris’ Mila 18 both about the Warsaw Ghetto as well as Leon Uris’ Exodus and James Michener’s The Source. I even uncovered in my local library a copy of the White Paper that collected the original memoirs and documents written by the fighters from the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943.

However, I found this a challenging work to read much less to review. It was difficult, not for any fault in the translation, but because of the author’s intent and his statements that made it clear to me that I was not a member of his intended audience. In fact, the deeper I read into the book the more I came to wonder if I wasn’t in fact a part of his “anti-audience” – a member of that community against which he was trying to warn his intended audience. His viewpoints and ideas were frequently at odds with my other sources and my resulting understanding of the historical and political events being described. The challenge was only increased when I read in the publisher’s press release that Israel Eldad was “one of the founding fathers of Israel” but by his own words in the book he rejected this modern state called Israel. Eldad described Israeli independence as the defeat of his Lehi movement which had called for an independent state – a sovereign kingdom of Israel – that incorporated Jerusalem and Jordan, as well as parts of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.

I recognized that Eldad’s narrative conflicted at many points with my previous readings – many of which reflected the attitudes of the British who controlled Palestine or which reflected the views of other more mainstream elements within the Zionist movement and the Jewish diaspora, and the Jewish community in the United States. My initial surprise in this regard centered on the realization that I had long known of Eldad’s Lehi organization under the sobriquet of “the Stern gang,” a label that supports the reader’s dismissal of the group as being of little value and no further interest, clearly reflecting the viewpoint of the British authorities. From this point on, I read with the understanding that I had passed through a looking glass that separated what I had previously understood about Israel from this new perspective on the nation, its people, and its history.

Eldad’s account of his life’s work on behalf of Lehi clearly supports the long-familiar concept – “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” As an ideologue and advocate supporting Lehi’s fighters in the struggle against Britain’s presence in Palestine and against any other apparent or potential restraint or obstacle to the realization of their vision for an independent Jewish state, Eldad conceded little to nothing in the vehemence of his arguments. The fighters of the Lehi movement were responsible for an escalating series of dramatic and bloody attacks upon the British authorities and even the UN, and its ambitions for further attacks were even greater. And while it is important to remember that his words reach us from a vastly different world almost half a century past, I must point out the following passage:

“And if the British Parliament and Buckingham Palace and the Foreign Office have not yet been blown sky high, this is not because we do not want to provoke or anger them, or because we are afraid of the results, but only because our boys in London have not yet submitted the practical plans to us, though they are working on them and we are awaiting for their letters, and we are sending explosives from France to England.”

There is within these words an echo of another conflict more familiar to me and which repeatedly came to mind as I read Eldad’s declarations on behalf of his cause. The last words above call to mind a 19th Century Irish song which promised “that there’ll be rifles in England that don’t come from France” declaring that the long struggle for Irish independence would be taken up in England’s own green fields.

However, these words above have to be read as very ancient and very modern. In our 21st Century post 9-11 world they have to be interpreted literally and cannot be set aside as a mere exercise in agit-prop political rhetoric. Today such a statement would be acted upon by the intelligence and security services (at least most of us would hope so). Even when first written these words must have held similar if less urgent interest for the authorities of the day.

Another parallel between the IRA and Lehi in their relations with British authority is found in Eldad’s account of how his movement’s fighters rejected the right of the British to put them on trial, the legality of their rule in Palestine, and thereby the authority of the British to determine what might or might not constitute illegal activity such as bearing arms. Irish rebels have long taken similar positions up to and including those members of the IRA brought to trial in the 1980s. By Eldad’s account, Lehi and the IRA also shared a common fund-raising technique – bank robbery. Despite Eldad’s explicit rejection of such comparisons, the parallels are further demonstrated by the IRA attack on then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the 1987 Conservative Party conference and the 1979 assassination of Prince Phillip’s uncle Lord Mountbatten. Neither the IRA nor Israel Eldad considered anyone beyond their reach.

According to the publishers, The First Tithe appeared in five editions in the original Hebrew. This first edition to appear in English was released on Israeli Independence Day, May 8, 2008. In addition to translating this work from the original Hebrew, Zev Golan has added endnotes and other explanatory data that make the work more accessible to the non-Israeli reader. While I may regret he expressed decision to drop certain passages that appeared in the Hebrew original because of the difficulty of translating and explaining their references to the Talmud and other source, his efforts to make this work more generally available are to be commended.

Even a single book as dramatic as The First Tithe is unlikely to change the reader’s views or even to result in a deeper understanding of a complex subject. However, a single book can compel the reader to understand that the subject of that work is indeed far more complex and less cut and dried than previously realized. In this, Israel Eldad and Zev Golan have succeeded and I personally have at least advanced to that recognition as a result. If you are interested in a deeper understanding of the situation that confronts us in the Middle East today, you need to read this book.

Christmas Eve, 1915, World War One

2008-12-24T17:44:00.003-05:00

Once again we approach Christmas Eve and Christmas Day with prayers for peace in our hearts and minds and on our lips. It seems to be always this way, but perhaps in 2009 we can make a start towards changing that. Here's a poem from 1915 that seems as relevant today as then. Merry Christmas. Happy Hanakkuh. Peace be with us all in a prosperous New Year in 2009.

Christmas 1915

‘Tis Christmas Eve. In all the camps
There gleam a host of tiny lamps
That make the hill on which I stand
A veritable fairyland.
For friends at home and far away
Have helped us celebrate the day
By sending each and every man
A present of a billycan
Crammed full of wondrous things inside,
You couldn’t guess them if you tried.
Tobacco, socks and butterscotch,
And for some lucky chap, a watch;
Tinned cheese, and ham, and bloater-paste,
Sweet biscuits (which we will not waste),
Toothbrushes, chocolate, lanoline,
Bootlaces, coca, Vaseline,
Stewed fruit, cigars, a Christmas cake,
And writing pad all helped to make
A gift as pleasant to receive
On service as it was to give.
Now the first excitement o’er
And as I listen from the shore,
A wave of song towards me floats
From fairy choirs in fairy boats
Bearing the message of love and praise
And a prayer for purer, better days.
The Spirit of God is hovering there
In the wondrous calm of the still night air,
For the roughest heart has seen again
A vision of peace and goodwill to men.
So here’s to you, good friends and true,
And ‘hands across the oceans blue’;
We wish you all both far and near:
A Happy Christmas, a prosperous New Year!

Sgt Alan J. Kerr
(AWM 1 DRL 397)

Mumbai Mayhem – in the streets and among the pundits

2008-11-28T13:32:00.002-05:00

I’ve already seen a fair amount of speculation bouncing around the internet and over the airwaves about the perpetrators of the latest terror attack in Mumbai (aka Bombay), India. Sherlock Holmes at this point would probably be muttering something about the futility of speculation in the absence of sufficient information – and I would suggest that the majority of these pundits still have insufficient information about a group or organization whose latest (if not first) terrorist operation is still ongoing. Certainly my own stints as an analyst taught me this same kind of caution – which as I expect all analysts know is one of the things that drives your policy-maker/decision-maker customers right up the wall.

All of that said, I personally would dare already to disagree about the sophistication, etc. of this attack, based upon what information we already have available.

In the first instance, the principal weapons used by the terrorists appear to be automatic weapons including AK-47s or at least some variation of the Kalashnikov automatic rifle family. This class of firearm is the entry level weapon for both domestic and international terrorists and can be found just about anywhere around the world. Even my daughter has fired one!

The timing of the operation – apparently dusk or early nightfall – offered the attackers both a somewhat covered approach to their objective(s), especially if they did in fact arrive by boat. It also, in Mumbai, offered them a ‘target-rich’ environment. In such a situation, the presence of a large number of civilians offers numerous advantages to the terrorists:

1) multiple targets – the care of the wounded and the identification of the dead impose a major burden on the responding security forces;

2) potential hostages – the assembled civilians in the targeted streets, hotels, restaurants, etc., included a significant number of foreigners (especially UK, U.S., and even Israeli citizens who we understand already were clearly of greatest interest), but also the significant presence of wealthy and/or prominent Indian citizens;

3) cover and concealment – the presence of a large number of civilians offered the terrorists both a crowd within which to lose themselves and a shield that would impose constraints upon the responding security forces.

The multiple targets raise two somewhat contrary thoughts. The targeting of more than one location resulted in dispersal of the terrorists’ numbers vice concentrating their entire force upon a specific target or targets in close proximity from which the terrorists would be able to support each other against responding security forces. On the other hand, the dispersal of targets and the terrorists spread wider panic and forced the security forces to also spread their responding strength. To my mind, along with the absence of masks or any other concealment of the attackers’ identities, this dispersal also supports that as some pundits have already suggested – this group was fully prepared to die in the execution of this attack having maximized the confusion, panic, and physical damage they could create.

The different attacks were not literally simultaneous, according to the timelines so far appearing from Indian and other media sources, although the coordination is evident. The weapons are pretty much the entry level terrorist arsenal of automatic weapons and grenades, and while I would defer to the Indian soldiers who have discussed this, learning the proper use of these weapons is not that difficult for even the average person (or else armies around the world would look very different than they do.). Even the rubber boats (if in fact part of the operation) are available for recreational use in many places around the world.

The one real surprise is that the terrorists were able to plan this attack and raise and equip the force that carried it out without anyone apparently recognizing that this was coming. The Indian security forces were clearly not prepared to prevent this specific attack or anything like it. That part of the terrorists’ operation was reasonably sophisticated – the rest of their operation reflects tactics that can be learned from any of a number of books readily available in public libraries, online, or even in book stores (I have a number of them on my own shelves). They can also be learned from a number of computer/video combat or shooting games – or even via practice with paintball or similar amusements. There are also a number of online sources for overhead imagery that may have facilitated the planning of the attack – assuming that the terrorists didn’t use the old-fashioned technique of actually walking over the ground and checking out the local streets and alley ways. None of the photos of the terrorists so far shown by the media suggest that any of these individuals would have stood out from the crowd if they had been scouting out the area before the attack.

Pending the receipt of that further information I mentioned above, my money right now is on a the attack being the work of indigenous South Asians (Pakistani and/or Indian Muslims) who have been in contact with Al Qaeda. That contact may have taken any of several forms, but it is entirely possible that no more than one or two members of the responsible group, if that many, has had any direct, personal contact with Al Qaeda or its agents.

Not Quite “The Thunderer” – But Still a Timely Noise

2008-11-17T15:48:00.004-05:00

When I first began seriously reading about military topics, beyond the usual war stories, battle histories, and biographies of the great commanders, I realized that a number of the authors I was reading either were or had been military correspondents for The New York Times. These included names like Drew Middleton, Hanson Baldwin, Leslie Gelb, and later David Halberstam. Their books, while not reflecting a unified theory of war and warfare or even a single arc of the political spectrum, helped me to think about warfare as a more complex phenomenon and to examine the disparate elements of how we go to war and how we make war.

Nevertheless, like many Americans, I have not in recent years looked to The New York Times for advice or useful insights on military matters, preferring the ‘professional’ presses which actually cater to the career military and civilian military intellectuals (many of which you will find referenced elsewhere alongside by blog). So it was with both surprise and great interest that I read the lead editorial in The New York Times Sunday edition of November 16 – “A Military for a Dangerous World.”

The timing of the editorial is clearly inspired by the global urge to give the President-elect the best advice we can offer (and I’m guilty too, having previously offered my two cents). The editorial hits every one of the points that would be evident to and understood by anyone who has been closely following our ongoing wars since 2001 and the toll that these have taken on our military.

The Times endorsed the increase in our ground forces by the 65,000 Army and 27,000 Marine troops now being raised. This will allow the U.S. greater opportunity to rebuild and to retrain units (both in the regular Army and Marines as well as the National Guard and Marine and Army Reserves) overstretched by repeated deployments in theatre.

The Army and Marines in particular, but the other services as well, need to institute training programs that will maintain U.S. dominance in conventional warfare but will also preserve the hard-earned lessons of irregular and counterinsurgency warfare. The irony to me of the recent emphasis on “asymmetric warfare” has been that virtually all warfare is “asymmetric” in that one always tries to pit one’s strength against the enemy’s weakness. The reality is that given U.S. dominance in conventional warfare our potential foes will continue to look for ways to exploit the weaknesses that they can identify (both in our forces and in the political will that commits those forces to combat). We need to prepare our forces accordingly so that they can respond flexibly and effectively. This includes increasing the Navy’s ability to fight in coastal waters as well as in the deep blue sea so beloved of the carrier and submarine admirals.

Mobility has been a critically important principle of war since the days when everybody walked (or rode an animal that usually walked) to the battlefield. Modern warfare (roughly since the 16th Century) has repeatedly demonstrated the importance of “getting there firstest with the mostest” (Bedford-Forrest) and that “Speed is essential. Haste harmful.” (Alexander Vassilyevich Suvorov). However, in today’s world, mobility means airlift (and logistics means sealift). Today, all of our ‘lift’ capability is in need of attention as much of the existing equipment (aircraft and shipping) is worn and possibly inadequate to the challenges of fighting not one but two conflicts on the opposite side of the world. It would probably astonish the average American to learn just how much use has been made by U.S. and Allied forces of the Soviet-designed Antonov 124 cargo jets flying under charter.

As the editorial points out, carrying out these necessary measures will not be cheap but part of the cost can be made up by spending wisely on capabilities that are really relevant to the conflicts we anticipate. For The New York Times, this raises questions about the F-22 and the national missile defense system. I am not convinced about the unnecessary nature of the F-22. Air superiority over Iraq and Afghanistan has not been in question and the observation, reconnaissance, and close support missions there can be better flown by other aircraft. This does not mean that we won’t need to fight for air superiority in some future clash with a different adversary. Continuing research on missile defense is clearly warranted, though the rush to deploy a complete system now can certainly be questioned.

The hope that money can be saved through reform of the DoD procurement system is a longstanding one, though I am skeptical that any of the previous reform efforts resulted in measurable financial savings. What any new reform effort has to achieve is to make the process more transparent while not burdening it with requirements that draw time and money away from the process itself while failing to create that transparency.

