“On the German Art of War/Truppenfuhrung” – aka – Germans on the Art of War

While Gutenberg’s printing business took off in the 15^th Century with Bibles and religious texts, another popular genre soon attracted readership among the upper classes – military memoirs and manuals.  In the early 19^th Century, Napoleon I recommended that students of the military art should study the campaigns of history’s great commanders, a number of whom also wrote their own manuals on how to make war.  But from the middle of that 19^th Century, you want to make sure to include the writings of Clausewitz and then of von Moltke the Elder and his Prussian acolytes on war, warfare, and how to go to war.  Much of that Prussian learning and experience is reflected in “On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung” edited by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki which presents a modern annotated English translation of the Germany Army’s World War Two manual.

The basic manual of the Wehrmacht, “Heeresdienstuorschrift 300”, was written in 1933 and served as its principal source on tactics and the conduct of combat operations through 1945.  Part 1 was published to the army in 1933 and Part 2 in 1934.  As often happens in our modern military era, it remained a ‘work in progress” through that period as new tools of mechanized and armored warfare evolved.  This was one of a family of five, sometimes multi-volume, manuals covering the various branches of service as well as staff and command functions.

Between 1936 and 1938, Captain Albert C. Wedemeyer was one of two U.S. Army officers attending the German Kriegsakademie in Berlin under an exchange program.  His report, aka The Wedemeyer Report, and his acquired insights on German tactics, operations, and strategy greatly informed U.S. responses towards Germany during World War Two.  His fellow exchange student, Harlan N. Hartness, likewise contributed his own “Hartness Report” drawing on his experiences.   Meanwhile, the U.S. Army acquired copies of both parts of the German manual and translated them into English.  That translation of Part I was only declassified in 1957 while Part II was still classified as late as 2000 as this book was being prepared.  Reportedly, numerous ideas from the German manual found their way into both the 1940 and 1944 versions of the U.S. Army’s FM-100-5.

Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki teamed up to produce this new translation, published in 2001.  The main body of the book is “Heeresdienstuorschrift 300”– in English, with original paragraph numbering etc.  Added to that are footnotes by the editors drawing on the unpublished annexes as well as offering additional background information.  This includes the 13 chapters of Part 1 (1933) and the 10 chapters of Part II (1934).  The book omits most of the original 12 annexes (which they describe as mostly obsolete even by 1940) except for Annex 8: Guidelines for Written Communications, Combat Reports, and War Diaries, and Annex 9: Guidelines for Schematics, Sketch Maps, Panoramic Sketches, and Situation Maps.

James Corum provides an informative Foreword that is followed by a 14 page introduction by the two editors that offers good historical background and context to both the manual and the ideas therein.  Their introduction included two quotes from Professor Williamson Murray describing the manual –

“It remains the most influential doctrinal manual ever written.”

“It also represents one of the most thoughtful examinations of the conduct of operations and leadership ever written.”

Certainly, if you want to know how war was supposed to be made across most of the 20th Century, this volume is excellent place to look.  I highly recommend this book.

But I do have to note that I was particularly struck, given the history of the Wehrmacht’s conduct during World War Two, by some of the statements found in the manual shared below (emphasis mine).  These brought to mind the contributions of Franz Lieber, author of President Lincoln’s General Orders No. 100 – aka “The Lieber Code” and the foundations of the modern laws of war.    Born in 1798 in Berlin, Franz Lieber was twice imprisoned in Berlin for his liberal political activities.  Fleeing first to England and then immigrating to the United States, he was an established scholar and author on ethics and government by the time the American Civil War broke out.

Late in 1862 he was asked to draft guidelines for the Union Army’s conduct during that conflict which was published in April of 1863.  Lieber’s draft guidelines included reference to the concept of ”military necessity” which while not intended to allow acts of cruelty or ‘perfidy’ – though deception is allowed – functions as a big loophole allowing military commanders to carry out actions necessary to achieve their military goals, i.e. win the war.  As the Lieber Code became the basis for the modern laws of war, this ‘military necessity’ clause was repeatedly further limited and hemmed in by treaty, amendment, and alteration of meaning and still “Military necessity” has been invoked by most armies in most conflicts since 1863.  Nevertheless, the surprise of finding language specifically authorizing the taking of civilian hostages in certain circumstances does appear to me to place the Wehrmacht far over to one side of the spectrum of how war is made.  As far back as the Franco-Prussian War, there are accounts of Prussian/German forces interacting with local enemy civilian populations with what can only be called harshness, but it never occurred to me before reading this manual that there might be a matter of policy behind those actions – or is it just that the manuals placed the Wehrmacht too close to the top of the slippery slope?

