Tanks for the Memories -

While humans have toyed with armored vehicles of one kind or another it seems since they first invented vehicles, the tank as a modern armored vehicle is only now approaching its centenary. So, with that 100th anniversary to look forward to, I have pulled a few of my own favorite books on tanks off the shelves and compile this list of recommended volumes on those marvelous machines. [Not all of the books on my shelves relating to tanks made the cut, but that is a reflection of just how many books on the subject there are, so I hope that at least some of you will find my contributions and comments useful.]


Tank Facts and Feats, A record of Armoured Fighting Vehicle Achievement, edited and compiles by Kenneth Macksey. © Guinness Superlatives Limited 1973. New York, The Two Continents Publishing Group, Ltd. ISBN 0-8467-0006-9.

Although a bit dated by its 1973 publication date, this remains one of the most useful single volume references on the history of tanks and armored fighting vehicles, so I recommend you seriously consider picking this up if you are interested in the subject. Also, if anyone knows of a more recent similar volume, I would be glad to hear of it – and if they don’t, then a shout out to aspiring experts on the subject to get cracking on a modern equivalent work!


King of the Killing Zone, by Orr Kelly. (c) 1989 by Orr Kelly. Berkley Books, New York. ISBN 0-425-12304-9.

The King of the Killing Zone refered to in the title is the M-1 Abram Main Battle Tank, and herein the author tells the tale of the two decades spent by the US to get it. This includes the wrong turns, bad decisions, and how it finally turned out a right. A tour-de-force description of how the USG's defense procurements can go wrong and can go right.


Death Traps, The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II, by Belton Y. Cooper. © 1998 by Belton Y. Cooper. Ballantine Books, New York. ISBN 0-89141-814-8.

The author, Belton Y. Cooper, served with the 3rd Armored Division Maintenance Battalion as a liaison officer whose duties took him back and forth across the battlefield to identify and arrange the recovery of damaged tanks and other vehicles belonging to 3rd Armored. As a result he saw a great deal more of both the results of front line combat and of how US tank crews responded to the conflict and to the challenges of meeting German veterans in the vulnerable Shermans. This is an outstanding book and a must read for anyone wanting to know how tanks actually functioned in World War II Europe. This was originally published in hardback by Presidio Press.


Flame Thrower, by Andrew Wilson. © 1956 by Andrew Wilson. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-24533-3.

I believe that this is possibly a unique account of the British Army’s Churchill Mk VII Crocodile flamethrower tanks of World War II. Andrew Wilson was an officer and Crocodile tank commander with the 141st Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps (The Buffs), serving in Normandy up to the end of the war along the Rhine.


With Pennants Flying, The Immortal Deeds of the Royal Armoured Corps, David Masters. 1943, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London.

As you can see, this 1943 volume focuses upon the early war experiences of British tank crews first in France, then Greece, Crete, Burma, the Dieppe raid, and in North Africa. Since it is the story of the whole of the Royal Armoured Corps, it includes information on various British tank units during this part of the war and a great many insights on the early lessons of tank warfare.


The Gods Were Neutral, Major Robert Crisp. © 1960 by Robert Crisp. Ballantine Books, New York.

Brazen Chariots, An Account of Tank Warfare in the Western Desert November-December 1941, by Robert Crisp. © 1959 by Robert Crisp. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-24163-X

Although the latter work was published first, together these two volumes cover Robert Crisp’s war service in the 3rd Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment in North Africa, Greece, Crete, and again in North Africa from January 1941 to the end of the year. He began this interval in the A-10 and then A-13 Cruiser tank s and ended it in the M3 Light Cavalry Tank popularly called Honeys or Stuarts. Both books abound with excellent tactical level details and insights into the tank fighting of this period.

The Golden Carpet, Somerset de Chair. © 1945 by Somerset de Chair. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-29580-2.

This is a firsthand account of the little known (at least in the US) and oft-forgotten 1941 invasion of Iraq via Syria, by 750 men of His Majesty’s Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards and of the Arab Legion under John Glubb Pasha – already becoming the stuff of legend. This mixed force traveling in heavy and light trucks, armed at most with machine guns, escorted by eight Royal Air Force Rolls Royce armored cars, supported by 2 pounder anti-tank guns, bested Iraqi police elements and a German supported Iraqi Army of 40,000 troops defending Baghdad in a one month campaign. The author was a Royal Horse Guards 2nd Lieutenant serving as intelligence officer to Brigadier Joe Kingstone who commanded “Kingcol” as the entire force was called. After taking Baghdad, they then turned back to take on French and Syrian troops at Palmyra, Syria that were loyal to Vichy France.

