While Gutenberg’s printing business took off in the 15th
Century with Bibles and religious texts, another popular genre soon attracted readership
among the upper classes – military memoirs and manuals. In the early 19th Century,
Napoleon I recommended that students of the military art should study the
campaigns of history’s great commanders, a number of whom also wrote their own
manuals on how to make war. But from the
middle of that 19th Century, you want to make sure to include the
writings of Clausewitz and then of von Moltke the Elder and his Prussian
acolytes on war, warfare, and how to go to war.
Much of that Prussian learning and experience is reflected in “On the German
Art of War: Truppenfuhrung” edited by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki which
presents a modern annotated English translation of the Germany Army’s World War
Two manual.
The basic manual of the Wehrmacht, “Heeresdienstuorschrift
300”, was written in 1933 and served as its principal source on tactics and the
conduct of combat operations through 1945.
Part 1 was published to the army in 1933 and Part 2 in 1934. As often happens in our modern military era,
it remained a ‘work in progress” through that period as new tools of mechanized
and armored warfare evolved. This was
one of a family of five, sometimes multi-volume, manuals covering the various
branches of service as well as staff and command functions.
Between 1936 and 1938, Captain Albert C. Wedemeyer was one
of two U.S. Army officers attending the German Kriegsakademie in Berlin under
an exchange program. His report, aka The
Wedemeyer Report, and his acquired insights on German tactics, operations, and
strategy greatly informed U.S. responses towards Germany during World War Two. His fellow exchange student, Harlan N.
Hartness, likewise contributed his own “Hartness Report” drawing on his
experiences. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army
acquired copies of both parts of the German manual and translated them into
English. That translation of Part I was
only declassified in 1957 while Part II was still classified as late as 2000 as
this book was being prepared.
Reportedly, numerous ideas from the German manual found their way into
both the 1940 and 1944 versions of the U.S. Army’s FM-100-5.
Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki teamed up to produce this
new translation, published in 2001. The
main body of the book is “Heeresdienstuorschrift 300”– in English, with
original paragraph numbering etc. Added
to that are footnotes by the editors drawing on the unpublished annexes as well
as offering additional background information.
This includes the 13 chapters of Part 1 (1933) and the 10 chapters of
Part II (1934). The book omits most of
the original 12 annexes (which they describe as mostly obsolete even by 1940)
except for Annex 8: Guidelines for Written Communications, Combat Reports, and
War Diaries, and Annex 9: Guidelines for Schematics, Sketch Maps, Panoramic
Sketches, and Situation Maps.
James Corum provides an informative Foreword that is followed
by a 14 page introduction by the two editors that offers good historical
background and context to both the manual and the ideas therein. Their introduction included two quotes from
Professor Williamson Murray describing the manual –
“It remains the most influential doctrinal manual ever
written.”
“It also represents one of the most thoughtful examinations
of the conduct of operations and leadership ever written.”
Certainly, if you want to know how war was supposed to be
made across most of the 20th Century, this volume is excellent place to
look. I highly recommend this book.
But I do have to note that I was particularly struck, given
the history of the Wehrmacht’s conduct during World War Two, by some of the
statements found in the manual shared below (emphasis mine). These brought to mind the contributions of
Franz Lieber, author of President Lincoln’s General Orders No. 100 – aka “The
Lieber Code” and the foundations of the modern laws of war. Born in 1798 in Berlin, Franz Lieber was twice
imprisoned in Berlin for his liberal political activities. Fleeing first to England and then immigrating
to the United States, he was an established scholar and author on ethics and
government by the time the American Civil War broke out.
Late in 1862 he was asked to draft guidelines for the Union
Army’s conduct during that conflict which was published in April of 1863. Lieber’s draft guidelines included reference
to the concept of ”military necessity” which while not intended to allow acts
of cruelty or ‘perfidy’ – though deception is allowed – functions as a big
loophole allowing military commanders to carry out actions necessary to achieve
their military goals, i.e. win the war.
As the Lieber Code became the basis for the modern laws of war, this
‘military necessity’ clause was repeatedly further limited and hemmed in by
treaty, amendment, and alteration of meaning and still “Military necessity” has
been invoked by most armies in most conflicts since 1863. Nevertheless, the surprise of finding
language specifically authorizing the taking of civilian hostages in certain
circumstances does appear to me to place the Wehrmacht far over to one side of
the spectrum of how war is made. As far
back as the Franco-Prussian War, there are accounts of Prussian/German forces
interacting with local enemy civilian populations with what can only be called
harshness, but it never occurred to me before reading this manual that there
might be a matter of policy behind those actions – or is it just that the
manuals placed the Wehrmacht too close to the top of the slippery slope?
"III. Reconnaissance"
"188….Quick and skillful interrogation of prisoners is
vitally important. They should be
questioned about their unit, adjacent units, higher units, the names of their
commanders, their last bivouac position, movements and means of transport, the
condition and morale of their units, and any deployments of special
weapons. Use of coercion is not permitted by international law. After examination, papers that have no
military significance must be returned to prisoners."
"XII. Quartering"
"684. When the
attitude of the local population is uncertain, it may be necessary to initiate
special security measures. These may include threats of punishment,
the seizure of hostages, and the requirement that all houses remain
unlocked and accessible.
The inconsiderate treatment of a passive population is
wrong. In all situations, restraint and
reserve toward the population is the best policy."
"XXIII. Logistical
Support in the Area of Operations"
"1027. During a
withdrawal, the sick and wounded who cannot be moved should be put under the
care of local civilian doctors.
Otherwise, they will be left behind with the necessary medical
personnel, under the protection of the Geneva Convention on the Wounded of 27
July 1929."
"1061….Military police missions include the maintenance of
order and traffic control at distribution points, depots, dumps, rail stations,
and along routes. They also are
responsible for collecting and forwarding stragglers; the prevention of looting and unauthorized requisitions; the
supervision of the civilian population, as well as their protection against
atrocities; and the enforcement of police measures to control contagious
diseases."