"III.  Reconnaissance"

"188….Quick and skillful interrogation of prisoners is vitally important.  They should be questioned about their unit, adjacent units, higher units, the names of their commanders, their last bivouac position, movements and means of transport, the condition and morale of their units, and any deployments of special weapons.  Use of coercion is not permitted by international law.  After examination, papers that have no military significance must be returned to prisoners."

"XII.  Quartering"

"684.  When the attitude of the local population is uncertain, it may be necessary to initiate special security measures.  These may include threats of punishment, the seizure of hostages, and the requirement that all houses remain unlocked and accessible.

The inconsiderate treatment of a passive population is wrong.  In all situations, restraint and reserve toward the population is the best policy."

"XXIII.  Logistical Support in the Area of Operations"

"1027.  During a withdrawal, the sick and wounded who cannot be moved should be put under the care of local civilian doctors.  Otherwise, they will be left behind with the necessary medical personnel, under the protection of the Geneva Convention on the Wounded of 27 July 1929."

"1061….Military police missions include the maintenance of order and traffic control at distribution points, depots, dumps, rail stations, and along routes.  They also are responsible for collecting and forwarding stragglers; the prevention of looting and unauthorized requisitions; the supervision of the civilian population, as well as their protection against atrocities; and the enforcement of police measures to control contagious diseases."

What Do You Mean “It’s Only A Movie”?

Like many of my friends and fellow students of military history/military affairs, I went recently to see the new movie “Midway”.  This community can deliver tough and often detailed criticism and I was interested at the range of reactions and responses to the film from those who had already seen it, especially its use of computer technology to recreate the original ships and planes.  You can find some amazingly detailed knowledge in surprising places.  One such surprise came many years ago when a fellow Foreign Service Officer at the State Department, whom I had not spotted as a part of this community, observed that in the then latest epic (and a personal favorite) film “The Wind and the Lion” the German troops were using a mount for their machine guns that was not actually introduced until some years after the events in the movie allegedly occurred.  Some years earlier, in university, while watching a personal favorite film “Kelly’s Heroes” in the on-campus theater, I gained new respect for one member of the group of ‘frat boys’ sitting behind me when I heard him gasp and call out “that’s a Tiger!” referring to the appearance (in facsimile) of that deadly nemesis of our World War Two Sherman tanks.  On another occasion, a friend and I were shushed by the outraged woman in the row in front of us after we rather loudly complained that Barry Lyndon’s Prussians were opening fire at much farther range than we thought they should have based upon our study of history!

As a boy in the 1950s and early 1960s, I spent a lot of time, especially on Saturdays, watching old Hollywood black and white films on the three or four TV channels available locally.  When I began this habit I didn’t know about ‘pan and scan’, letterbox format, or editing for time and broadcast, among the many tricks used in broadcasting these movies on television – nor did I know anything about “The Hays Code” that was intended to insure that innocents like myself would not be offended or shocked by anything in the movies.  All of that knowledge came later, but not too much later, because these movies inspired me to seek out more information and wanting to confirm that history was accurately presented  in these movies – or not.  I grew up watching model ships recreate great naval battles, American tanks portraying the armored formations of both sides, and Roman legionnaires who fought like gladiators instead of the army they represented. I knew that no one actually died in these movies (a more sophisticated understanding of that reality came later after I discovered ‘stuntmen’).  But I was curious enough about the ‘history’ presented in these movies to head for my local library and dig through their collections. 

