“On the German Art of War/Truppenfuhrung” – aka – Germans on the Art of War

While Gutenberg’s printing business took off in the 15^th Century with Bibles and religious texts, another popular genre soon attracted readership among the upper classes – military memoirs and manuals.  In the early 19^th Century, Napoleon I recommended that students of the military art should study the campaigns of history’s great commanders, a number of whom also wrote their own manuals on how to make war.  But from the middle of that 19^th Century, you want to make sure to include the writings of Clausewitz and then of von Moltke the Elder and his Prussian acolytes on war, warfare, and how to go to war.  Much of that Prussian learning and experience is reflected in “On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung” edited by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki which presents a modern annotated English translation of the Germany Army’s World War Two manual.

The basic manual of the Wehrmacht, “Heeresdienstuorschrift 300”, was written in 1933 and served as its principal source on tactics and the conduct of combat operations through 1945.  Part 1 was published to the army in 1933 and Part 2 in 1934.  As often happens in our modern military era, it remained a ‘work in progress” through that period as new tools of mechanized and armored warfare evolved.  This was one of a family of five, sometimes multi-volume, manuals covering the various branches of service as well as staff and command functions.

Between 1936 and 1938, Captain Albert C. Wedemeyer was one of two U.S. Army officers attending the German Kriegsakademie in Berlin under an exchange program.  His report, aka The Wedemeyer Report, and his acquired insights on German tactics, operations, and strategy greatly informed U.S. responses towards Germany during World War Two.  His fellow exchange student, Harlan N. Hartness, likewise contributed his own “Hartness Report” drawing on his experiences.   Meanwhile, the U.S. Army acquired copies of both parts of the German manual and translated them into English.  That translation of Part I was only declassified in 1957 while Part II was still classified as late as 2000 as this book was being prepared.  Reportedly, numerous ideas from the German manual found their way into both the 1940 and 1944 versions of the U.S. Army’s FM-100-5.

Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki teamed up to produce this new translation, published in 2001.  The main body of the book is “Heeresdienstuorschrift 300”– in English, with original paragraph numbering etc.  Added to that are footnotes by the editors drawing on the unpublished annexes as well as offering additional background information.  This includes the 13 chapters of Part 1 (1933) and the 10 chapters of Part II (1934).  The book omits most of the original 12 annexes (which they describe as mostly obsolete even by 1940) except for Annex 8: Guidelines for Written Communications, Combat Reports, and War Diaries, and Annex 9: Guidelines for Schematics, Sketch Maps, Panoramic Sketches, and Situation Maps.

James Corum provides an informative Foreword that is followed by a 14 page introduction by the two editors that offers good historical background and context to both the manual and the ideas therein.  Their introduction included two quotes from Professor Williamson Murray describing the manual –

“It remains the most influential doctrinal manual ever written.”

“It also represents one of the most thoughtful examinations of the conduct of operations and leadership ever written.”

Certainly, if you want to know how war was supposed to be made across most of the 20th Century, this volume is excellent place to look.  I highly recommend this book.

But I do have to note that I was particularly struck, given the history of the Wehrmacht’s conduct during World War Two, by some of the statements found in the manual shared below (emphasis mine).  These brought to mind the contributions of Franz Lieber, author of President Lincoln’s General Orders No. 100 – aka “The Lieber Code” and the foundations of the modern laws of war.    Born in 1798 in Berlin, Franz Lieber was twice imprisoned in Berlin for his liberal political activities.  Fleeing first to England and then immigrating to the United States, he was an established scholar and author on ethics and government by the time the American Civil War broke out.

Late in 1862 he was asked to draft guidelines for the Union Army’s conduct during that conflict which was published in April of 1863.  Lieber’s draft guidelines included reference to the concept of ”military necessity” which while not intended to allow acts of cruelty or ‘perfidy’ – though deception is allowed – functions as a big loophole allowing military commanders to carry out actions necessary to achieve their military goals, i.e. win the war.  As the Lieber Code became the basis for the modern laws of war, this ‘military necessity’ clause was repeatedly further limited and hemmed in by treaty, amendment, and alteration of meaning and still “Military necessity” has been invoked by most armies in most conflicts since 1863.  Nevertheless, the surprise of finding language specifically authorizing the taking of civilian hostages in certain circumstances does appear to me to place the Wehrmacht far over to one side of the spectrum of how war is made.  As far back as the Franco-Prussian War, there are accounts of Prussian/German forces interacting with local enemy civilian populations with what can only be called harshness, but it never occurred to me before reading this manual that there might be a matter of policy behind those actions – or is it just that the manuals placed the Wehrmacht too close to the top of the slippery slope?

"III.  Reconnaissance"

"188….Quick and skillful interrogation of prisoners is vitally important.  They should be questioned about their unit, adjacent units, higher units, the names of their commanders, their last bivouac position, movements and means of transport, the condition and morale of their units, and any deployments of special weapons.  Use of coercion is not permitted by international law.  After examination, papers that have no military significance must be returned to prisoners."

"XII.  Quartering"

"684.  When the attitude of the local population is uncertain, it may be necessary to initiate special security measures.  These may include threats of punishment, the seizure of hostages, and the requirement that all houses remain unlocked and accessible.

The inconsiderate treatment of a passive population is wrong.  In all situations, restraint and reserve toward the population is the best policy."

"XXIII.  Logistical Support in the Area of Operations"

"1027.  During a withdrawal, the sick and wounded who cannot be moved should be put under the care of local civilian doctors.  Otherwise, they will be left behind with the necessary medical personnel, under the protection of the Geneva Convention on the Wounded of 27 July 1929."

"1061….Military police missions include the maintenance of order and traffic control at distribution points, depots, dumps, rail stations, and along routes.  They also are responsible for collecting and forwarding stragglers; the prevention of looting and unauthorized requisitions; the supervision of the civilian population, as well as their protection against atrocities; and the enforcement of police measures to control contagious diseases."