"Hurrying Heinz" Guderian Talked Tanks in 1937

In 1931, Lieutenant-Colonel Heinz Guderian was named chief of staff to the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops, the center of Germany's work on mobile warfare and armored forces.  Guderian was the public advocate while his new boss General major Lutz worked behind the scenes.  Guderian reached out to leaders of the Nazi regime to promote the panzer force concept, attract support, and secure resources, including a demonstration for Hitler himself.  Lutz persuaded, cajoled, and compensated for Guderian's often arrogant and argumentative behavior.  In autumn 1936, Lutz asked Guderian to write a book that promoted the Mobile Troops Command and strategic mechanized warfare. The resulting work was “Achtung! Panzer!”.  First published in German in 1937, Guderian’s best-selling book remained in print for much of the war but was only translated into English in 1992 by historian Christopher Duffy.   (His memoirs, “Panzer Leader”, appeared in English in 1952).  The book opens with a preface from General der Panzertruppen Lutz.

With 10 chapters, each with two to five subheadings, the first 133 pages recount the history of armored warfare from the World War I British and French introduction of tanks, and eventually Germany’s limited adoption of them.  Drawing on the information available to him in 1937, Guderian provides a professional military assessment of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of their use during the Great War.  He includes 14 maps to illustrate the various battles.  In the following sections of the book, he surveys post-Great War developments regarding tanks and tank warfare, technically, tactically, and organizationally.  This segment also lays out Guderian’s distillation of Germany’s (and his own) thinking on tank warfare. 

Guderian’s analysis of the Great War battles reflects his own thoughts on tactics and especially tactics for mechanized warfare.  The evolution of the tank to mounting a single main cannon in a turret capable of 360 movement sets the standard for tank armament – supported by multiple machine guns.  He dismisses the Spanish Civil War as fielding too few tanks on any battlefield to offer any serious insights.  His most interesting revelation is that the German mechanized force, rather than start with a blank page, adapted the British Army’s 1927 Provisional Instructions on Tank and Armoured Car Training, Part II as its first manual, subsequently modified to reflect Germany’s own lessons, experiences, and thoughts.  Guderian freely admitted that the British and French had led the way in armor and tactics at the end of the Great War while Germany neglected to develop either

Each chapter includes endnotes provided by the translator and there is a one page bibliography of works cited by Guderian.  This edition includes 40 black and white photographs of tanks of day (1916 to 1937) as well as the classic profile photo of Guderian himself.   Unfortunately, the photos and captions are not tied to related points in the text.  The imagery and Guderian’s original text clearly rely upon the classic reference work of the day, Taschenbuch der Tanks, by Heigl.

With an admittedly limited focus and only a short vision into the future (because of technology limitations), the book addressed two important questions which would require answering if an army was to be mechanized.

How will the army be supplied with fuel, spares and replacement vehicles?

And how to move large mechanized forces, especially those that are road-bound?

Guderian answered these questions in discussions of three broad areas: refueling; spares parts; and access to roads.  He also called for radio receivers in all tanks as well as transmitters in command vehicles (in these pre-transceiver days).   One additional point, reflecting both his historical analysis and in his prescripts for the future use of tanks, is the emphasis upon mass – concentrating armor into a major element in either attack or defense (usually by counterattack) rather than scattering and dissipating the power of armor by distributing it amongst and tying it to the infantry. 

From our modern perspective, the ideas Guderian presented on how armored units should be organized and how they should fight are not surprising.  And even in period, the ideas were all out there but no one had brought so many of them together and helped implement them as early and completely.  The lessons of actual combat would offer further developments and tweaks but it’s all pretty much here.

•             “we have no desire to impose a rigid tactical framework”

•             “most important mission is not infantry support, but to destroy the enemy anti-tank defenses and suppress or blind the enemy artillery” first

•             “The tanks will go ahead of the infantry when an extensive tract of open ground has to be traversed before the break-in.  When the two sides are in close contact and the terrain favors the attack, the tanks will attack simultaneously with the infantry; the infantry will have to attack under artillery cover ahead of the tanks when we need to overcome initial obstacles – a stretch of river, for example, or barriers or minefields – before the tanks can intervene” 

•             What was needed was a “modern and fast moving force of infantry possessing strong fire power, and specially equipped, organized and trained in permanent co-operation with tanks”

