Some Comments Regarding "Military History for the Modern Strategist, America’s Major Wars Since 1861" by Michael O’Hanlon

 

My longstanding rule as a military historian and student of strategy is to read as widely as possible, from strategists and from generals and even from philosophers, and whenever possible I read histories from both sides of the same conflict. You need to read the good and the bad, in order to sharpen your own mind and define your own thoughts and ideas on strategy by comparing them to the ideas of others.  I know Michael O’Hanlon from his earlier books and from presentations at The Brookings Institute, where we have conversed more than once, I knew I must read this work by him.

In these pages, the author draws upon the history of America’s wars to illustrate strategy.  The book begins in 1861 with the American Civil War.  Further chapters cover World War I, World War 2, the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts in a single chapter, and then the subsequent conflicts in the Middle East in a single chapter.  As I consider the author at least an acquaintance, I was disappointed to find that the published book is not without its flaws.  Some are as simple as typos that should have been caught, for example, a 20__ date is printed rather than the correct 19__ date.  However, there are also sins of omission, suggesting perhaps that the author didn’t read deeply enough.  There are also sins of commission where he placed too much weight on his selected sources.  It must be noted that there is no bibliography, so the only way to know what sources the author used is to read his endnotes closely.   None of these flaws invalidate his points on strategy, but more reading may have added to the depth and breadth of the discussion of strategy in these conflicts.

The American Civil War

Any modern discussion of the commanders in blue and grey must reflect the fact that most officers (the ones who went to West Pont) would have read primarily from Jomini’s Art of War, where the focus is upon Napoleon’s wars, his actions as a commander, and his thoughts and ideas about war as filtered by one of his staff officers.  Clausewitz’s work, On War, wasn’t yet available in English and German would not be taught at West Point for another decade or more.  It is likely that the only Union or Confederate officers familiar with Clausewitz, would have been one of the German émigré officers found in both armies, especially those who had served in their homeland’s army.  It is also important to recognize that calculations made before the war about the relative economic strength of North vs South overlooked the harsh reality that a sizable portion of that Southern wealth was literally the human multitudes held in bondage – and Southern planters would find it hard to translate such a ‘resource’ into hard cash in wartime.

As a slight aside, I believe that I can address the Michael O’Hanlon’s question (echoing Russell Weigley) as to why it took longer to train Civil War soldiers that to train soldiers for the war in Vietnam.  I went through Basic and Advanced Individual Training at Fort Knox in 1972, by which date the US Army had been training draftees for a good two decades.  It had training facilities, training personnel, and manuals on how to do it.  In 1861, the roughly 15,000-man US Army was scattered around the country and had little in the way of centralized training facilities or training personnel.  An added complication was that the vast majority of new regiments created to fight the war were raised by the individual states, which had no training facilities or personnel (unless they could find a West Point, VMI, or the Citadel, etc., graduate to name as Colonel of the new regiment).  However, the Union Army had a 3-volume manual (generically called “Casey’s” after its author) which covered everything the soldier needed to know.  As a Civil War reenactor, we often joked that a brand-new officer would do just fine training his soldiers if he could keep at least a chapter ahead of the troops as he went through the manual.  (The Confederate Army had “Hardee’s” manual.)  My experiences with both training practices also showed me that this initial training primarily resulted in an individual who could stand, sit, march, and generally act like a soldier (including taking care of himself, his weapons, and his other equipment) – but he wasn’t yet a combat soldier.  It would be the job of the regiment or unit in the field to which our new soldier would report to train that soldier into being a combat effective part of the unit.

The First World War

Explaining how the First World War came about is something numerous historians and others have attempted to explain over the following century, each placing special weight where that author thought it belonged.  Such extended examination of how ‘the Great War’ came about are, of course, almost literally the foundation for modern deterrence study.  Here, however, I am concerned that the author in this case may have tried too hard to be evenhanded but then focused in my view on the wrong things.  For example, in discussing Ottoman Turkey’s belated entry into the war as a German ally, he mentions the story of the Germany cruiser Goeben reaching Turkish waters after a long sea chase by the Royal Navy – but he completely failed to note that before the war had broken out, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill infuriated Turkey by seizing for his Royal Navy the two new and nearly completed battleships in British shipyards that were already paid for by Turkey – and offered neither apology or compensation.  The related anger set the stage for the Turkish decision triggered by the Goeben incident.

Similarly, I think too little attention is paid by the author to the British commitment (shared in international agreement with Germany) to Belgian neutrality.  Germany’s brazen and bungling violation of Belgium’s neutrality presented Britain with the decision to either go to war ‘over a piece of paper’ or not.  However, having helped create an international system (especially in Europe) that established the importance of such a ‘piece of paper’ and then helped to maintain that system for a century, Britain had no choice – however poorly it explained its position to Berlin.  Such pieces of paper were of concern to those who wrote and signed them but in Germany these individuals failed to refocus the German General Staff’s attention from the question of ‘can it be done?’ to the real one of ‘should it be done’.

The Second World War

The extensive discussion of the Second World War did include one rather confusing sentence:

“In what became known as the Bataan Death March of early 1942, the American forces that had been garrisoned on the Philippines were isolated, outmaneuvered, and effectively starved into capitulation by a modest-sized but highly effective Japanese invading force.”