The Obama administration and the American public will be faced with many hard decisions to be made on these kinds of military issues. Whatever is to come, however, can only be improved by contributions such as this editorial from a platform like The New York Times. I look forward to it.

A Sampling of Verse for Armistice Day

2008-11-10T22:03:00.005-05:00

The Heroes

In that Valhalla where the heroes go
A careful sentinel paced to and fro
Before the gate, burnt black with battle smoke,
Whose echoes to the tread of armed men woke,
And up the fiery stairs whose steps are spears
Came the pale heroes of the bloodstained years.

There were lean Caesars from the glory fields
With heart that only to a sword-thrust yields;
And there were Generals decked in pride of rank,
Red scabbard swinging from the wary flank;
And slender youths, who were the sons of kings,
And barons with their sixteen quarterings.
And while the nobles went with haughty air
The courteous sentinel questioned: “Who goes there?”
And as each came, full lustily he cried
His string of titles, ere he passed inside…
And presently there was a little man,
A silent mover in the regal van.
His hand still grasped his rifle, and his eyes’
Seemed blinded with the light from Paradise…
His was a humble guise, a modest air—
The sentinel held him sharply: “Who goes there?”

There were no gauds tacked to that simple name,
But every naked blade leapt out like flame,
And every blue-blood warrior bowed his head—
“I am a Belgian,” this was all he said.
Men’s cheering echoed thro’ the battle ‘s Hell
“Pass in, mon brave,” said that wise sentinel.

M. Forrest
Brisbane, Queensland

At the Movies

They swing across the screen in brave array,
Long British columns grinding the dark grass.
Twelve months ago the marched into the gray
Of battle; yet again behold them pass!

One lifts his dusty cap; his hair is bright’
I meet his eyes, eager and young and gold.
The picture quivers into ghostly white;
Then I remember, and my heart grows cold!

Florence Ripley Mastin
(Teacher of English Literature, Brooklyn, New York)

The Connaught Rangers

I saw the Connaught Rangers when they were passing by.
On a spring day, a good day, with gold rifts in the sky.
Themselves were marching steadily along the Liffey quay.
An’ I see the young proud look of them as it was to-day!
The bright lads, the right lads, I have them in my mind,
With the green flags on their bayonets all fluttering in the wind!

A last look at old Ireland, a last good-bye maybe,
Then the gray sea, the wide sea, my grief upon the sea!
And when will they come home, says I, when will they see once more
The dear blue hills of Wicklow and Wexford’s dim gray shore?
The brave lads of Ireland, no better lads you’ll find,
With the green flags on their bayonets all fluttering in the wind!

Three years have passed since that spring day, sad years for them and me.
Green graves there are in Serbia and in Gallipoli.
And many who went by that day along the muddy street
Will never hear the roadway ring to their triumphant feet.
But when they march before Him, God’s welcome will be kind,
And the green flags on their bayonets will flutter in the wind.

Winifred M. Letts

(Winifred M. Letts served in 1915 as a V.A.D. nurse in Manchester Base Hospital, at Command Depot Camps at Manchester and Alnwick, and an Orthopedic Hospital in Blackrock, Dublin. The Connaught Rangers would be disbanded on July 31, 1922 in the wake of the regiment’s 1920 mutiny in India after news reached them of the brutal actions of Britain’s Special Auxiliaries – “the Black and Tans” - in Ireland.)

The Last Post

The bugler sent a call of high romance—
Lights out! Lights out!—to the deserted square:
On the thin brazen notes he threw a prayer.
God, if it’s this for me next time in France
Spare me the phantom bugle as I lie
Dead in the gas and smoke and roar of guns,
Dead in a row with the other shattered ones,
Lying so stiff and still under the sky—
Jolly young Fusiliers, too good to die.
The music ceased, and the red sunset flare
Was blood about his head as he stood there.

Robert Graves
(Captain, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, serving in France for 18 months including the battles of Loos and the Somme)

The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same -

2008-11-05T08:32:00.003-05:00

As is now clear to everyone, this year’s Presidential election has produced unprecedented change in America. There is no question that it is an important change, but I was glad to see that the President-elect and the people around him appear to understand the immensity of the challenge now facing them. They are reportedly already talking about how this new team must act quickly but not hastily. After all, there remain divisions within the country. Their words brought to mind one of my favorite aphorisms borrowed from the Russian general Alexander Suvorov – “Speed is essential, haste harmful.”

In a moment of irony, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s cold reaction to the U.S. election made clear one of the reasons for this new administration to want to move with speed. It appeared as if Russia, out of all the nations of the world, remains determined to play the game of international relations by the old rules. The reality is that many of these old rules remain in place and it is imperative that Americans and particularly the new Obama Administration recognize this fact. However important and significant Obama’s election is much of the world around us remains the same.

We don’t know much about how the President-elect will actually lead and govern the country. As a recovering American apparatchik who voted for Obama, I am still anxious about his apparent lack of knowledge of how the U.S. government works and where the buttons and levers are. The best news is that unlike the current resident of the White House, Obama clearly is an intelligent thoughtful man capable of changing his mind when information is brought to him that compels such a response. Also, by the mere fact of his election he has changed the domestic political equation to greatly reduce (note that I do no say eliminate) race from our domestic debate – and abroad his election has revalidated the previously widely held and sometimes rather romantic view that America is truly a nation of hope and opportunity – Too bad Ronald Reagan isn’t alive to offer some benediction on the event as I think he would recognize it.

Our greatest hope must be that Obama doesn’t squander the good feelings, that he acts on his intention and his demonstrated ability to bring people together, and creates an administration that will not swing to the extremes. This includes the requirement that he really extends a hand and lends an ear to the Republicans in Congress while the Democratic leadership on the Hill avoid the past excesses committed by both parties on the Hill. The challenge for the Republicans as they work to rebuild their party – or find a new political home – is to decide what principles they represent and how to work with the Obama administration in a way that reflects and embodies those principles instead of projecting an image of their party as the ultimate ugly guest at the ball.

That’s the best I can do for you this morning. After all, it’s all speculation now. President-elect Barack Obama actually has to start doing things before we can really be sure that we know who he is and what his election means.

“God Will Know His Own” – Do We?

2008-09-23T17:18:00.003-04:00

While pursuing my duties last week as a volunteer at the Newseum in Washington, DC, I noticed a woman visitor writing down one of the many quotes liberally displayed on the museum’s walls. This led to conversation about how many of us share the habit of collecting the words of others. I mention the incident because the bombing of the Marriot in Islamabad brought to mind one of the quotations that I had recorded in my collection.

In 1209, a monk recorded the words of Arnaud-Amaury, Abbot of Citeaux and Papal Legate to the Crusaders led by Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester fighting against the Cathar heresy in Southern France: “Kill them all. God will know his own.” The Crusaders besieging the city of Beziers had finally breached the walls and were preparing to storm it. Simon de Montfort noted that not everyone in Beziers was a member of the heresy, so how should they be treated when the Crusaders capture the city? The monk recorded the answer as "Neca eos omnes. Deus suos agnoscet." With that guidance, the Crusaders killed everyone they could find in the city.

The latest official death toll reported from the Islamabad bombing, as I write these words, is 54 dead and likelier to go higher. These 54 reportedly include the Czech Ambassador to Pakistan, two Americans employed by the Department of Defense, in addition to the many Pakistanis who were at the hotel and particularly its restaurant for the iftar – the meal that would break their daily fast during the celebration of Ramadan.

This last aspect of the attack should make it clear that the inchoate alliance of Islamic fundamentalists who are waging this struggle have defined it as one of them against the world. They have rewritten and adopted the Crusaders’ advice – “Kill them all. Allah will know his own.”

This should recall, for all of us who are the targets of this onslaught, the even older aphorism – “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Both we in the West, of whatever faith, and those in the Muslim world who reject the violence of these fundamentalists must recognize that we are in fact allies in this struggle and should act accordingly. Which brings to mind as well a saying of my own, “Never make an enemy accidently.” We in the West need to be certain that the leaders we elect and follow, and the policies and strategies which these leaders pursue on our behalf, are in fact directed towards success in the war against terrorism and do not accidently or inadvertently add to the numbers of our enemies.

“The more I reflect on the experience of history the more I come to see the instability of solutions achieved by force, and to suspect even those instances where force has had the appearance of resolving difficulties.” BH Liddell Hart: Thoughts on War, 1944

“The trouble with the world is that the stupid are cocksure and the intelligent are full of doubt.” Bertrand Russell

Follow-On Moves and Maneuvers

2008-08-24T00:03:00.002-04:00

In an October 1939 radio broadcast, Winston Churchill famously described Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma;” but he also went on to say that “perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” In the time that has passed since Russian troops entered Georgia, Russia’s behavior has perhaps lifted some of the mystery surrounding Russian intentions vis a vis Georgia especially now that these forces are apparently withdrawing – and the key does appear to be Russia’s perception of that national interest.

As revealed by its actions in Georgia, Russia’s goals include:

Eliminating as much of Georgia's military capability as possible

Embarrassing the U.S. and NATO over their inability to prevent Russian actions

Reminding other neighboring states that were formerly allies or a part of the Soviet Union of their vulnerability to similar Russian action

Building up its perceived role as the leading challenger/competitor/rival to the United States for both its domestic and international audiences

Enough information has also emerged, and continues to emerge, regarding the Russian military operation to make it clear that Russia was probably preparing an invasion of Georgia when the incident began. Saakashvilli's decision to order Georgian forces into South Ossetia simply allowed Russian forces to accelerate own plans under the cover of responding to Georgia's initiative. The sizable presence of Russian forces in the region, the cyber attacks in the days leading up to the conflict, on top of the pattern of incidents between Russia and Georgia over the previous months of 2008, all fit the pattern established by Russia in 1999 when Moscow sent its troops into its own breakaway region of Chechnya.

It is also clear that at the response by the United States and its allies to Russia’s actions will need to be clearly defined and even rather robust. In addition to winning greater acceptance of U.S. anti-missile system plans in Europe (as in Poland) the Georgian armed forces will have to replace the sizable equipment losses inflicted by Russian forces. However, this assistance will have to be accompanied by extensive training across the full spectrum of military activity – not just how to use the equipment, but improving the command and control of Georgian forces and the quality of the strategic direction provided by Georgia’s political and military leadership in order to avoid any future miscalculations on the scale of this recent activity. The performance of Georgian forces calls to mind the evaluation by Prussia’s von Moltke of the American armies engaged in our 1861-1865 civil war as consisting of nothing more than “armed mobs.” The Russian forces appear better only by contrast (and the fact of their overwhelming numbers). It is fortunate for both Georgia and Russia that the fighting was not more intense.

No White Hats Anywhere and No Cavalry in Sight

2008-08-10T20:51:00.002-04:00

George Bernard Shaw once wrote that the problems between England and Ireland arose from the fact that the Irish couldn’t forget their history and the English couldn’t remember it. Given the current conflict in the Caucasus, something similar can be said about Georgia and Russia – the Russians can’t forget their history and the Georgians appear unable to remember it.

Like the Balkans, the Caucasus region overflows with the history of past conflicts between the many empires whose armies have struggled across its mountains. One of the legacies of these conflicts is a patchwork of neighboring populations that do not get along. Tsarist and Soviet Russia both took advantage of this legacy, just as Moscow has been doing since 1991. Among the things the Russians appear to have forgotten is that Georgia’s reported attempt last week to forcibly return South Ossetia to its control could well have been inspired by Moscow’s own use of military force to reassert its control over Chechnya just over a decade ago, though that conflict simmers on in a guerrilla-terrorist struggle.

The Georgians likewise appear to have forgotten the Russian military’s willingness and even eagerness to engage in military operations in the Caucasus region. Tbilisi also failed to remember the geography of their part of the world – Moscow is a lot closer than just about anyone from whom the Georgians might have expected real military help.

Georgia is a key U.S. ally in the war on terror, having lent its territory, its airspace, and its troops to support that conflict and it has been a recipient of U.S. military equipment, training, and assistance. Tbilisi has also made clear its ambitions to join the NATO alliance. A major western-owned pipeline passes through Georgia carrying oil from Central Asia (and according to press reports this pipeline has already been targeted by Russian bombers.) However, whether they are in Brussels or New York, the diplomats now engaged in seeking a peaceful resolution to this conflict are much farther away than the Russian forces now facing the Georgians.

The outcome of any conflict between Russia and Georgia recalls the admonition that “victory doesn’t always go to the big battalions – but that’s the way to bet.” This Russian “victory” will not be won with elegant maneuvers and rapid, decisive surgical strokes – it will be ground out the hard way and with violence just as the conventional war in Chechnya was fought.

Up to the time of this writing, late on Sunday August 10, Russian ground forces appear to be confined to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia enclaves – although Russian aircraft are striking cities and other targets across Georgia. However, if the Russian generals are unable to resist the memory of Georgia’s previous status as a part of the Soviet Union, it would be a mere matter of hours at most for Russian forces to traverse the rest of Georgia. The real question yet to be answered – and this may be true in Moscow as well – is “what will a Russian victory in a conflict with Georgia look like?”

Expensive Traditions

2008-07-22T15:23:00.002-04:00

In 1787, Catherine the Great, Tsarina of Russia, was touring the southern Ukraine province where her former lover Prince Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin was Governor. Potemkin, hoping to retain his position and such influence as he had over Catherine, reportedly made a great effort to line her route with happy Ukrainian peasants living in beautiful villages. While the real conditions which Potemkin thus concealed may not have been all that bad by the standards of the period, his efforts to ensure that the Tsarina left with only the very best impression of his governance bequeathed to us the phrase “Potemkin village” referring to any effort to conceal a less than happy reality by means of some façade, false front, or elaborate charade.