By Tank into Normandy, A Memoir of the Campaign in North-West Europe from D-Day to VE Day, Stuart Hills. © Stuart Hills 2002. Cassell, London. ISBN 0-304-36640-4.

The author served as an officer in the Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry from the D-Day landings on Gold Beach to VE Day which found him across the River Wesser heading for Hamburg. Stuart Hill was a crewmember and tank commander on Sherman tanks, including the Sherman DD (Duplex Drive) swimming tanks built specifically for the invasion. From this vantage point, he offers a good many tactical and technical insights into the challenges facing Allied Sherman tanks confronted by superior German Mark V Panthers and Tiger tanks, as well as the deadly 88 mm guns frequently deployed in anti-tank roles.

The Game is Afoot: Advice from The Sage of Baker Street for Intelligence Analysts and Television Pundits

While the world has been preoccupied with underwear bombers and other modern horrors, I went to see the latest incarnation of Sherlock Holmes in the new movie starring Robert Downey, Jr. This is not the first time that the great detective has been reshaped for a new generation, though rarely as dramatically as in this version (anyone remember The 7 Percent Solution). I was nevertheless gratified to recognize elements of the canon in the new film, including the “patriotic V.R.” bullet-hole monogram in his Baker Street flat. While much attention has been given to this new athletic ‘action-man’ portrayal, I also enjoyed the reference to the detective’s intellectual side as he called for “data” that would enable him to attack the ongoing mystery.

Reading the adventures of Sherlock Holmes was my earliest introduction to the disciplined use of reason and logic. These lessons, in addition to other more formal instruction, later proved valuable during a career that included several tours of duty as an analyst either in Washington or overseas, whether the problem was diagnosing local politics or analyzing the international gray/black market trade in missile technology and other sensitive advanced technologies and hardware. For example, it was Holmes who first introduced me to Occam’s razor, though he didn’t so identify it at the time: “How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?” Holmes was so fond of this bit of advice that he actually stated it twice in the same adventure, The Sign of the Four, “Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth.”

In A Study in Scarlet, Holmes responds to Watson’s observation, as their cab carries them to the scene of a possible investigation, that Holmes didn’t seem “to give much thought to the matter in hand.” The world’s first consulting detective replied, “No data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment.” Watching the recurring appearances by expert talking heads on the television news and commentary programs revealed that far too many of these individuals had forgotten that bit of advice. Speculation runs rampant and the sound bite rules as they ignored Holmes’s further cautionary advice that “It is an error to argue in front of your data. You find yourself insensibly twisting them round to fit your theories.”

As a public service, therefore, I offer some additional bits of Sherlockian wisdom from my own small collection in the hopes that analysts, pundits, experts, and the general reader will benefit.

“…I make a point of never having any prejudices and of following docilely wherever fact may lead me…” The Reigate Squires. [Don’t prejudge where the information will lead you before you have accumulated the information necessary to support a conclusion.]


“One should always look for a possible alternative and provide against it. It is the first rule of criminal investigation.” The Adventure of the Black Peter. [In other words, always look for possible alternative explanations of the available data.]

“When you follow two separate trains of thought, you will find some point of intersection which should approximate the truth.” The Disappearance of Lady Frances Carfax. [Evidence is always subject to multiple interpretations or explanations, but as you accumulate additional evidence the correct interpretation emerges.]

“Who is it that profits by it?” The Naval Treaty. [A rephrasing of the classical cui bono? Answer the question of who benefits or profits most directly from an action, event, or outcome and you always have the starting point for your analysis or investigation, and sometimes, it will also give you the end point.]

And the most famous of all, “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” “That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes. The Silver Blaze. [A reminder never to examine an event or incident in isolation, but to remember that it is but one moment on a time line that strings together a series of events or incidents and to look for how they are connected or fail to be connected. In this instance, it was presumed that a stranger had entered the farm – but if it had been a stranger, why didn’t the dog bark at him? And if the dog didn’t bark at this “intruder” could the “intruder” in fact not have been a stranger to the dog and thus it didn’t bark at him.]

Of course, neither Sherlock Holmes nor Dr. Watson would concede that simply reading the great detective’s adventures would enable anyone to fully absorb his methods and achieve anything like his degree of success. Nevertheless, anyone interested in learning how to be an intelligence analyst (or perhaps even to play at one on television) or anyone wanting to brush some rust of their analytical skills now has some basic concepts with which to start. But both critics and advocates of Holmes’ methods must remember that not even Sherlock Holmes cracked every case nor captured every miscreant or criminal.