   

Movies are made primarily as entertainment which means selling tickets and filling seats in movie theaters – though the introduction of cable channels, videocassettes and dvd/Blu-ray discs has altered that equation slightly.  Moviemakers have always balanced the demands of realistically portraying actual events with putting the story that is the movie they are making on the screen.  Sometimes, it isn’t even left to the moviemaker to get the history wrong when the moneymen (and sometimes) politicians behind the movie want a particular viewpoint about that history to come through.  They make mistakes and sometimes they get it completely wrong (dare I mention “The Patriot” 

or “Braveheart”?).  Could anyone in the film making industry have realized that one of the simplest truths about the original film “Sahara” (1943) with Humphrey Bogart that made it better than the Jim Belushi remake “Sahara” (1995) was that Bogart and the original cast just looked more believable as men who had survived the Great Depression working on ranches in Texas or the South African veldt, or pounded the pavements of London, Paris, or New York looking for work – only to find themselves all together now in the North African desert?

Students of military history who also like movies can fill pages with the names of movies that have made a hash in their depiction of war, warfare, military life, etc. – most movies about the American Civil War or the wars with Native Americans on the Great Plains alone could fill a book.   But we can also note the progress that has been made over the years – one of my favorite moments was watching the brilliant by the book depiction of the charge in the 1968 version of “The Charge of The Light Brigade” which compares very well with the charge made by the Australian Light Horse at Beersheba during the First World War depicted in the movie “The Lighthorsemen”.  The films “Cromwell”, “Waterloo”, and “Kagemusha” showed armies deployed on a battlefield much as they would have actually looked.

It is important for those of us interested in seeing history on screen adding to our understanding and appreciation of film to know a bit about how films or a film come into being.  Some of my favorite books present the stories of how favorite films such as “Horse Soldiers”, “Zulu”, or “Battle of Britain” came to be made.  It has been equally enlightening to learn about the efforts put into translating a very unhistorical novel such as “GoneWith the Wind” into an equally unhistorical though epic film, or how “Enemies at the Gate”, which I enjoyed very much, was very much based upon a 1973 book of the same title that drew almost exclusively on what we now know was the Soviet propaganda version of the history.  Historical films about military events have been and will continue to be inspired by both histories and novels based upon that history.

Drawing on my experience in high school dramatics and college theatre, I developed a more relaxed approach to storytelling whether in person, on stage, or on the screen.  I sit down to watch a movie with a willing suspension of disbelief – I will try to cut the storyteller some slack as they story unwinds on the screen.  The story presenter is required to NOT abuse my willing suspension of disbelief by not putting anything on the screen that catapults me out of my seat screaming (preferably metaphorically) – “What the F… was that?”

“Midway” was an interesting viewing experience.  I really enjoyed seeing the actual ships and planes from the battle portrayed thanks to modern computer generated images.  Much better than the use of models (as in another favorite, “In Harm’s Way” and in “Sink the Bismarck”) or the substitution of other modern ships as was also done in “In Harm’s Way” but also in the British film “Pursuit of the Graf Spee” or “Master and Commander”.  I thought it made better use than the not as good “Pearl Harbor” – while the aviation sequences, sad as I was not to see more coverage of the fighters from both sides, showed that the CGI first seen in the excellent “Dogfights” series is continuing to improve – though a couple of times the “Midway” aircraft were shown doing things I thought of questionable accuracy but not impossible.  I also appreciated seeing the differences in the Imperial Japanese Navy’s carriers and those of the United States Navy – which had both been portrayed in earlier films by U.S. Navy ships.

I have seen complaints about the personal story lines included in “Midway” – but I thought it very interesting that in this account of the naval war in the Pacific then-Commander Edwin Layton was moved up stage while his colleague Rochefort (featured in “In Harm’s Way and the earlier “Midway” film) stepped back a bit.  And this is also where we come back to the “it’s only a movie” – “Midway” is a feature film not a documentary.  Feature films include characters, plot, etc., even as they recount in some form or fashion an historical event.  And for context, “Tora, Tora,Tora” has been criticized for not invoking more personal stories in its almost documentary account of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 

 

For me the important point isn’t that this or that movie includes errors (assuming the whole thing is just made up), but the fact that we have come so far in improving historical details and overall accuracy.  We have come a long way from those 1930s and 1940s films I first watched.  And despite the occasional film that goes wrong (still can’t watch "The Thin Red Line") films like the new “1917” show some promise amidst the one or two quibbles.  So, try and relax reminding yourself it’s only a movie – and in the words of Mel Brooks, “hope for the best, expect the worst” - that makes the good surprises all the more enjoyable.