The Soviets frequently demonstrated a fine grasp of the concept during their 75-year rule. In one famous example, they introduced their first jet engine heavy bomber to the world at the 1954 May Day Parade in Moscow when a single example flew over the parade. The following year, several more of these Mi-4 Bison bombers flew above the parade. The appearance of these additional aircraft in 1955 confounded U.S. analysts who had predicted a slower production rate. Alarm soon developed over a possible “bomber gap” between the USSR and the U.S. This alarm increased on August 12, 1955, when a group of 10 and then a second group of 18 Mi-4 Bison bombers appeared in the annual Soviet Air Force Day aerial parade. These 28 aircraft were twice as many as had flown in May and four times the number of new B-52 bombers then in U.S. service. It was only some years later that the U.S. learned that the Soviets had sent every Mi-4 they could find into the air and then had some of the aircraft fly out of sight so that they could fly back to make a second appearance, giving observers the chance to count more of the bombers than actually existed at that time.

The Russian Federation has shown that this talent survives in the 21st Century. For all of the recent attention to the wealth and economic stability brought to Russia by increased oil prices and the re-emergence around the world of Russian aircraft, submarines, naval vessels, and the deployment of new missiles, there is a certain “Potemkin village” quality to it. Behind the bravado, parades, and military displays the Russian Federation remains a wounded giant, especially when compared to the Soviet Union. Today’s Russian army by some reports should consist of 10 divisions, 7 brigades, and 13 regiments. However, military analysts in Russia make it clear that the combat ready force is significantly smaller than this. The Army remains troubled by its broken system of conscription and its accompanying evils such as often lethal hazing of new draftees. The Air Force and Navy face equal or even greater challenges with an aging inventory of equipment and slow to non-existent procurement of the latest generation weapons’ systems to replace what are often worn-out Soviet era models.

Many of Putin’s supporters demonstrate a certain nostalgia for the Soviet Union, especially the Soviet Union that with its rival the United States dominated the world. The ideological contest that made rivals of these two superpowers disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union as did many of the economic and military resources that made the USSR's superpower status plausible. Russia is using today's energy windfall to buy back some of those lost superpower trappings in the form of new missiles, tanks, etc. for its armed forces while ignoring the . So far, Medvedev's solution has been to announce a series of reform plans, as did Yeltsin and Putin, but the resistance to real reform is strong and none of these three has yet broken it.

Meanwhile, Moscow has concluded that there is little cost in also seeking to revive its lost superpower status by criticizing and challenging U.S. policies and actions around the world. The issues at the center of these confrontations are not as important to Moscow as the resulting impression around the world of Russian and the United States butting heads and locked in struggle. The impression becomes fact for many people and thus the Russian Federation is once again a “superpower” linked with and locked in competition with the United States, concealing the reality that only the latter still has the military, economic, and industrial resources and global reach of a superpower. In these confrontations Moscow is settling for the appearance rather than making the hard decisions on economic, foreign, and military policies that might in fact give substance to its claims to a revival of Russian power.

“Surtout, pas trop de zele” – Above all, not too much zeal

2008-07-06T13:11:00.001-04:00

Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord (1754-1838) was a man of many accomplishments – among them cleric, diplomat, statesman, aristocrat, revolutionary, and imperialist. He is considered by many the most accomplished European diplomat of his age, with a diplomatic career that began with his mission to London in January 1792 to persuade Great Britain to remain neutral as revolutionary France battled the rest of Europe. His final diplomatic achievement was the 1834 conclusion of a formal alliance among Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, and France. Nevertheless, he is most often remembered today for the many epigrams attributed to him, of which my favorite is “Surtout, pas trop de zele,” often translated as “Above all, not too much zeal." By this phrase, Talleyrand was reportedly reminding his diplomatic subordinates that decisions about war, peace, and the nation’s security must be based upon the exercise of cool-headed reason and not upon emotions or any waxing or waning popular enthusiasm.

Talleyrand’s words came back to me recently as I listened to both presumptive-presidential candidates outlining their views on national security issues and declaring what their future decisions would be with regard to war and peace in different circumstances. Personally, the experience acquired over my diplomatic career leads me to generally disregard such commitments. Statements made in the heat of a political election campaign cannot help but suffer from a surfeit of zeal, intended as they often are to pander to the perceived enthusiasms of all or a part of the electorate.

The United States has had past experiences with the harmful impact of enthusiasms on political-military decision-making. I, for one, want to believe that the next President of the United States will ponder any decisions about peace, war, national security, and the future of the nation with a cool and rational consideration of the merits of the issue at hand – and not by trying to remember what promise he may have made on the campaign trail.

For Memorial Day, Four Poems

2008-05-25T23:38:00.003-04:00

GRASS

Pile the bodies high at Austerlitz and Waterloo.
Shovel them under and let me work--
I am the grass; I cover all.
And pile them high at Gettysburg
And pile them high at Ypres and Verdun.
Shovel them under and let me work.
Two years, ten years, and passengers ask the conductor:
What place is this?
Where are we now?
I am the grass.
Let me work.
Carl Sandberg

CHAMPS D'HONNEUR

Soldiers never do die well;
Crosses mark the places--
Wooden crosses where they fell,
Stuck above their faces,
Soldiers pitch and cough and twitch--
All the world roars red and black;
Soldiers smother in a ditch,
Choking through the whole attack.

Ernest Hemingway
Paris, 1923

THE FIGHTING RACE

"Read out the names!" and Burke sat back,
And Kelly drooped his head.
While Shea--they call him Scholar Jack--
Went down the list of the dead.
Officers, seamen, gunners, marines,
The crews of the gig and yawl,
The bearded man and the lad in his teens,
Carpenters, coal passers--all.
Then, knocking the ashes from out his pipe,
Said Burke in an offhand way:
"We're all in that dead man's list, by Cripe!
Kelly and Burke and Shea."
"Well, here's to the Maine, and I'm sorry for Spain,"
Said Kelly and Burke and Shea.

"Wherever there's Kellys there's trouble," said Burke.
"Wherever fighting's the game,
Or a spice of danger in grown man's work,"
Said Kelly, "you'll find my name."
"And do we fall short," said Burke, getting mad,
"When it's touch and go for life?"
Said Shea, "It's thirty-odd years, bedad,
Since I charged to drum and fife
Up Marye's Heights and my old canteen
Stopped a rebel ball on its way.
There were blossoms of blood on our sprigs of green--
Kelly and Burke and Shea--
And the dead didn't brag," "Well, here's to the flag!"
Said Kelly and Burke and Shea.

"I wish't was in Ireland, for there's the place,"
Said Burke, "that we'd die for by right,
In the cradle of our soldier race,
After one good stand-up fight.
My grandfather fell on Vinegar Hill,
And fighting was not in his trade;
But his rusty pike's in the cabin still,
With Hessian blood on the blade."
"Aye, aye," said Kelly, "the pikes were great
When the word was 'clear the way!'
We were thick on the roll in ninety-eight--
Kelly and Burke and Shea."
"Well, here's to the pike and the sword and the like!"
Said Kelly and Burke and Shea.

And Shea, the scholar, with rising joy,
Said, "We were at Ramillies;
We left our bones at Fontenoy
And up in the Pyrenees;
Before Dunkirk, on Landen's plain,
Cremona, Lille, and Ghent,
We're all over Austria, France, and Spain,
Wherever they pitched a tent.
We've died for England from Waterloo
To Egypt and Dargai;
And still there's enough for a corps or crew,
Kelly and Burke and Shea."
"Well, here is to good honest fighting blood!"
Said Kelly and Burke and Shea.

"Oh, the fighting races don't die out,
If they seldom die in bed,
For love is first in their hearts, no doubt,"
Said Burke; then Kelly said:
"When Michael, the Irish Archangel, stands,
The angel with the sword,
And the battle-dead from a hundred lands
Are ranged in one big horde,
Our line, that for Gabriel's trumpet waits,
Will stretch three deep that day,
From Jehoshaphat to the Golden Gates--
Kelly and Burke and Shea."
"Well, there's thank God for the race and the sod!"
Said Kelly and Burke and Shea.

Joseph Ignatius Constantine Clarke

ANGELS OF BATANN

To the Nurses of Bataan.

Funny looking angels, in their blood-stained rumpled coveralls.
Funny looking angels, with their patient weary eyes.
And you know I don't mean "funny" . . . Godamighty! They are lovelier
Than any laundered angels twanging harps in Paradise.

War is not a pretty business . . . it is Hell and stench and agony.
They're not nurses in the movies . . . "cool pale hands on fevered brows"
It is bathing shattered bodies, antiseptics, anaesthesias;
It is constant grinding vigil, watchful eyes that dare not drowse.

There is laughter . . . they provide it . . . like a soothing hypodermic
When they want to scream with tension or to black-out with a faint.
They are soldiers, Man, what soldiers! Take your hats off, Folks, salute them.
They are human. They are women. And they rate the name of saint.

We went through the Hell together, fighting . . . all of us were fighting.
We with rifles, knives and bullets; they with bandages and blood,
In the open, unprotected; getting just the same as we got,
And they didn't ask for favors in that rotten muck and mud.

When they're handing out the medals, building monuments and arches,
When they tell heroic stories of the ones who carried on . . .
Let them carve in golden letters that undying splendid story
Of the service and the glory of the Angels of Bataan.

Don Blanding

If amateurs discuss strategy and professionals discuss logistics, what do presidential candidates say about national security strategy?

2008-05-07T21:24:00.001-04:00

A recurring theme in the ongoing national dialogue over the war on terror and the related conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan is the plaint that the U.S. has no stated and broadly accepted national strategy such as the Cold War era strategy of containment. This does not mean that we do not have a strategy for Iraq and a strategy for Afghanistan, or a strategy for the war on terror, because you can actually find and read these over the Internet as well as in print. The U.S. has no strategy that defines where in the world we as a nation are now, where we would like to be, how we expect to get there, and what kind of world we expect to find when we arrive there.

A major purpose behind the existence of any government is to manage change on behalf of the population that supports that government. Without a strategy or even with a strategy that is ill-thought out and unsupported, governments easily find themselves dealing with the crisis of the day with no idea of how that crisis relates to or reflects the ongoing, anticipated, and yet-to-be imagined changes confronting it. This is sometimes called “putting out the fire in the in-box” school of government.

Presidential election years are the moment when questions of national strategy and its long-term implication should be asked. Candidates for high office – whether the Presidency or a House or Senate seat – should be challenged to clearly and simply state what world they foresee for the United States and how they intend to lead the United States to achieve that world. The Cold War years of nuclear confrontation saw far too many people opt out of debates over strategy, leaving it to be debated, decided, and implemented by those political figures interested or forced to be interested, alongside a coterie of too often self-selected experts hoping to be recognized as the nation’s new “Wise Men.”

At university, one of my classes debated how or even whether a democratic political system could publicly debate and decide questions of foreign policy and national strategy. The hypothesis was that since democracy thrives on open debate but foreign or national security policy is most effective when surrounded by a degree of secrecy, discretion, and even ambiguity, there cannot be an effective open popular debate of such matters. Another argument raised against public debate was that questions of strategy were too intricate, complex, and even arcane to expect any meaningful contribution from the general public or anyone not an educated expert in the field.

In its simplest meaning, a strategy is a plan for achieving a desired goal using the resources you have available. Anyone who has and prepared a plan to achieve a goal – whether to increase sales or to win a sports match – has prepared a strategy. However, you do not really even need these experiences or qualifications for this needed debate. The contribution to this debate that is needed from you is a clear statement as to where you want the United States to be in the world and what kind of world you want that to be for you, for your children, your grandchildren, and so on. The challenge facing the United States today, as the sole surviving superpower, is what do we do with that power, understanding how our use of that power impacts the world today and tomorrow.

As in the days immediately after the end of the Cold War, two extreme choices frame that range of possible worlds:

– The U.S. actively uses its power to direct world affairs, deploying its influence and even its military forces to forcibly shape a world under which nothing is allowed to happen unless the U.S. is agreeable; or,

– The U.S. uses its power and influence to create and support international organizations, coalitions, agreements, and other mechanisms through which the U.S. and other countries together respond to crises and resolve conflicts while sharing the responsibilities and the burdens of making these efforts.

The first possibility risks ever increasing resistance to our exercise of power, leading to our having to use ever greater and more costly levels of force to achieve our desired goals. The second possibility raises the risk that the U.S. will not always achieve exactly the outcome it desires, that responses to crises may come more slowly than we desire, and that others will criticize U.S. policies and the behavior of U.S. forces when they fall short of the standards the U.S. expects other countries to meet.

What you need to do is decide where within the spectrum defined by these two extremes you wish the United States to be, make that desired goal clear to the numerous political candidates, and then ask them to explain whether they share that goal and how they expect to achieve it – how will they work in office to reach that goal.

“My general strategy at present is to last out the next three months.” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the Soviet Ambassador, August 1940

“The more I reflect on the experience of history the more I come to see the instability of solutions achieved by force, and to suspect even those instances where force has had the appearance of resolving the difficulties.” B. H. Liddell Hart, “Thoughts on War,” 1944

Which is the mightiest - pen, sword, or gospel?

2008-04-02T16:49:00.005-04:00

The study of history offers many rewards, but sometimes it’s the unexpected discoveries that are the most interesting – the individual stories that are often overshadowed by the grand scale of events as we look back. It is also sometimes surprising to see how individuals in the past lived within a different frame of reference or with different expectations, for example, of how a journalist or a military chaplain should behave.

I recently began researching the story of Arthur B. Fuller, whose name appears on the Freedom Forum’s Journalists Memorial at the Newseum (Museum of News) in Washington, DC, as a special correspondent for The Boston Journal killed during the Battle of Fredericksburg. He is one of eight journalists reportedly killed or reported to have died while covering the war for newspapers in the south or the north. Finding his name associated with both the Battle of Fredericksburg and the Boston Journal was a surprise because I have spent much of my time researching both the battle and another Boston Journal correspondent, Charles Carleton Coffin, and yet I did not remember reading about the death of any of fellow journalist. Fortunately, in world of the Internet, I was able to quickly confirm that an Arthur B. Fuller had been a special correspondent during the war and was killed at Fredericksburg, but the story still offered some surprises.