Corporals' Guards, Sergeants' Wars, and Field Marshal's Batons

President Obama has made his decision regarding Afghanistan and shared it with the American People (after briefing President Karzai and our allies). In simplest terms, he will use U.S. and Allied forces, and available Afghan forces, to push back against recent gains made by Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies. The hope is that these efforts will buy time during which the Kabul government’s police, army, and other security forces can built up enough to at least begin to take on the responsibility of prevent the rebirth of Al Qaeda’s base of operations in Afghanistan. Confronted by dwindling popular support in the US for this conflict after almost nine years, the President is calling for these government forces to start taking over that mission in some 18 months, allowing for the beginning of a withdrawal of US and Allied (at least combat) forces within three years.

This is an operational model that has been used before and has no guarantee of success. The plan depends upon several critical factors:

1. Enough battlefield success to sustain US popular support over the life of this operation (and to support the necessary fiscal expenditures during a time of economic hardship at home).
   The degree of support and participation by our NATO and other Allies will be a critical factor here since the lack of such support will immediately raise questions about why the US is shouldering the burden alone.
2. The preservation, at least, and preferably the development of greater popular support in Afghanistan for the Karzai government in Kabul. [The history of Afghanistan repeatedly shows that governments popularly perceived as having been imposed by outside powers do not last long against traditional clan and tribal and today Mujahidin leadership.]
3. The successful expansion and improved effectiveness of Kabul’s own forces as the currently 95,000 man Afghan army is increased to 240,000 by 2013, and the 92,000 man police force grows to 160,000.
4. Continued and effective efforts by Pakistani forces to prevent the use of its territory as a secure ‘rear area’ by forces fighting against the US-led coalition/Kabul government forces.

As difficult as it will be to achieve goals one, two, and four, the toughest challenge may well be the effective expansion of the Afghan’s own security forces. The major challenge of this effort is the need to identify, recruit, and train the non-commissioned officers (corporals and sergeants) who make up the backbone of 20th Century armies based upon our own experience throughout that century and into the present conflict.

The US has experienced this kind of expansion of its own forces several times in history. On January 1, 1861, the United States Army consisted of 16,367 men (1,704 of whom were absent from duty). On May 1, 1865, after the surrender of the Confederacy and its armies, the United States Army (counting both Regulars and Volunteers) numbered 1,000,516 men (202,709 of whom were recorded as absent from duty). Under President Lincoln’s leadership, the US Army had increased to more than 60 times its pre-war size. A critical element of that expansion was the necessity of identifying men to fill the non-commissioned ranks of this rapidly growing army – each 1,000 man Civil War Union Army regiment included more than 130 sergeants and corporals in that number – meaning that the Army as a whole needed 130,000 non-commissioned officers.

The Army manuals of the period, from which most of the newly minted Union Army officers learned their trade, encouraged the selection of NCOs for the regiment from among the ranks of what were called “intelligent soldiers,” i.e., men who demonstrated more awareness and understanding of what needed to be done and when as compared to those many soldiers who simply awaited orders. These NCOs also had to be able to read and write to fulfill the full range of their duties and many of them rose into the officer ranks as the war continued.

With changes in war and warfare since then, standards for and what is expected of NCOs has risen considerably. Historian Michael Doubler in his Closing With The Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, described how American Generals called the urban warfare encountered by US troops in Europe in 1944 and 1945 “a corporal’s war.” This reflected the reality that in warfare in an urban setting, the battle was fought and decided by the decisions of the corporals leading sections of men as they fought street by street, building by building, and room by room – not a style of warfare in which divisions, corps, and armies and their commanding generals could affect the outcome as effectively.

Most of the fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan is in many ways similar as both of these wars are fought by small units operating in patrols or manning outposts, rather than by the grander formations of battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies usually depicted by those big arrows on the maps. The burden of leading these new Afghan army and police units into the hills and onto the streets of Afghanistan will fall to the newly trained NCOs [and junior officers - lieutenants and captains], but most of them will have only a little bit more (if any more) training than the men they are leading. The US attempted something similar with “Vietnamization” during the conflict in Vietnam, with well known results.

So many of the Emperor Napoleon's Marshals and senior General officers had served in the ranks of the non-commissioned officers of the old French Royal Army that it was said that in his Grande Armee the corporals marched with a Field Marshal's baton in their knapsacks. It will be critical in Afghanistan for a sufficient number of its recruits and soldiers carry corporals' and sergeants' stripes in their packs, pockets, or persons.