•             “if… rifle units were united permanently with tanks in a single formation, it would form a comradeship of army in time of peace – a comradeship that would prove its worth”

•             “Airpower’s role is to “bring the entire depth of the enemy defense under simultaneous attack” and to ‘delay intervention of enemy reserves” road and rail traffic, command centers and the whole communications system…troop accommodations… - paratroops and air-landing forces”

Guderian offers a number of positive references to Hitler and his importance to the panzers, including Hitler’s words about motorization and mechanization at the 1937 Automobile Exhibition.  Guderian would later say “The Fuhrer is a man of vision….[who] recognized the enormous significance …of road construction which is massive in scale and carried through on consistent principles….7,000 kilometers of autobahn.”  Two and a half pages are dedicated to the “The Versailles Diktat” and how the Germans looked for loopholes.  It is also generally known that Guderian was one of the very few generals to repeatedly challenge Hitler’s views and decisions and survive, although it cost him field commands on more than one occasion.

Guderian and his staff surrendered to U.S. forces on 10 May 1945.  He answered Allied questions and denied being an ardent supporter of Nazism.  He avoided conviction at the Nuremberg Trials because there was no substantial documentary evidence against him at that time, though having joined the U.S. Army Historical Division in 1945, the U.S. refused requests from the Soviet Union to have him extradited.

While interned by the Americans, his conversations were secretly taped. In one such recording, in conversation with Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb and General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, Guderian said, "The fundamental principles [of Nazism] were fine".  Guderian was released from captivity without trial in 1948.  He retired to Schwangau near Füssen in Southern Bavaria and began writing. He remained an ardent German nationalist for the rest of his life.  He died on May 14, 1954 at the age of 65.

“Achtung! Panzer!” remains an important milestone in the history of the development of armor and mechanized warfare, collecting and presenting principles for their use that still apply today.  It is also an important historical work for understanding the thinking and operational art of the German army during the Second World War. 

You Can't Have One Without the Other

December 15’s Sunday Washington Post featured a great review by Gerard DeGroot of the new book “Strategy, A History” by Lawrence Freedman, a British strategic analyst and former foreign policy analyst to then-Prime Minister Tony Blair. What made this a great review was not just the reviewer's positive comments about the book (he convinced me that I want to read it), but I especially appreciated his comments illuminating the relationship between plans and strategy – which are far too often confounded by those discussing either or both.

At the conclusion of his review, Professor DeGroot writes, “All this strategizing is, in truth, an attempt to impose individual will upon a recalcitrant world…We convince ourselves that we are, in fact, architects of our own fate…much more palatable than having to admit that we might be mere flotsam in a turbulent sea of circumstance.” The latter reference resonates with me because it calls to mind the reality within which we work and struggle, especially at the level of national security and warfighting.

DeGroot’s statement resonated with some of the lessons I had learned from experience – enlightened at least equally by a number of tenets drawn from the pages of On War, written by the 19^th Century Prussian officer Clausewitz (and cited by DeGroot in his review)-“everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult”. Strategy is how you intend to conduct your war – plans are how you will make that strategy effective in your campaigns and battles.

During a 30 year career as an American diplomat, I found that of all the Secretaries of State under whom I served only Henry Kissinger thought and worked at the level of strategy, having a clear picture of the nation’s starting point as well as relative current situation while still keeping an eye on the intended eventual end state.  By comparison, it seemed that his immediate predecessor and his successors were for numerous reasons focused intently upon whatever event had washed up into their inbox and there immediately burst into flames.

I suspect that Kissinger, DeGroot, myself, and possibly Clausewitz, share a metaphoric vision of the world in which time moves as a river, pushing us onward as we encounter events that are swallowed up by the forward momentum, are pushed aside by subsequent events or which on occasion force that forward flow from its seemingly intended direction and bursting these banks to move in new and unanticipated directions. A commander who relies upon a precisely executed sequence of actions is doomed to fail against this tide, but one who prepares and anticipates this reality in the knowledge that his plan serves primarily as the basis for whatever adaptation or improvisation will be forced him upon by events and circumstances will have every chance at success.