Arthur Buckminster Fuller was born on August 10, 1822 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His father, Timothy Fuller, was elected to Congress from 1817 to 1825, where he served as Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs. Congressman Fuller was described as frank and vigorous, a defender of the Seminole Indians against the federal authorities, and an opponent of the Missouri Compromise. Despite financial obstacles following the death of his father in 1835, Arthur was able to attend Harvard College and graduated in 1843. He then used his remaining few hundred dollars to purchase a small academy in Belvidere, Illinois and embarked upon teaching as a full time career. However, during the following two years, Fuller found his interest and energies increasingly drawn to the Sunday school he taught there and his related preaching. As a result, he returned to Harvard’s Divinity School from which he graduated in 1847.

The new Unitarian minister proceeded to pursue his religious vocation over the following years, filling several pulpits in succession and acting as chaplain for the branches of the state legislature. At the same time he served as editor of his sister Margaret’s writings preparing them for successful publication. He also acted upon his interest in education, serving on various school boards, and was active in support of anti-slavery reforms. These endeavors came to an end with the secession of the southern states and the expected onset of a war between North and South.

Reverend Arthur B. Fuller became the Chaplain of the newly raised 16th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers on August 1, 1861, a regiment primarily representative of his own Middlesex County. The regiment left Boston on August 17, 1861. While on service, Reverend Fuller was ever attentive to his men, holding weekly Sunday School classes and services as well twice-daily prayer meetings during the rest of the week in his “chapel-tent.” He distributed Bibles, religious volumes, and songbooks that included both religious and patriotic musical selections through the regiment. As did many chaplains throughout the Union Army, Reverend Fuller offered educational classes to the soldiers. Consistent with his religious views, he formed a Division of the Sons of Temperance within the regiment, bringing together more than one hundred officers and men who would continue to hold weekly meetings. Finally, following a tradition already more than a hundred years old in Europe and now the United States, Reverend Fuller regularly reported by letter to various newspapers on the events of the war. His letters were featured in a number of newspapers including the Boston Journal, Boston Traveller, New York Tribune, and Christian Inquirer. His most famous report was a graphic account of the battle between the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia (formerly USS Merrimack).

Unfortunately, upon his enlistment Arthur Fuller was already almost 40 years old and he found that even for chaplain, army service was a young man’s work. His health soon began to fail him and he was several times forced to remain behind as his regiment went to the field. On December 10, 1862, he received an honorable discharge from this service with a surgeon’s certificate of disability, and with the promise of a commission as chaplain for a hospital or stationary camp. However, on the day following his discharge, December 11, while he was still with the army, the call came around for volunteers to cross the Rappahannock River and drive off the Confederate sharpshooters who were preventing Union army engineers from completing their bridge across the river to Fredericksburg. Despite having been discharged the day before and his lack of training as a soldier, Arthur Fuller stepped forward and armed himself with a borrowed musket and accoutrements.

We have an eyewitness account of what happened in the town from Captain Moncena Dunn of the 19th Massachusetts Volunteers who commanded some 25 volunteers out of the force that crossed the river, including Chaplain Fuller. While not previously acquainted, Captain Dunn recorded that he had heard of Chaplain Fuller’s work in the 16th Regiment and had hoped to meet him. However, their first acquaintance would come in the streets of Fredericksburg, at Carolina Street at about half past three in the afternoon as Captain Dunn commanded his line of skirmishers. It was at this point that Chaplain Fuller approached, saluted, and said to him, “Captain, I must do something for my country. What shall I do?” Captain Dunn replied that there was no time like the present and that he should take his place on the captain’s left. He described Reverend Fuller as being “perfectly cool and collected” and anticipated that he anticipated good service from the chaplain.

The Captain’s account went on, “His position was directly in front of a grocery store. He fell in five minutes after he took it, having fired once or twice. He was killed instantly, and did not move after he fell. I saw the flash of the rifle which did the deed. I think the Chaplain fell from the ball which entered the hip. He might not have been aware of the wound from the ball entering his arm, sometimes soldiers are not conscious of wounds in battle, or he may have been simultaneously hit by another rifle. We were in a very exposed position. Shortly before the Chaplain came up, one of General Burnside’s aids accosted me, expressing surprise, and saying, ‘What are you doing here, Captain?’ I replied that I had orders. He said that I must retire, if the Rebels pressed us too hard. In about half an hour I had definite orders to retire, and accordingly fell back, leaving the Chaplain and another man dead, and also a wounded man, who was unwilling to be moved. It is not usual, under such pressing circumstances, to attempt to remove the dead. In about an hour afterward, my regiment advanced in line with the Twentieth Massachusetts. They occupied the place where Chaplain Fuller fell; and they suffered very severely, it being much exposed. The Chaplain’s body we found had been robbed, and the wounded man bayoneted by the Rebel Vandals, while the ground was left to them.”

Arthur B Fuller’s remains were sent home to Massachusetts at the earliest opportunity. Later in December 1862, private funeral services were held in his brother’s house in Boston, and then on December 24, a heavily attended and reported public funeral took place at the First Church, Chauncey Street, Boston. He was buried in Mount Auburn Cemetery, in Cambridge. The Massachusetts State Adjutant General would record his death as having taken place on December 12, 1862 in Fredericksburg, possibly reflecting the date of removal of his remains from the field. Later that same month, the United States Congress would vote a special bill to award Mrs. Fuller the pension otherwise denied her on the grounds of her late husbands' December 10 discharge.

"There is no conceivable human action which custom has not at one time justified and at another time condemned." -- Joseph Wood Krutch

Past tense; Present tense; Future tense?

2008-03-14T21:04:00.002-04:00

There has been a longstanding debate among historians, philosophers, and others, as to whether or not history repeats itself. Anyone who has pursued the study of history for any length of time will have encountered those moments of recognition that bring to mind a similar event in another time and another place and involving completely different individuals and told in a completely different language. Since I myself count in this number, I should offer my own conclusion that it isn’t so much a question of history repeating itself as it is a matter of human beings repeating themselves – that is that human beings frequently respond in a similar fashion to similar situations or circumstances, regardless of differences of place, time, language, etc.

So it is with no surprise that I am now seeing the return of “the winter soldiers,” i.e., veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan who are recounting their experiences in these conflicts to justify their opposition to the continuation of these wars and in hopes that they will persuade others here at home to join in that opposition. The same label was adopted in the 1960s and 1970s by American veterans of the war in Vietnam who came home and campaigned for the end of that war, as many of you know thanks to John Kerry's 2004 presidential campaign. The name of “the winter soldiers,” of course, is taken from that advocate and author of revolution, Thomas Paine, whose most famous work “The American Crisis” referred to “the summer soldier and sunshine patriot” who would “shrink from the service of their country.” Unlike these the winter soldiers would stand by their country and deserve “the love and thanks of man and woman.” As a historian, I cannot resist pointing out that as the ultimate “winter soldier,” the eternal agitator Thomas Paine would die in 1802 at the age 72 after years of living with ill health, poverty, abuse, neglect, and even hatred from his fellow countrymen and would even be denied burial in the Quaker burial ground that represented his natal faith.

Perhaps some 200 years later, in the 21st Century, Americans are more intellectually curious, open-minded, and sophisticated about such things. Perhaps they can even willingly listen to people with whom they disagree or with whom they suspect they will disagree if they actually bothered to hear them out before coming to a firm conclusion on that point. Perhaps in this case they may think that out of respect for their service to this country, individuals such as this latest generation of winter soldiers deserve to be heard and to have questions about their patriotism or loyalty withheld until they have been heard.

For those who think they are up to this challenge, these winter soldiers are gathering in Washington DC from March 13-16 to present their testimony about what they individually saw and experienced in the ongoing conflicts. These four days will reportedly be closed to the general public, though they will be joined by panels of scholars, veterans, journalists, and other specialists who will try to put this collected testimony into a larger context. Video footage from these four days will be shown to the public in Baltimore March 14-15 and will reportedly also be available for viewing on line at www.ivaw.org, the website of The Iraq Veterans Against the War.

I would like to think that perhaps American today are capable of meeting this challenge, but so much of what I have read of history tells me otherwise. I will try to put myself to this test as well as this effort progresses and see what conclusions I might draw from the experience, and I will try to share them here. Let us see together how we stand this test.

"Nothing ever happened in the past, only in the present. The difference is it was somebody else's present, not ours." David McCullough

Hold the Fort!

2008-02-29T16:11:00.003-05:00

One of the more interesting pieces of legislation and related political activity in the United States is the Congressionally mandated Base Re-Alignment and Closure, more commonly referred to for obvious reasons as BRAC. BRAC is probably unique on this planet as it is the process by which the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Armed Services compare their real estate holdings against current and projected needs. Property determined to be surplus to those needs is then released by DoD for the use of other federal, state, or local government agencies or put up for sale. The concept dates back to the 1960s and you can find its history on Wikipedia and on the Global Security.Org website. The latest BRAC round began in 2005 and the Commission’s own website presents its full report. As you may imagine, however, this can be a process fraught with pressure from every direction as industry, business, community, political interests, as well as the different levels of government compete for a particular piece of real estate.

But I also want you to visit The Citizens for a Fort Monroe National Park because the 2005 BRAC report states that the military will leave Fort Monroe on the Chesapeake Bay near Norfolk, Virginia in 2011. CFMNP is pushing for Fort Monroe to then become a National Park, supported by the Civil War Preservation Trust and other preservation organizations, and me (for what that’s worth) and I hope will be supported by you. It this proposed park is to become reality, it will need strong public support and time for the National Park Service to plan and budget for its preservation and presentation to the public.

Construction of Fort Monroe was begun in 1819 in the vicinity of the Old Point Comfort Lighthouse (built in 1802 and still there today). It was planned as a first class fortification for the defense of Hampton Roads and the James River (leading ultimately to Richmond). The fort was part of what is called the Third System of forts intended to strengthen the young nation’s Atlantic coast defenses after the demonstrated ease with which British forces invaded American territory during the War of 1812. It was named for the fifth president, James Monroe (1817-1825) and designed by the French military engineer Simon Bernard, who bore the American brevet rank of a brigadier-general based upon the recommendation of the Marquis de Lafayette and his own prior service at that rank to Emperor Napoleon I.

Called Fortress Monroe until officially changed to Fort Monroe in 1832, the new masonry, granite, and earth fort was located on the point of Old Point Comfort and linked to the mainland by a narrow isthmus and a single bridge. The fort was given a perimeter circuit of 2,394 yards and encompassed 63 acres. Its placement and its design as a regularly bastioned work with seven fronts or faces, was expected to make it impossible to take by siege, which it never was.

Although Bernard designed and began the construction of Fort Monroe, it was not actually completed until 1847, long after his return to France in 1831. At that time it already hosted the U.S. Army’s first service school – the Artillery School of Practice since 1824, and in the first half of the 20th Century it would host that school’s successor, the Coast Artillery School, making Fort Monroe the center for harbor defense training and for related research and development programs. Monroe would later serve as Headquarters, U.S. Continental Command (CONARC). Today’s Fort Monroe covers 570 acres (including the fort) and hosts the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as well as Army Accessions Command, Headquarters Cadet Command, and other Army, Navy, and defense organizations.

Although Fort Monroe never saw battle, its story is deeply entwined with our nation’s history. Robert E. Lee was stationed there from 1831-1834. The Fort’s Casemate Museum also includes the cell in which Confederate President Jefferson Davis was held after his capture at the end of the Civil War. During that war, the Union garrison at Fort Monroe rendered it an important base of support for operations along the Confederacy’s Atlantic coast and against its capitol city of Richmond in 1862 and again in 1864-1865. Southern slaves also recognized this Northern outpost as an outlet to freedom and made active use of its existence throughout the war.

If you are interested in the subject of forts and fortifications in general, whether in the United States, Europe, or anywhere in the world, you may also want to visit the website of The Fortress Study Group and join this active international group of scholars, historians, and enthusiasts.

"For what we are about to receive..."

2007-11-28T10:28:00.000-05:00

The above noted fragment comes from a blessing that has been used (with variations) at mealtime for hundreds of years. I imagine that in its original un-ironic sense, this prayer was uttered at many a Thanksgiving table this past week. I remember it from reading the adventures of Horatio Hornblower, Jack Aubrey, and others as a half prayer/half joke uttered by seamen of Britain’s Royal Navy just before the guns of an enemy ship would send several hundred pounds of metal hurtling toward them.

In this ironic sense, it may have also been on the minds of the volunteers the State Department found for those 48 jobs in Iraq that need to be filled during the coming year. In case you hadn’t heard, members of the Foreign Service did step forward and volunteer for these positions. There probably won’t be anywhere near as much attention paid to this news as was paid to the report that the State Department had previously put the Foreign Service on notice that these positions would be filled by ‘directed assignment’ if volunteers were not identified. That means that the Department was threatening to send the ‘press gangs’ through the corridors in order to shanghai the required number of personnel. I am confident that from Secretary Rice down to individual Personnel Officers, the Department’s management is grateful that such extreme measures were not necessary (though we don’t yet know if any of the volunteers might now be able to discuss the merits and of water-boarding as a means of persuasion).

It is probably true that this would have been the first time since the Vietnam War that the Department would have filled positions via directed non-voluntary assignment. However, it is not the first time since the end of that war that the Department reminded Foreign Service employees of such a possibility. All members of the Foreign Service join with a stated commitment that they are available for assignment anywhere, anytime – worldwide availability. In reality, this commitment has not prevented some officers from spending little to no time outside of Washington, DC, or plum assignments in Western Europe. During my own thirty years of service, the Department made repeated efforts to convince personnel that the assignment process was fair and ensured that everyone had their share of both plush and hardship posts. When Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State, such an effort was given the unfortunate name of “GLobal Opportunity Program” and the officers thus selected to leave Europe for the underdeveloped world were christened “GLOP-ees.”