 

“The Impossible Game” A History of Chess, by David Shenk

I have long noted chess as one of the oldest games of strategy in the West in discussing the history of wargaming and wargames, and its origins and roots in Persia and India take it back much farther.  Author David Shenk guides us on an entertaining, informative journey through the history of the game in his book “The Impossible Game”.  Providing moments of diversion from that journey is the parallel telling of a single chess game played between two masters of the mid-19th Century, Adolf Anderssen and Lionel Kieseritzky, immortalized as “The Impossible Game” referred to in the title.

I don’t remember when I first learned about chess, how the pieces move, and a general idea of how the game works.  I still make no claim to having learned how to play chess.  David Shenk’s account of the history and evolution of the game and its play both supports that confession while renewing my interest in the game.  I found his explanations of the pieces and strategy of the game very clear and insightful, much easier to grasp than what I had read in the past from a handful of the tens of thousands of books written about Chess.

I have also decided that in the argument about whether or not chess is a “wargame”, it is at the very least a battle game and it offers many of the same benefits from playing as do wargames.  Benjamin Franklin offered what might be considered the classical argument in favor of chess as a wargame:

   “We learn by chess the habit of not being discouraged by present bad appearances in the state of our affairs, the habit of hoping for a favorable change, and that of persevering in the search of resources.” 

He went on to specify the beneficial lessons of playing chess:

Foresight – looking ahead to the long-term consequences of any action

Circumspection- surveying the entire scene, observing hidden dynamics and unseen possibilities, dangers,

Caution-avoiding haste and unnecessary blunders as you must abide the consequences

Perseverance-refusing to give up in dim circumstances, continually pushing to improve one’s [relative] position and look for the opportunities

Author Shenk is kind enough to include Franklin’s collected thoughts on chess in an appendix of his book but you can also read it here:.  https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-29-02-0608

Obviously real generals did play chess, though a British chess writer in 1840 wrote upon observing Napoleon playing chess that “He played openings badly…and was impatient if his adversary dwelt too long upon his move…. Under defeat…he was sore and irritable.”  In exile on St Helena, he ironically played with an ivory chess set sent to him as a gift without ever knowing that the plans for an elaborate escape from the island were hidden in the chess set, but the officer with that knowledge died on the voyage to the island and never revealed the secret.  So being a good chess player, or being a good general, does not automatically mean you will be good at the other.

Researchers studying how Chess Grandmasters ‘saw’ the game as they played it, blindfolded them as they played, and then asked them to draw how they saw the board in their mind.  Rather than drawing a photographic like picture of the board, their drawings focused on the patterns made by the major pieces and the lines made by their relative positions on the board.  In a lifetime of studying battles and playing wargames, I can recognize this manner of seeing a battle and planning actions in it. 

Author Shenk goes on to recount a more recent study in which Australia’s Defense Science and Technology Organization analyzed chess games examining 3 key variables:

·         material (number of pieces per player);

·         tempo (number of moves allowed per turn), and

·         search depth (number of moves ahead).

The intent was to find insights into war and conflicts in which these are critical elements of the contest.  They concluded that “deep searching” – seeing more moves ahead – combined with an increased tempo overwhelmed an opposing force having greater material, i.e., more pieces.

A more entertaining observation offered by David Shenk was the suggestion that one of the most famous chess games in cinema was won because the winner – HAL, the computer – psyched his opponent.  In the film 2001: A Space Odyssey – HAL apparently cheats at chess via a psych move – 

HAL: Bishop takes Knight’s pawn

FRANK: Lovely move…Rook to King One

HAL: I’m sorry, Frank, I think you missed it.  Queen to Bishop three, Bishop takes Queen, Knight takes Bishop, Mate.

FRANK: Yeah, looks like you’re right.  I resign.

HAL: Thank you for a very enjoyable game.

[HAL doesn’t tell the truth about the forced Mate.  The Computer essentially intimidates Frank into resigning.]

Dave Shenk has given us an entertaining, informative, and for me inspiring book about the game of chess – its play, its history, and its potential.  I will leave with you a particularly apt piece of advice he shared – for chess players and for generals:

Rudolf Spielmann said, “Play the opening like a book, the middle game like a magician, and the endgame like a machine.”