I have been a player of historically based war games and conflict simulations for more than 50 years, losing and winning innumerable battles, campaigns, and wars played out on a tabletop. I learned the hard way that in games which depended often upon chance (as does war according to Clausewitz), I had to make my plans in the expectation that my plan would not go perfectly or smoothly, but would be repeatedly disrupted either by my bad luck or my opponent's good luck. I had to make plans that were ‘luck-proof’, incorporating provisions against both the anticipated and unforeseen ‘what-ifs’ that might come. Napoleon himself, though an avid planner, also recognized this when he claimed that in battle “first I engage and then I see” – knowing as he did how chance events might derail his plans and how as soldiers say today, “the enemy gets a vote” on how, when, and where a battle will be conducted.

DeGroot’s review did not specifically draw drawn upon Clausewitz’ comments upon the role of chance in warfare, but the Professor does offer his own tale of the unforeseen events that converted his plan to read Freedman’s book in four days, draft his review on the fifth, revise and polish on the sixth, and (inevitably) on the seventh take his ease – into an event-driven reality that required seven days spent on just the reading. The Prussian general von Moltke the Elder famously wrote, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.” The mythic iconic soldier, Sergeant Murphy, put it perhaps more succinctly but less elegantly when he reputedly said “shit happens.”

Another SIde of the Global Warming Issue - The Generals and Admirals Weigh In

I recognize that some time has passed since my last blog, but I don’t try to do this on a daily basis and some times my topic requires a bit of study before I write about it. My previous blog on the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire’s use of intelligence services and clandestine operatives called to mind some lessons from my contacts with the intelligence community during my career at the Department of State, some of which came to mind in connection with this new report on “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.”

The Center for Naval Analysis, often known simply as CNA, recently released this report, which can be accessed and downloaded at www.SecurityandClimate.can.org , was prepared by a panel of 11 distinguished retired Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps generals and admirals. Their purpose in this report was to examine the issue of climate change “through the lens of our military experience as warfighters, planners, and leaders.” This is a straightforward statement reflecting a basic aspect of military analysis often overlooked by those outside of the Department of Defense and the uniformed services.

Military analysts, such as those working with intelligence information at the Pentagon, for example, almost always focus upon military and related capabilities rather than on intentions when assessing possible threats by other states and by non-state players. During the long years of the Cold War, this reflected the hard truth that capabilities could be assessed in great part by simply counting the other side's warships, airplanes, tanks, submarines, and missiles etc. While this is not a bad thing in and of itself, a focus solely upon capabilities that ignores intentions can result in erroneous and sometimes almost farcical conclusions. (An Army paratroop officer I knew at the Navy War College in the mid-1980s had conceived the notion that the Soviet Union was going to use all of its then-recently expanded airborne/parachute/airmobile assets to launch the simultaneous seizure of the microchip manufacturing centers in Japan and Singapore and thus deprive the United States, its friends, and its allies of these essential commodities. He was un-persuaded by the argument that such an operation flew completely in the face of decades of Soviet military operations and practices – not to mention centuries of Russian operations – and was completely inconsistent with the then-global geo-political situation – i.e. he ignored the issue of intentions because of his fascination at the capabilities.)

This does not mean that I believe that our retired generals and admirals have fallen into this trap in their analysis of the threat of climate change. It does mean that the reader should bear in mind that this analysis will in many ways likewise focus upon capabilities – especially the capabilities that are likely to be needed by the United States and its friends and allies if/when confronted by the identified possible outcomes and effects of global warming. And because these are capabilities that cannot be acquired overnight but must be acquired, developed, and built up over months and years of work and of Congressional budget cycles – their report is going to present a lot of worst case analysis. They have to present such worst cases if we are to be prepared for the worst – and especially if they have concluded that we are dangerously far right now from being prepared for the worst possible cases. Our experience with Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath do not offer much assurance and not enough has been done to correct the identifiable errors in our response to that disaster.

But the worst cases contemplated in this study are not just those of natural disasters linked to or resulting from climate change, also considered are the potential consequences of those disasters for humanity and the possible behavior of affected states and/or their populations. Again, the analysis reflects an assessment of potential capabilities because intentions in such projections are even more difficult to determine than they are today in the war on terror. Do read their report carefully, examine their recommendations, and decide what you think about their recommendations and what we should be doing. There is a relevant though now crusty epigram that I learned while working with the military – the Five (or if you prefer, Six) Ps - Prior Planning Prevents Piss-poor Performance. Without this study and the numerous others examining the challenges of climate change, we would be unable to make any plans at all.



"Intelligences sees how to. Wisdom sees when to."
Gwen Ross