The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought to center stage the question of personal safety and security for Foreign Service personnel serving abroad. When I joined the Foreign Service in 1973, the Department had just lost two officers killed by Palestinian terrorists in Sudan. Those deaths brought to over 100 the number of names on a memorial plaque commemorating members of the Foreign Service who died while serving abroad. Those two officers, Cleo Allen Noel, Jr., and George Curtis Moore, are buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Today there are two plaques in the C Street lobby of the State Department building in Washington http://www.afsa.org/plaquelist.cfm bearing the names of 225 members of the Foreign Service who died while on service abroad. The related guidelines have changed since 1973 so the entries are no longer strictly chronological, but the plaques include the names of 71 individuals who died from 1973 to 2007.

The official U.S. government (USG) position on the protection of its diplomatic/consular personnel and facilities abroad is based upon international law and on the agreements that govern diplomatic and consular activity, which make it clear that their security is the responsibility of their host governments. However, while the USG will rarely say so publicly, the protection provided by host governments has frequently failed in the face of terrorists or of angry crowds of their own citizens.

The Department of State has taken and continues to take steps to protect its employees and its physical plant or facilities, as well as the sensitive information to which it has access. The Department’s Division of Security, or DS, did not exist in 1973 in the robust incarnation that it presents to the world today. The Department also requires all personnel going abroad on assignment to undergo several days of security-related training before they leave. However, DS cannot provide bodyguards for every employee abroad, and the question of issuing personal firearms to American diplomats for self-defense is so surrounded with questions of legal liability, international law, host government laws, and the terrible international public image it would create that the possibility is never even seriously raised.

The Departments of State and Defense (DoD) had repeated discussions over my own 30 years’ service about the possibility of using military personnel to provide security for State facilities and personnel abroad. The response has always been, and I believe continues to be, “No,” other than the ongoing and highly successful Marine Corps’ Embassy Security Guard program. DoD rightly argues that it does not have sufficient personnel for such duties, that most military personnel are trained for combat not for security duties, and that such added duties would draw military personnel from other critical missions and duties.

The facts of the matter are clear. The Foreign Service has always been a career accompanied by real risks and confronted by some very real threats. This is even more so in this 21st Century world. It is up to the individual to recognize this and decide what to do about it, including considering the possibility that this not a career they wish to pursue. For its part, the Department’s management is obligated to discuss the risks and threats frankly and fully with all personnel and potential employees; to take every practical precautionary measure to assure the safety and security of Foreign Service personnel while still allowing them to pursue their duties effectively; and most importantly that means the Department must ensure that every member of the Foreign Service is adequately trained and prepared to confront the threats – both real and potential - with every possible chance of success. Those sailors I mentioned at the beginning of this blog fully recognized that their given (if not chosen) trade entailed serious risks including injury and even death. Their half-jesting prayer was an acknowledgement of the realities of their world and a declaration that they would meet those challenges head on. As even Defense Secretary Gates recently acknowledged, the United States is in greater need than ever of the skills, talents, and dedication of its Foreign Service than ever in its history. What the members of the Foreign Service need from us is the moral, physical, and fiscal means necessary to enable them to effectively work as their service to the nation takes them in harm’s way. “For what we are about to receive….. “

"Lest We Forget - - "

2007-11-08T10:59:00.000-05:00

Grass

Pile the bodies high at Austerlitz and Waterloo.
Shovel them under and let me work—
I am the grass; I cover all.

And pile them high at Gettysburg
And pile them high at Ypres and Verdun.
Shovel them under and let me work.
Two years, ten years, and passengers ask the conductor:
What place is this?
Where are we now?

I am the grass.
Let me work.

Carl Sandburg (1918)
Private, 6th Infantry, Spanish-American War

Reveille

In the place to which I go,
Better men than I have died.
Freeman friend and conscript foe,
Face to face and side by side,
In the shallow grave abide.

Melinite that seared their brains,
Gas that slew them in a snare,
War’s inferno of strange pains,
What are these to them who share
That great boon of silence there?

When like blood the moon is red;
And a shadow hides the sun,
We shall awake, the so-long dead,
We shall know our quarrel done,--
Will God tell us who has won?

Ron Lewis Carton
Lieutenant, The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry

CHAMPS D'HONNEUR

Soldiers never do die well;
Crosses mark the places--
Wooden crosses where they fell,
Stuck above their faces,
Soldiers pitch and cough and twitch--
All the world roars red and black;
Soldiers smother in a ditch,
Choking through the whole attack.

Ernest Hemingway, Paris, 1923
Ambulance Driver, Red Cross, World War I

Mesopotamia (1917)

They shall not return to us, the resolute, the young,
The eager and whole-hearted whom we gave;
But the men who left them thriftly to die in their own dung,
Shall they come with years and honour to the grave:

They shall not return to us, the strong men coldly slain
In sight of help denied from day to day:
But the men who edged their agonies and chid them in their pain,
Are they too strong and wise to put away?

Our dead shall not return to us while Day and Night divide---
Never while the bars of sunset hold.
But the idle-minded overlings who quibbled while they died,
Shall they thrust for high employments as of old?

Shall we only threaten and be angry for an hour?
When the storm is ended shall we find
How softly but how swiftly they have sidled back to power
By the favour and contrivance of their kind?

Even while they soothe us, while they promise large amends,
Even while they make a show of fear,
Do they call upon their debtors, and take counsel with their friends,
To confirm and re-establish each career?

Their lives cannot repay us—their death could not undo—
The shame that they have laid upon our race.
But the slothfulness that wasted and the arrogance that slew,
Shall we leave it unabated in its place?

Rudyard Kipling
Father of Lieutenant John Kipling, The Irish Guards,
lost at the Battle of Loos, 1915

“If You Know Of A Better ‘Ole…”

2007-11-02T14:40:00.000-04:00

For those who don’t recognize it, the title above comes from a British cartoonist of the First World War, Captain Bruce Bairnsfather, and was used for what is probably his most famous cartoon. The cartoon pictures a shell hole in no-mans-land on the Western Front, in which two British soldiers have taken shelter from the still ongoing artillery barrage over their heads. One soldier is apparently responding to the complaints of the other by advising him that “If you know of a better ‘ole, go to it.”

This First World War reference seems apt as we approach November 11, originally the Armistice Day ending that conflict which we now commemorate as Veterans’ Day. That war is also on my mind because I recently read Stephen O’Shea’s outstanding “Back to the Front: An Accidental Historian Walks the Trenches of World War I.” The author’s description of his walking tours of the Western Front battlefields and his accounts of what originally happened there brought home again in an especially strong way the truth that we apparently learn nothing from history.

At this time in 1917, British and French forces were just winding up their costly Third Battle of Ypres, also known as Passchendaele. Russia was confronted with the revolution that would take it out of the war and lead to the failed experiment that was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Italy was reeling from the successful Austro-German offensive that was the battle of Caporetto (aka Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo) that would cost it 40,000 killed and wounded and a further 275,000 prisoners as they retreated. This offensive rescued Austria-Hungary from the collapse that had seemed imminent after the Italian success of the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo in late summer, a collapse that was in fact merely postponed until 1918. The United States had only been in the war for just over six months by this time, and its forces in France would not see serious combat for almost another six months.

This year, November 11 falls as we are half way through the fourth year of the conflict in Iraq. One aspect of life inside the Washington DC beltway is the abundance of institutes, think tanks, and policy advocacy groups focused upon every subject imaginable (and a few I would have never imagined). Remember ‘the surge’ in Iraq? In August, it seemed that it was all that the news media, Congress, and these think tanks could focus upon. Now the greater danger seems to be of a Turkish ‘surge’ into Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish PKK forces, an ironic echo of the one bright spot for the Allies some ninety years ago when Allenby defeated Turkish forces on October 31 at the Third Battle of Gaza/Battle of Beersheba (the latter battle recounted in the excellent Australian film “The Lighthorsemen”).

But in the wake of General Petraeus’ and Ambassador Crocker’s successful defense of the surge and the ensuing drumbeat regarding reduced U.S. casualties, everyone in Washington seems to have gone in search of that ‘better ‘ole’ in the form of some other issue such as immigration, including many of the politicians seeking election or re-election. The Washington Post recently featured a story on the developing plans for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq proposed to begin at about the middle of next year. However, I can’t help but wonder if the simultaneously reported decline in U.S. casualty rates and in attacks on U.S. forces might reflect decisions by the competing Iraqi militias to hunker down in their own ‘’oles’ and wait for the real contest for the control of Iraq that could begin as the last U.S. soldier is walking up the ramp of this generation’s homebound ‘Freedom Bird.’ Score one for the White House, it seems, or at least score one for those who haven’t left the White House in search of their own ‘better ‘oles’.

“The Smell of Victory, the Agony of Defeat” or, Victory can smell suspiciously like defeat and vice versa – but your feet hurt either way

2007-09-13T14:19:00.000-04:00

I spent last weekend in Maryland at a reenactment of elements of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam. Watching the parts of these battles selected for reenactment, it would have been easy to conclude that the Union Army handily defeated Robert E. Lee on September 17, 1862. However, most historians record this as a drawn battle and the bloodiest day in American history, with combined total losses (killed, wounded, and missing) for the two sides as high as 26,100.

What this weekend experience brought to mind against the background of the ongoing debate over the war in Iraq is just how difficult it can be to judge whether you are winning or losing while deep in the throes of combat. As my colleagues in Vietnam taught me back in the mid-1970s, it is sometimes hard to remember, when you find yourself up to your waist in alligators, that your job is to drain the swamp.

Historians and other students of warfare have long known that skirmishes, combats, battles, campaigns, and wars are very complicated phenomena. As the Greek poet Homer complained in The Iliad, “Victory often changes her side.” The Duke of Wellington had this complexity in mind when he wrote that “The history of the battle is not unlike the history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance.”

In fact, two of history’s greatest military commanders, Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte, were fooled on just this point. In 1741, Frederick fled from the field of the Battle of Mollwitz after his cavalry was defeated by the Austrians. However, his infantry, commanded by Marshal Count Kurt C. von Schwerin (who persuaded Frederick to flee) succeeded in defeating repeated Austrian attacks, finally driving them from the field. At the Battle of Marengo in 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte’s opponent concluded at 1:00 in the afternoon that he had won the battle and retired to his tent. Unfortunately for General Melas, Bonaparte persisted, rallied his reinforcements, and counterattacked at 5:00 to win the battle.

The Scottish General James Graham, Marquis of Montrose, actually took advantage of this confusion at the Battle of Auldearn in 1645. Beset by two opposing armies coming against him, his own army was deployed such that each of its two wings could not see what was happening to the other. In command of the left wing, Montrose received a messenger from his right wing commander reporting that he was hard pressed and appealing for urgent assistance. Instead of declaring that they must rush to the rescue, Montrose turned to the commander of his cavalry reserve and announced that the right wing was driving the enemy before it and asked, “Will you let the MacDonalds have all the glory of the day?” The two troops of cavalry rushed into the flank of the attacking enemy force supported by Montrose’s infantry from the left wing and shattered the enemy armies. Auldearn has been described as Montrose’s most brilliant tactical victory in which his losses were reported as a few hundred and those of the enemy as about two thousand.

Warfare is ideally the centrally coordinated application of willpower and resources in a manner calculated to persuade the enemy to stop doing what he wants to do and to start doing what you want him to do. This effort is attempted in midst of conditions that are the dictionary definition of chaos. It is also attempted in the face of your opponent’s efforts to do exactly the same thing to you. As a result, the answer to the question of who is winning can change from moment to moment, hour to hour, and even day to day. Both the question and the answer are different over any longer time frame – and can be even harder to pin down. Today, we look back to the last six months of 1942 and recognize turning points in the course of World War II. To the leaders, commanders, and citizens alive during that period, there was a lot less certainty about the direction of events.

Therefore, if you are confused about whether we are winning or losing the war in Iraq, be assured that you are but the latest to exercise a longstanding military tradition. But I might offer some guidance as to who to believe on the issue of who is winning and who is losing:

o If they are not in a position to hear gunfire or at least cannonfire, then they are too far out of touch.

o If they are in a position to be frequently ducking from and dodging gunfire, they are probably up too close to be able to see the big picture.

o However, if they are close enough to hear the cannonfire and hear the gunfire without having to duck or dodge, they may well be in the best position to figure out who is winning.

Some further food for thought:

“It is no doubt a good thing to conquer on the field of battle, but it needs greater wisdom and greater skill to make use of victory.” Polybius, Histories.

“Victory in war does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline will insure it.” Vegetius, De Re Militari. (378)

“Defeat is a thing of weariness, of incoherence, of boredom. And above all, futility.” Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Flight to Arras. (1942)

“Victory is a moral, rather than a material effect.”

“Gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of war.”
Both from Captain Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, Thoughts on War. (1944)

“When things are going badly in battle the best tonic is to take one’s mind off one’s own troubles by considering what a rotten time one’s opponent must be having.” Sir Archibald P Wavell, Other Men’s Flowers. (1944)

“Horribly stuffed with epithets of war.” Othello, Act I, I.

2007-09-04T21:49:00.000-04:00

As we mark the end of our summer holidays, the approach of autumn, or the return to school, spare a thought for documentary filmmaker Ken Burns. According to The Washington Post (Friday, August 31), Mr. Burns and his partners at Public Broadcasting (PBS) are concerned that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may launch a second front on his new World War II documentary “The War” over the reported use of obscenities by veterans discussing their wartime experiences. In an apparent effort to defuse possible FCC concerns, Ken Burns and PBS have reportedly decided, “war is heck.” The Washington Post reported that there will therefore be two versions of “The War” broadcast - an ‘adult’ version for evening hours and a cleaned-up obscenity-free version for the subsequent weekend/daytime hours when the program is more likely to be seen by children and perhaps other innocent viewers.

As Ken Burns must realize, his decision could be said to contradict experts such as General William Tecumseh Sherman, who declared to an 1880 assemblage of Union Army veterans that “There is many a boy here today who looks on war as all glory, but boys, it is all hell.” Similar thoughts can be found expressed in language that might be more acceptable to PBS and the FCC. For example, Robert E. Lee, writing in the aftermath of his victory in the Battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862, said, “It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it.” Even Lee’s good right arm, Stonewall Jackson, reportedly wrote in April 1861 about how “It is painful enough to discover with what unconcern they speak of war and threaten it. I have seen enough of it to make me look upon it as the sum of all evils.”

The film “Saving Private Ryan,” mentioned in The Washington Post, featured one of the most intense scenes of combat in film history. The television mini-series “Band of Brothers” included a very effective and dramatic recreation of combat in Normandy in the wake of the D-Day landings. The attack by Captain Winter and Easy Company on a German artillery battery is especially dramatic in its camera work that mixes action footage that is confused and even blurred in its fast-moving intensity with moments that are almost presented as snap-shots when something especially captures the attention and focus of whoever the camera is following. The resulting affect as I watched this segment was to recall the words of veterans of several conflicts that seemed to describe exactly this impression.

Nevertheless, the representation of warfare has long presented a challenge whether it was to be on the written page, on stage, in music, or on film – to mention only a few of the relevant art forms. For example, many veterans report that all artistic representations fall short because they cannot convey the full range and intensity of noises and smells that in particular afflict the battlefield. William Shakespeare specifically acknowledged the limitations of his stage in his Prologue to Henry V, when Chorus declared:

….But pardon, Gentles all,
The flat unraised spirits that have dared
On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth
So great an object: can this cockpit hold
The vasty fields of France? Or may we cram
Within this wooden O the very casques
That did affright the air at Agincourt?
O, pardon! since a crooked figure may
Attest in little place a million;
And let us, ciphers to this great accompt,
On your imaginary forces work.”

But there are questions left unanswered by Ken Burns, William Shakespeare, and the community of artists in all media who have confronted the challenge of representing the realities of war.

“Should artistic representations of war and warfare be more or less detailed and realistic?”

And, against the background of an ongoing conflict launched in great part by individuals who never wore a uniform much less served in combat, would American society be better or worse served by the frankest possible discussion of the realities of war, or is it better that we continue to shield people from this realities?

The Limitless Aspect of a Limited War

2007-07-02T09:30:00.000-04:00

With the appearance of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War, many people who thought about warfare grappled with the implications of the unlimited power of nuclear weapons for what was now called conventional war – to distinguish it from the new form of warfare using nuclear weapons. From this effort arose the concept of “limited war.”

Discussions about limiting war’s destructiveness are an integral part of the long history of the human race. For example, Europe’s wars of the 18th Century were nicknamed “the Lace Wars” from the lace trim worn on the uniforms of the day. These uniforms were especially worn by Generals who avoided battle as much as possible and made war either through a series of sieges which ended in the surrender of the besieged party in full ceremonial splendor and regalia, or through the execution of complicated maneuvers that convinced the enemy to avoid a battle by retreating or to formally concede that the party that executed the “best” maneuvers was the victor. The armies of that day were small and expensive and often considered too valuable to actually be risked in battle.

Limited wars have been defined in various ways at various times by various experts and decision makers. The first and most obvious limit is a war fought without nuclear weapons. Another recognized limit is a war fought only with the forces immediately available without mobilizing the nation’s manpower and industries to the level of total (but still non-nuclear) warfare – sometimes called the ‘come as you are’ war. Other limits involve decisions not to use certain tactics, not to use different types of weapons, not to strike various kinds of targets, etc.

However, the definition of limits and the drawing of boundary lines around the conduct of our wars almost always overlooks the reality of war at the level of the individual soldier. For the individual infantryman, in particular, who is always at some point exposed to attack by the enemy’s weapons and in turn must look that enemy in the eye or at least look at him (or her) through a weapon’s sight, there are no limits upon war. The individual soldier (and this really includes many people beyond the infantryman or Marine rifleman) is exposed to lethal harm whether or not the U.S. fights within limits.

In some cultures, both historically and still today, the decision to expose oneself to the enemy’s weapons on a battlefield is a demonstration of how important to you is the issue at the root of the conflict. A perceived reluctance to personally hazard the dangers of combat is interpreted to indicate at the least a lack of serious commitment to the issue at contest. This is in part why those who would have it so have so often claim that the United States is unwilling to risk combat or does not have the will to sustain a bloody and/or prolonged conflict. Certainly an examination of American history would prove that this is not the case, but rather, Americans have to be convinced that engaging in the conflict has to be for a goal that is worth the risk to human life. The reality is that no matter how limited politicians consider their military objectives to be, the associated conflict is unlimited as far as the people charged with achieving those objectives are concerned.

An excerpt from John Brown's Body by Stephen Vincent Benet -

If you take a flat map
And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,
The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.
The science of war is moving living men like blocks.
And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment.
But it takes time to mold your men into blocks
And flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies
Hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush,
They are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries,
And you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them.
--A string of blocks curling smoothly around the left
Of another string of blocks and crunching it up—
It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind,
But the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow
To move, when they start they take too long on the way—
The General loses his stars and the block-men die
In unstrategic defiance of martial law
Because still used to just being men, not block-parts.

The Lessons of Generalship - Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne

2007-06-25T17:09:00.000-04:00

I just finished reading George Billias’ George Washington’s Generals and Opponents: Their Exploits and Leadership, a collection of chapter-length biographies of the principal American and British commanders from our Revolutionary War. I found it a compelling read as the experiences of the individual British commanders blended into a portrait of the conflict as the British viewed it. General Burgoyne’s experiences were especially striking, perhaps reflecting the fact that this account was written against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and was now being read with Iraq in the background. Immortalized in popular lore as “Gentleman” Johnny, Burgoyne cut an interesting figure even for an 18th Century British general as the reputed illegitimate son of a Chancellor of the Exchequer and a recognized playwright by the time of his service in America.

Burgoyne began his service in America with optimism, convinced that “trained troops were inevitably bound to win out over untrained forces.” He did not consider the Americans capable of “any long and drawn-out resistance,” expecting the majority to be quieted by a British show of strength. The remainder would not stand to fight in a pitched battle or general combat unless they had entrenchments like those around Boston. He noted that the Americans were “accustomed to working with shovel and axes” and could quickly through up entrenchments. He was also skeptical of the American rebels in general, considering them to be “dominated by a few despotic figures…subject to bribery.” Burgoyne anticipated that this latter weakness would allow the Crown to persuade them to end all resistance to lawful British rule.

In the wake of Bunker Hill, Burgoyne amended his expectation of quick victory, though he still expected a British victory. In 1776, he described the American militia as “respectable” foes and assessed the conflict as follows:

“Composed as the American army is, together with the strength of the country, full of woods, swamps, stone walls, and other enclosures and hiding places, it may be said of it that every private man will in action be his own general, who will turn every tree and bush into a temporary fortress, from whence, when he hath fired his shot with all deliberation, coolness, and certainty which hidden safety inspires, he will skip as it were to the next, and so on for a long time…”

Burgoyne began to call for more men and material in order to apply more direct military pressure on the recalcitrant rebels. He reconsidered his thinking about the fragility of the American rebels’ morale, noting that in battle “The panic of the rebel troops is confined, and of short duration…the enthusiasm is extensive and permanent.” As the conflict continued, Burgoyne came to recognize that it could not be ended in any conventional manner on British terms, his own discussion of the conflict came to include references to the American “nation” and no longer spoke of “rebellious subjects.”

On the battlefield, Burgoyne emphasized in response the use of light infantry, reflecting his experience with light troops during the Seven Years War. He believed that once the British army’s superior artillery blasted the Americans out of their entrenchments and “temporary fortresses, his light infantry and light cavalry could deal with them.

Burgoyne won an independent command in this conflict in 1777 as head of the army invading from Canada. What he expected to happen is not completely clear, but his objective appears to have been the city of Albany, with which the British would control the Hudson River, dividing New York from the New England colonies. The explanation that London failed to tell General Howe to march north from New York to meet Burgoyne and thus caused the latter’s surrender has been discredited. It appears likely that Burgoyne actually believed, at least at first, that he could reach Albany without assistance. The British were confident that the perceived weakness of the Americans and the supposed strength of the Loyalists in upper New York and in Pennsylvania assured success. They expected Burgoyne to be marching through an area with a friendly population. .

Burgoyne did not rest in attempting to gain every advantage for his army. He urged his officers to follow the American example and use entrenchments and guerrilla tactics whenever possible. He brought along his technological edge over the Americans (especially the militia) in the form of more than 138 cannon. Just before the Battle of Saratoga he organized a unit of sharpshooters reputedly inspired by the example of Daniel Morgan’s riflemen.

Burgoyne also had his propaganda campaign in the form of proclamations declaring that the British army had been summoned to restore constitutional government and to protect the “general privileges of Mankind” against “the compleatest form of Tyranny [the Continental Congress] that ever God in his displeasure suffered….to be exercises over a….stubborn generation.” American leaders were accused of “arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, [and] persecution and torture.”

However, Burgoyne received only a third of the promised horses and was far short of his stated requirement for carts. He also had only 1,000 Canadian and loyalist militia and Native Americans instead of the planned 3,000. However, when the crisis came, his real weakness would come from decisions made in London and New York that left to small a force in New York to break through to him.

The advance towards Saratoga apparently led Burgoyne to change a number of his ideas about the conflict. Two months before his surrender, Burgoyne wrote that “the great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congress, in principle and zeal; and their measures are executed with secrecy and dispatch that area not equalled. Wherever the King’s forces point, militia, to the amount of three or four thousand, assemble in twenty-four hours.” After his surrender on October 17, 1777, Burgoyne would again record his impression of his American opponents in a letter to Lord Germain in London:

“The standing corps which I have seen are disciplined: I do not hazard the term, but apply it to the great fundamental points of military institution, sobriety, subordination, regularity, and courage. The militia are inferior in method and movement, but not a jot less servicable in woods. My conjectures were very different after the affair of Ticonderoga; they were delusive, and it is a duty to the state to confess it.”

Burgoyne’s return to England after his surrender (and his parole upon the promise not to fight in America again) found England more politically divided than ever over the American conflict. When the government learned that Burgoyne intended to place the responsibility on his superior, General Howe, it warned him that he could not then expect the support of the government (already under attack in parliament by an opposition hoping to embarrass the government with General Howe’s performance as commander-in-chief in America). Burgoyne would ask for, be refused, but eventually be the subject of a parliamentary inquiry in May 1779. Despite his testimony that the orders given him by Lord Germain, the American Secretary in the Government, offered him no flexibility and compelled him to attempt to reach Albany regardless of circumstances or consequences. He also complained that General Howe had failed to support him or his army. The inquiry’s result was both political and militarily inconclusive, but Burgoyne’s military career was now totally dependent on the Opposition coming to power. However, because of its political and military implications for American Independence, Burgoyne’s campaign and the final Battle of Saratoga would retain their fascination for historians right up to the present day.

Some possible items of interest for further reading:

Burgoyne’s Orderly Book

Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books: A Journal Kept in Canada and Upon Burgoyne's Campaign

The Dramatic and Poetical Works of the Late Lieut. Gen. J. Burgoyne

“The Devil’s Disciple," by playwright George Bernard Shaw

“Take it quietly, Major Swindon: your friend the British soldier can stand up to anything except the British War Office.” Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, Act III, The Devil’s Disciple, George Bernard Shaw.

"Watch them words, watch them words!"

2007-06-06T10:57:00.001-04:00

Tom Ricks, the Washington Post’s Military Correspondent, has a knack for getting my attention with the items he shares from his wide-ranging contacts with members of our armed services. The latest such tidbit was a short note on how American military personnel have picked up Inshallah as part of their everyday vocabulary. Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary (www.m-w.com/ which includes an audio guide for pronunciation) defines it to mean “God willing,” or “if Allah wills it.” What is not yet clear is the degree to which the appearance of the phrase in regular usage also reflects the adoption of some related degree of fatalistic thinking among the troops about their mission’s chances for success.

Of course, this is not the first time that American troops have taken up foreign words and phrases as a result of their exposure to foreign climes. I was very much reminded of this last Memorial Day as a friend and I drove into Washington DC to participate in the Annual Memorial Day Parade. As he described some office project to me, he made some reference to boo-coo problems – and hearing this legacy of the Vietnam War really caught me off-guard. In part because I hadn’t heard it in so long, was entirely unaware of the nature of his connection to that war, and perhaps because we were both wearing Union Army uniforms (reproductions) for the parade at that particular moment. (By the way, at least one of my sources suggests that the Yanks had previously captured the word in France during the First World War – perhaps it was sent back home during the Depression. One can only wonder at what forgotten lessons the American soldiers of the Revolutionary War learned from their French comrades-in-arms?)

Another piece of linguistic booty that I learned long before I knew its origin is boondocks to refer to remote, rural regions. This is a legacy of the Philippine Insurrection that followed our occupation of the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. Also picked up during that conflict was the word bolo, the Spanish language name for the large machete like knife used by the guerrillas. This reportedly survived in a First World War reference to the men who did not perform well on the rifle range as ‘the bolo squad’ (apparently suggesting they would be better armed with bolos than rifles) and most recently during Desert Storm in the ‘bolo badge’ nickname for a Purple Heart badge awarded for a wound that was received under particularly foolish circumstances. Interestingly, stockade is of Spanish origin but has been in English usage for so long that it appears to date from pre-American Revolutionary contacts between American or British and Spanish forces in Europe or North America.

However, in spite of all of this entertaining trivia, the reported usage of Inshallah does warrant reflection on what this conflict is doing to the military now and in for the future. For most of the 19th Century, French offered the strongest impact on the speech of American soldiers since we and everybody else took Napoleon and his Grande Armée as our model for military perfection. French was the first foreign language taught at West Point. With the rise of Prussia in Europe, after our American Civil War, German words entered the military vocabulary as our officers sought to master a more theoretical approach to war based upon the study of Clausewitz and the application of his ideas by German generals. This influence survived right up to the verge of the Cold War when Russian began to exert a greater influence. As the post-Vietnam War army refocused on a possible conflict with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, German re-emerged in words like schwerpunkt to mean strongpoint or center of gravity, for example, as American forces studied how to fight a war in Europe against a modern technologically advanced and larger opponent. Words do have meaning and attention to the evolution of military vocabulary offers insight into what is happening on the battlefield as well as what is happening in the higher headquarters both in the field and in Washington, DC.

“Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it, misdiagnosing it, and misapplying the wrong remedies.”
Groucho Marx

It's a Mystery

2007-05-29T21:11:00.000-04:00

In the June 2007 issue of SMITHSONIAN magazine, Gregory R. Treverton, Director of the RAND Corporation’s Center for Global Risk and Security and formerly Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (responsible for production of National Intelligence Estimates), describes the difference between a puzzle and a mystery – characterizing the former with the Cold War task of assessing the military capabilities of the Soviet Union by counting their missiles, calculating their various capabilities, and adding up the sums. Today’s challenge for the Pentagon analysts focused upon the terrorist threat is “to frame mysteries.” Treverton elaborates as follows:

“Puzzles can be solved; they have answers….But a mystery offers no such comfort. It poses a question that has no definitive answer because the answer is contingent; it depends on future interaction of many factors, known and unknown. A mystery cannot be answered; it can only be framed, by identifying the critical factors and applying some sense of how they have interacted in the past and might interact in the future. A mystery is an attempt to define ambiguities.”

I find Treverton’s thoughts interesting because I always want to hear from people who have practical experience that they are willing to share. However, my initial reaction is that he may be trying to make his point the hard way. By comparison, Donald Rumsfeld’s 2002 discussion of “known knowns,” “known unknowns,” and “unknown unknowns” was transparently clear based upon my work during several assignments as an analyst in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. There I had personal experience sorting intelligence reports and identifying the “known knowns,” the “known unknowns,” and the “unknown unknowns.”

Treverton’s example of Soviet military capabilities as a puzzle does not really make his point for me either. John Prados’ 1982 book “The Soviet Estimate” recounts how much difficulty the U.S. Intelligence Community had in measuring the USSR’s military expenditures. A series of faulty assumptions such as projecting our own costs and procedures onto the Soviet Union resulted in repeated miscalculations and overestimates of the USSR’s military strength. Treverton’s reduction of Soviet military capabilities to the level of a puzzle to be solved by means of mathematical exercises may accurately reflect the process, but as Prados’ book showed these calculations too often reflected false or erroneous assumptions.

Winston Churchill is reported to have said, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” This is a useful observation in this context because it brings up a point I have made in the past about how Pentagon analysts approached their task by focusing on capabilities and ignoring intentions. What I understand Treverton to be saying is that now the terrorist threat represents a mystery rather than a puzzle because the intelligence community must factor in the question of their intentions as well as their capabilities.

“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest to fool.”
Richard Feynman

Washington Looks at its Cards, Moscow Looks at the Board

2007-05-16T15:34:00.000-04:00

I remember when I was an undergraduate, my Russian History professor offered the observation – even then a cliché – that Americans played poker while Russians played chess. The ‘truth’ within this epigram was that Americans tended to play for the short term, thinking only of the current hand, knowing that the deck would get reshuffled and play would start again; while the Soviet Union (led principally by Russians) played for the long-term win, looking ahead two, three, or even five or six turns ahead – meaning also ahead of the Americans. During my State Department career, I had several opportunities to observe that – as with most clichés – this one held a kernel of truth.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire in the early 1990s, the United States and the new Russian Federation recognized that without the burden of ideological rivalry the life-and-death struggle of the Cold War had ended. The two countries looked increasingly like partners as the 20th Century came to an end. However, Moscow learned, as have London, Paris, Bonn, and other friendly capitols, that Washington does not allow partnerships to prevent it from acting unilaterally when it considers action necessary, especially post 9/11.

The Bush Administration came into office with several goals that directly affected this emerging partnership, including, for example, winning a free hand to pursue a modernized nuclear deterrent more relevant to the post-Cold War world by reducing or eliminating related arms control commitments. Resulting U.S.-Russian frictions were compounded by disagreements over such issues as trade, technology transfer, Russia’s World Trade Organization membership, NATO expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries and former parts of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the Balkans conflict, Iraq, and U.S. concerns at Russian actions in its relations with the new independent states that had been part of the Soviet Union.

One U.S. goal that was achieved was the elimination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was considered an obstacle to the desired national missile defense system aimed at the growing missile threat from Third World countries such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran – among others. The U.S. announced its withdrawal from the treaty in December 2001. Since then work has proceeded on the missile defense system and the U.S. has been discussing with friendly governments where to place system launch units, warning radars, command and control centers and other components.

Various locations in Europe have been mentioned for the launchers, including the UK and Poland. As proposed launcher sites neared its borders, Russia escalated its public objections. Moscow claimed that the U.S. system is actually intended to counter Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence. It was also rumored that Moscow would walk away from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that eliminated a whole class of shorter range NATO-Warsaw Pact missiles. Since the range of these weapons limited them to use in Europe, this may have been an attempt to dissuade Washington’s European allies from participating in the project.

The United States holds a pretty strong hand on these issues. The achievement of a functioning missile defense system is primarily a matter of time, resources, money, and determination. The U.S. holds most of these in abundance – only its determination is subject to question as Presidential administrations come and go. By contrast, without the resources of the former Soviet Union at its command, the Russian Federation cannot compete with the United States in any hypothetical arms race – even with a strong, healthy economy.

Having read (or counted) the cards – Moscow has announced that it may suspend its obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Agreement. Signed in 1990, the CFE treaty includes restrictions on the size, makeup, and deployment of NATO and Warsaw Pact member conventional (non-nuclear) military forces in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to Russia’s Ural Mountains with the goal of limiting each side’s ability to launch a surprise conventional attack. The treaty is supported by a system of mutual inspections in which personnel from the signatory countries visit each other’s military installations to verify compliance.

The CFE treaty has been a sore spot for the Russian Federation because its terms continue to limit Russian deployment of conventional military forces and because the U.S. and other Western countries have invoked its terms in connection with the presence of Russian military forces in the Caucasus (Georgia in particular) and in Moldova. Adjustments to the Treaty were agreed upon by all parties in Istanbul in 1996, but the NATO countries refuse to ratify this Adapted Treaty until Russian forces are withdrawn from Moldova and Georgia where their presence is considered a treaty violation. So, as the U.S. is perceived in Moscow as having raised the ante by discussing the possible deployment of anti-missile interceptors in Poland, Russia has responded by advancing Queen’s Rook to a4 (or QR4).

"When an escaped prisoner looks for a guard, he always finds one."
Klingon Proverb (Star Trek)

Another SIde of the Global Warming Issue - The Generals and Admirals Weigh In

2007-04-27T16:04:00.000-04:00

I recognize that some time has passed since my last blog, but I don’t try to do this on a daily basis and some times my topic requires a bit of study before I write about it. My previous blog on the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire’s use of intelligence services and clandestine operatives called to mind some lessons from my contacts with the intelligence community during my career at the Department of State, some of which came to mind in connection with this new report on “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.”

The Center for Naval Analysis, often known simply as CNA, recently released this report, which can be accessed and downloaded at www.SecurityandClimate.can.org , was prepared by a panel of 11 distinguished retired Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps generals and admirals. Their purpose in this report was to examine the issue of climate change “through the lens of our military experience as warfighters, planners, and leaders.” This is a straightforward statement reflecting a basic aspect of military analysis often overlooked by those outside of the Department of Defense and the uniformed services.

Military analysts, such as those working with intelligence information at the Pentagon, for example, almost always focus upon military and related capabilities rather than on intentions when assessing possible threats by other states and by non-state players. During the long years of the Cold War, this reflected the hard truth that capabilities could be assessed in great part by simply counting the other side's warships, airplanes, tanks, submarines, and missiles etc. While this is not a bad thing in and of itself, a focus solely upon capabilities that ignores intentions can result in erroneous and sometimes almost farcical conclusions. (An Army paratroop officer I knew at the Navy War College in the mid-1980s had conceived the notion that the Soviet Union was going to use all of its then-recently expanded airborne/parachute/airmobile assets to launch the simultaneous seizure of the microchip manufacturing centers in Japan and Singapore and thus deprive the United States, its friends, and its allies of these essential commodities. He was un-persuaded by the argument that such an operation flew completely in the face of decades of Soviet military operations and practices – not to mention centuries of Russian operations – and was completely inconsistent with the then-global geo-political situation – i.e. he ignored the issue of intentions because of his fascination at the capabilities.)

This does not mean that I believe that our retired generals and admirals have fallen into this trap in their analysis of the threat of climate change. It does mean that the reader should bear in mind that this analysis will in many ways likewise focus upon capabilities – especially the capabilities that are likely to be needed by the United States and its friends and allies if/when confronted by the identified possible outcomes and effects of global warming. And because these are capabilities that cannot be acquired overnight but must be acquired, developed, and built up over months and years of work and of Congressional budget cycles – their report is going to present a lot of worst case analysis. They have to present such worst cases if we are to be prepared for the worst – and especially if they have concluded that we are dangerously far right now from being prepared for the worst possible cases. Our experience with Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath do not offer much assurance and not enough has been done to correct the identifiable errors in our response to that disaster.

But the worst cases contemplated in this study are not just those of natural disasters linked to or resulting from climate change, also considered are the potential consequences of those disasters for humanity and the possible behavior of affected states and/or their populations. Again, the analysis reflects an assessment of potential capabilities because intentions in such projections are even more difficult to determine than they are today in the war on terror. Do read their report carefully, examine their recommendations, and decide what you think about their recommendations and what we should be doing. There is a relevant though now crusty epigram that I learned while working with the military – the Five (or if you prefer, Six) Ps - Prior Planning Prevents Piss-poor Performance. Without this study and the numerous others examining the challenges of climate change, we would be unable to make any plans at all.

"Intelligences sees how to. Wisdom sees when to."
Gwen Ross

A Byzantine Model for a Byzantine Conflict?

2007-04-05T20:18:00.000-04:00

With the distractions of the ongoing war in Iraq, the related political war in Washington, and the recent but now faded worry over a potential war between Iran and the UK and/or the United States, perhaps a quick reminder of that other war is in order. I am referring to the war on terror, the war that began on 11 September 2001 with the horrendous images from New York City and Washington.

This is the war that was brought to us not by any country or government but by a group of radical Islamic fundamentalists. This is the war that we pursued when we entered Afghanistan and brought down the Taliban regime that had given shelter, aid, comfort, and support to that movement. And it was the war that we neglected when the decision was made to enter Iraq and bring down the regime of Sadam Hussein.

Although we may have neglected this conflict, at least in terms of it demanding any of the public’s attention, it has not gone away. It is not a war that is fought or will be fought with major force deployments, unlike the conflict in Iraq. It may at times be raised to the levels seen in Afghanistan at the time of the destruction of the Taliban regime, but normally this will be the war of the shadows first referred to in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It is likely that this conflict will only emerge into public view when Al Qaeda or one of its affiliates or allies makes a successful attack. It is almost as likely that our own successes will not so emerge and will remain unheralded. That raises, in fact, the likelihood that this war will remain out of the headlines until another successful attack occurs.

In the shadows where this war is fought, our immediate need is information, the essentials of who, what, where, when, how, and why. One presumes that we are using every technical/technological means at our disposal to gather the desired information, while also confronting the difficult challenge of improving our human intelligence effort against this most difficult of targets. However, the shortage of people who speak the various forms of Arabic and other languages spoken by Al Qaeda operatives and their allies does limit our ability to make the fullest possible use of the information that we might be gathering.

Our striking power consists primarily of the special operations units of the Armed Forces but also whatever other forces that can be called upon by the U.S. and by its Allies. At the pointy-end (an old-fashioned phrase dating from the era of the bayonet), that striking power might look like one of the night-vision goggle wearing warriors in armored vests and full kit that we are accustomed to seeing on the television news or on those cable channels that specialize in programs on military affairs and technology. It might also look like a missile or other smart weapon homing in on a target from out of the heavens – if that blow is even seen before it lands.

There can be no doubt that Al Qaeda, its allies, friends, and even rivals have been hurt by our efforts since 9/11. They have suffered losses in trained personnel and they have lost the base and training facilities they once enjoyed in Afghanistan. Communications within Al Qaeda and within the terrorist world in general are more difficult due to the loss of those facilities and bases but also because they are trying to keep us from reading their mail or even knowing who is communicating with whom. They also want to deny us the ability to read any communications that might come into our hands – other than those taped messages that are intended both for us and for their sympathizers, supporters, and allies. However, this is a patient, determined, and inventive opponent. They are willing to launch operations at whatever targets they can reach, meaning so far those beyond the continental United States, while still working at again reaching out and touching the number one enemy again in a dramatic and probably unexpected fashion, and they are willing to wait for their opportunities and are determined to stay in this struggle for the long haul.

To the best of my recollection, the best historical example of such a prolonged conflict and possibly one of the best, i.e. most effective, practioners of such a war in the shadows were the Byzantines – the Eastern Roman Empire with its capitol in what is today Istanbul. Their abilities for conducting this type of war and the way in which they did it are reportedly reflected today in our usage of the very word ‘Byzantine’ to refer to any intricate exercise in scheming and intrigue. Frankly, I do not know as much about their efforts in this regard as I would like to so I am off to find out more about it. Any suggestions for reading material on the subject would be welcomed and I will be happy to share any recommendations with the permission of the suggestor.

"Nothing is more terrible than ignorance in action." Johann von Goethe

“One Staff Officer jumped right over the other staff officer’s back, and another staff officer jumped right over the other staff officer’s back,…..“+

2007-03-28T15:30:00.000-04:00

There is a rather old jibe about the Congress that I confess comes back to me over and over again through the years. At its most succinct it is a description of Congress as a circus consisting of 535 clowns and no animal act. While some observers may be tempted to insist that certain animals are in fact represented based upon the behavior of selected members, I am more concerned at the suggestion that the members of our two legislative houses wish to become 535 generals (of whatever rank they may choose). Unfortunately, the attempt by the Congress to control military operations in Iraq strongly suggests that they are collectively reaching their Peter Point*, because in the attempt they have clearly forgotten one of the most important of the principles of war – Unity of Command, sometimes also expressed as Unity of Purpose.

Military forces function best when there is a clear chain of command that places operational military decisions in the hands of a single individual – who carries equal burdens of authority and responsibility. History is replete with the examples of the importance of this principle. It also works best if that individual is rather close to the scene of military operations rather than half a world away. While the technology of today is incredibly fast by comparison, one example that unavoidably comes to mind is of those senior officers during the First World War who attempted to direct military operations in the trenches and across the “no-man’s land” of the Western Front from the comfort of their headquarters housed safely (and comfortably) in the rear. When the Allies tried to run the war this same way in 1940, the end result was the rapid fall of France and the risky evacuation of the virtually disarmed British Expeditionary Force from the beaches of Dunkirk.

I recognize that the Democratic leadership on the Hill is trying to demonstrate responsiveness to what it sees as the sense of the American electorate expresses in last November’s elections. But inserting Congress into the chain of command will not achieve the result they are looking for.

+The soldiers of the British Army on the Western Front made up any number of songs that matched their lyrics commenting on their predicament with various well-known melodies. A personal favorite is “They Were Only Playing Leapfrog” which depicts the staff officers safe at headquarters in the rear area more interested in personal advancement (leaping over other staff officers) than they were in the reality in the front-line trenches.

*Peter Point – from the work of Dr. Laurence J. Peter who identified the Peter Point as being that position of responsibility in which the occupant’s poor performance demonstrates that he/she has risen above his/her level of competence.

"The British soldier can stand up to anything except the British War Office." General Burgoyne, in George Bernard Shaw's "The Devil's Disciple."

Social Contracts and Contract Law

2007-03-21T15:18:00.000-04:00

I was in New York City over the past weekend to participate in the annual St. Patrick’s Day parade. I was part of the contingent of reenactors from the Maryland-DC-Virginia area who fell in with the New York-based 69th New York, portraying the original unit that made up part of the Union Army’s Irish Brigade during the American Civil War. It is always a fun occasion but in the face of a number of controversies in both Washington and New York over who is fit to march in parades and who is fit to wear the country’s uniforms, it was also thought provoking.

During the years before American Civil War – and even after it – Irish immigrants faced great prejudice in this country expressed by such groups as the anti-immigrant/anti-Roman Catholic “Know-Nothing Party” of the 1850s and others. Even if the appearance of the “No Irish Need Apply” signs has been exaggerated, they represent a real attitude of the times. My own paternal grandfather held a prejudice against the Irish right up to his death in the 1970s. In spite or perhaps because of this, the Irish were the second largest ethnic group represented in the Union Army during that war, with some 200,000 men enrolled. [The Germans were the largest foreign-born contingent at an estimated 216,000 men and there were a reported 210,000 African-Americans enlisted by war’s end.] For the Irish in 1861, such service was a step forward in their struggle for the fullest exercise of their new citizenship and its recognition by American society at large, just as it would be during the much longer struggle by African-Americans and later women.

The idea that service in a nation’s armed forces will win one a stronger claim to an equal place in that nation’s socio-political-economic system was not a new idea in 1861. Even today, honorable military service is a pathway to U.S. citizenship for many immigrants. During the American War for Independence, African-Americans fought both for the British and for the American colonies seeking to win a place for themselves and their community within whatever victorious entity emerged from that conflict. They would be disappointed, as the newly independent American colonists would push them aside in establishing their new country while the British took many of their African-American veterans and sold them on the slave marts of the West Indies.

This idea is a reflection of something I learned in my study of military history and military theory. Most nations, but especially democratic societies such as the United States, have an unwritten social contract between the society at large and those individuals that makes up the armed elements that defend that society. The contract terms vary from country to country and often alter with the passage of time and changes in that society. This contract authorizes these individuals to take up arms and exercise lethal force against the identified enemies of the society. The contract thus empowers these individuals to do things in the name of that society that if done under other circumstances would result in their arrest and punishment at the hands of society. In return for their willingness to fulfill this role, society agrees to honor and reward them, support them and their families, and within bounds protect them from any consequences of their actions on its behalf.

The relationship thus defined by this contract is not without its bumps, faults, and errors. African-Americans fought in the American Civil War, in the post-Civil War conflicts with Native Americans, in the Spanish-American War (all too many people remember Teddy Roosevelt but ignore who else charged up San Juan Hill), served in the First World War (only a few were actually allowed to serve in combat), fought in the Second World War, and only during the Korean War were the Armed Forces officially integrated (society took longer). The presence of women in our Armed Forces can be said to be older than the country, but it has only been recently that our Armed Forces and society at large has been forced to face the reality that no one wearing a uniform can be protected from or is immune to the risks of combat.

Now we are confronted (again) with the issue of the presence of Gays in the Armed Forces. Despite the veil often drawn over such things by both contemporaries and succeeding generations, there are examples throughout history of homosexuals engaged in war and combat with generally the same degrees of success and failure as heterosexuals. There is no inherent reason to believe that Gays cannot serve ably in our Armed Forces and based upon reports from Iraq and Afghanistan, there is in fact every reason to believe the contrary.

What has to be understood about the social contract is that it is a two-way street. Society has the right under this contract to require that its Armed Forces reflect that society in their makeup and society’s values in the way in which the Armed Forces fulfill their duties. When society came to believe it was the thing to do, the Irish, the African-Americans, and women (though still reportedly confronted by issues of harassment and assault) were all given the opportunity for military service. When the day comes that America concludes Gays deserve that same right of serving in the Armed Forces without fear of prejudice it will become a reality. It appears that this point has not yet been reached – but it appears to be coming closer – and based upon history it will probably come before many people are ready for it and will have taken longer than it should have.

Unplanned Non-obsolescence

2007-03-15T23:03:00.000-04:00

In today’s world, the Internet can turn up all sorts of interesting information. I found an item reporting Marines’ views on various U.S. weapons and equipment in the Washington Post (February 4, 2007). Washington Post Military Correspondent Tom Ricks cited Military.com as the source via friends in that website’s community. Military.com is quoted in the Post article as acknowledging that the information came to them without attribution but they having been persuaded by the item’s insights into the experience of U.S. Marines serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, they chose to use it.

The article as presented in the Post offers a succinct assessment of 13 items of weaponry and current equipment being used by the Marines:

Thumbs down M-16 rifle (chronic jamming due to dust, problems which also plague the more popular M-4 carbine; the 5.56mm (.223) round is
considered underpowered for their situation)

Thumbs down M243 SAW (squad assault weapon)(chronic jamming problems, often requiring partial disassembly)

Thumbs neutral M9 Beretta 9mm pistol (good gun but an old complaint about the underpowered 9mm round has resurfaced)

Thumbs up Mossberg 12ga military shotgun
Thumbs up M240 Machine Gun (7.62mm/.308 calibre)
Thumbs up, way up M2 .50 calibre heavy machine gun
Thumbs up .45 calibre automatic pistol
Thumbs up M-14 7.62mm rifle
Thumbs way up Barrett .50 calibre sniper rifle
Thumbs up M24 sniper rifle
Thumbs up Newer body armor
Thumbs way up Night vision and Infrared equipment
Thumbs up Lights

The interesting thing to me is the number of weapons on the ‘thumbs up’ portion of the list can be traced back the First and Second World Wars.

By the time of U.S. entry into World War II, the M2 ‘Ma Deuce’ Heavy Machine Gun was already a veteran weapon. I personally became acquainted with ‘Ma Deuce’ in the early 1970s, when she was already a grand old lady of more than 50 years service. The M2 has long been recognized has a powerful weapon with remarkable long-range accuracy. The Barret .50 calibre sniper rifle is in fact a close relative of the .50 machine gun, reflecting that well-recorded long-range accuracy. Before the development of today’s tank main gun fire control systems, many tanks were equipped with a .50 calibre weapon strapped to the main gun to be used to fire single round ‘aiming shots’ at selected targets, allowing the gunner to quickly and accurately fix the range to the target before firing the main gun. In the heat of armored combat, the single .50 calibre round was often not even noticed by the target vehicle’s crew.

U.S. forces have long used shotguns, sometimes civilian models and more often weapons modified for military use. A highpoint for military shotguns were the pump-action ‘trench broom’ shotguns of the First World War. Such weapons were as useful in the close combat of the trenches as they apparently are now in clearing buildings in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The M240 Machine Gun is described as being based upon the operating system of the veteran Browning Automatic Rifle (or BAR) and the ammo belt feed system of the World War II German MG 42 (the gun that also inspired the older U.S. M-60 7.62mm machine gun). The BAR was introduced to U.S. forces during World War I as a squad level automatic weapon. The MG 42 was recognized during World War II as an outstanding weapon and was the bases for the U.S.’s 7.62mm M60 machine gun of Vietnam War fame.

The M-14 rifle, the first standard issue U.S. weapon capable of full automatic fire, was introduced in 1957. Basically an improved M-1 Garand rifle (the standard U.S. infantry weapon of World War II), the M-14 was replaced by the M-16. For some years, the U.S. Marines used the M21 model of the M14 as a sniper rifle.

The ‘great-granddaddy’ from this list of rediscovered weapons is the .45 calibre Browning automatic pistol first adopted by the U.S. in 1911 – more than 90 years ago. Undergoing various modifications and changes, the .45 Browning served U.S. forces until replaced by the 9mm Beretta in the 1980s – a decision criticized even then. Bringing this weapon out of retirement even on a small scale echoes the reported reasons for its original adoption. American troops in the Philippines were faced by strong resistance to the imposition of U.S. rule after the defeat of Spain in 1898. These soldiers reportedly complained that their Army Colt revolvers lacked the power needed to stop a charging Islamic Moro guerrilla warrior with his large machete like ‘bolo.’

A hallmark of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s tenure was his drive for transformation of the American military. Militaries do need to evolve, to adapt to new technologies, new opponents, new geography, etc. Meeting this need to evolve has almost always been accompanied by extended debate as different individuals claim to have the latest, best new idea, to have identified the true Revolution in Military Affairs whether it be the tank, the airplane, or network centric warfare. But the above list shows an interesting aspect to military evolutions and even military revolutions – not every idea or technology or weapon is obsolete just because it has been around awhile. Ask the B-52 flight crews who are flying airframes older than their parents. Achieving a better, more capable military force does not always require throwing away everything that went before. Keeping some of those capabilities and the related tools around can prove useful.

Repitition is the Mother of Learning - even in History?

2007-03-13T13:08:00.000-04:00

It is widely said that there is an ancient Chinese proverb to the effect that “a fool learns from experience, a wise man learns from the experience of others.” Whether or not this is correctly quoted, President Bush appears to have learned one way or the other about the uncertainties of war given his statement a while ago that “no plan survives contact with the enemy.” This phrase refers to a military aphorism attributed to the 19th Century Prussian Field Marshal and Chief of the General Staff, Helmut von Moltke (the elder). While von Moltke may not have said it in exactly those words, the idea is reflected in several places in his writings and the wisdom therein is thus on offer to the wise man who wishes to learn from the experience of others.

This brings us to the possibility of learning useful and even important lessons from the study of history, something long advocated for students of military affairs by figures such as Napoleon Bonaparte and our friend von Moltke. Many people, especially politicians, are demonstrably fond of citing various lessons from history to support whatever action – or inaction – they are advocating. But as most historians (and some politicians) know, history can be a slippery instructor and it is often hard to be certain that the right lesson has been learned.

For those interested in knowing more about the possible uses and abuses of history and its lessons, there are two books in particular that should be looked for:

“Historians’ Fallacies, Toward a Logic of Historical Thought” by David Hackett Fischer, (1970, New York, Harper & Row, LoC 69-15583), and,

“Thinking in Time, The Uses of History of Decision Makers” by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, (1986, New York, The Free Press/Macmillan, ISBN 0-02-922790-9).

In the first book, historian David Fischer attempts to set out a disciplined and logical approach to the study of history and the analysis of historical events – and in the process examines the myriad ways in which historians and others can get it wrong. He hangs this attempt upon a list of fallacies that he has found committed by historians and the users of history, grouping this list into 12 categories each with some 10 to 12 member fallacies: Fallacies of Question-framing; Fallacies of Factual Verification; Fallacies of Factual Significance; Fallacies of Generalization; Fallacies of Narration; Fallacies of Causation; Fallacies of Motivation; Fallacies of Composition; Fallacies of False Analogy; Fallacies of Semantical Distortion; and Fallacies of Substantive Distraction. Personally, I find it difficult to find any of the listed fallacies that cannot be used in connection with much of the debate in recent years over the war on terror, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even the debate on who demonstrates the greatest support for the troops. Nevertheless, I would draw the special attention of the reader to the Fallacies of False Analogy, Fallacies of Question-framing, Fallacies of Verification, and Fallacies of Causation.

Richard Neustadt and Ernest May based their 1986 work, “Thinking in Time,” on their experience teaching an innovative course at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, in which they sought to instruct high-level public officials and their aides on how to use history in their decision-making. The book discusses some 30 historical case studies used in their classes to reflect upon the misuses of historical analogy and on proper ways to draw upon historical examples in addressing contemporary issues. The selected case studies range from the secession crisis leading up the outbreak of the American Civil War, the creation of Social Security in 1935 and separately its reform in 1983, the question of defending South Korea in 1950, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the subsequent 1979 issue of the presence in Cuba of a Soviet military brigade, and a number of cases relating to different aspects of the conflict in Indochina that became the United States’ Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. The book includes appendixes providing additional detailed information regarding the catalog of case studies, the analytical methods presented in the course of instruction, and discussion of the different courses that the authors have prepared and taught drawing upon these ideas.

A central argument almost inevitably raised in any discussion of the use of history in decision-making or the making of historical comparisons in discussing contemporary issues is the idea that history does (or does not) repeat itself. Personally, I am not in complete disagreement with either side of this debate. On the one side, I have to agree that history does not appear to have ever repeated itself exactly, despite the fact that people confronting the same or similar problem or challenge will often respond in the same or similar ways. But it is this very observation that leads me to counter-argue that “No, history does not repeat itself, but people do.”