It appears that the author is applying the sobriquet of “the Bataan Death March” to the Japanese campaign in the Philippines when it actually refers to the subsequent march by the Japanese of some 76,000 American and Philippines POWs some 65 miles over 5 to 10 days without adequate food or water.  Only 59,000 would survive this march and after the war a Japanese Major General and two Colonels would be tried, convicted, and executed for this.

This thought leads to another observation about how racial prejudice and mistaken preconceptions about other nationalities and races underpinned key bad decisions made by about every combatant nation participating in the Second World War, though this volume primarily calls out Japanese estimates that the US would not fight.

In my view, the author also missed the opportunity to discuss the Allied information war success against Germany, relevant as we follow the ongoing war in Ukraine.  In April 1945, the German garrison in occupied Norway surrendered to the Allies – more than 400,000 of them.  The garrison in Norway was tied down by a prolonged Allied information campaign, enabled by the ability to read German military communications and the control of multiple German agents who had been turned by the Allies, all aimed at convincing Hitler that the Allies were preparing to send troops to liberate Norway.  The 400,000 men in Norway were only a bit fewer than the number who surrendered in Italy at the end of a prolonged campaign begun with the 1943 invasion of the Italian mainland, but which tied down a larger number of Allied troops over almost a full two years.

Korea and Vietnam

It should be noted regarding US participation in the conflict in Korea, that the US did not mobilize in the same way that it had for the Second World War.  This imposed restrictions on what manpower and resources could be sent to Korea even as the US sought to bolster its forces in Europe fearing a Soviet invasion there.  As for Vietnam, it needs to be noted that after 1954 the governments in both Hanoi and Saigon were primarily run by Northern Vietnamese figures.  Also, as Hanoi started preparing for a renewal of armed conflict in South Vietnam, it began by organizing its sympathizers there into the Viet Cong – dominated in its early phases by Southerners who would over time be replaced by people sent down from the North because operations like the Tet Offensive had been so costly for that Southern leadership.  I think also that Richard Nixon’s sabotage of President Johnson’s peace efforts in 1968 needs to at least be referenced in the discussion.

The Mideast Wars

The histories of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, like the various post-Cold War interventions in Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria are in fact still being written – and rewritten.  This makes it a rather daring and even daunting effort to look to the history of these conflicts for strategic insights.  However, here Michael O’Hanlon is on ground well-known to him as a long-time participant in open (and some more discrete) conversations about these countries, the challenges they represent, US actions in each, and what lessons about strategy might be drawn from these experiences.  I believe what is presented here might be considered a good ‘first draft’ which we can keep at hand as more information and new histories are written about these conflicts and the US’s decisions with regard to each of them.

As I come to the end, I need to remind the reader of my advice at the beginning, read everything.  I look forward to Michael O’Hanlon’s next project.  He has a lot to tell us about strategy and I wish him the best as he continues to look for the historical underpinnings of it!

 

 

The Burden of Command

“General, soldiering has one great trap: to be a good soldier you must love the army. To be a good commander, you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love. We do not fear our own death you and I. But there comes a time... We are never quite prepared for so many to die. Oh, we do expect the occasional empty chair. A salute to fallen comrades. But this war goes on and on and the men die and the price gets ever higher. We are prepared to lose some of us, but we are never prepared to lose all of us. And there is the great trap General. When you attack, you must hold nothing back. You must commit yourself totally.”

Michael Shaara wrote the above speech in its original form for General Robert E. Lee speaking to General Longstreet in his novel “The Killer Angels.” The above version is the way it was rewritten for the film “Gettysburg” based upon Shaara’s book. In both book and film, Lee goes on to tell Longstreet that he must not expose himself too dangerously in the coming battle because of his (Longstreet’s) importance to the army.

This speech came to mind as I was finishing William Philpott’s brilliant “Three Armies on the Somme, The First Battle of the Twentieth Century” after recently read several First World War memoirs by junior officers (Robert Graves, Guy Chapman, Siegfried Sassoon, among others). The First World War marked an extreme between the way the soldiers and their generals experienced war.

Veterans of combat, if and when they are willing to speak honestly about it, will generally tell you that ‘combat is a bitch.’ If you look at previous wars, in fact, you will find many generals offering rather similar sentiments that reflected how much more closely their combat experience echoed that of the private soldier. The day after his “near-run” victory over Napoleon at Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Lady Frances Shelly, “I hope to God I have fought my last battle. It is a bad thing to be always fighting. While in the thick of it I am too much occupied to feel anything; but it is wretched just after. It is quite impossible to think of glory.” Robert E. Lee reportedly spoke in similar spirit to General Longstreet in the aftermath of the Confederate lopsided victory at Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, “It is well that war is so terrible—we should grow too fond of it.”

Long after their experiences in the American Civil War, commanders on both sides would make similar statements. General Sherman told a Columbus, Ohio audience in 1880, that “There is many a boy here today who looks on war as all glory, but, boys, it is all hell.” Confederate partisan leader John Singleton Mosby would write in his memoirs, “War loses a great deal of its romance after a soldier has seen his first battle.”

The truth that the individual soldier fights more for those around him than for any higher cause is today so widely accepted as to have become a Hollywood movie cliché (and in the process proving again that even clichés often conceal a hard truth). The physical and emotional toll of close combat is heavy and post-traumatic stress syndrome is not a new phenomenon, though soldiers of earlier wars might have referred instead to battle fatigue, battle-happy, cannon fever, chicken-heart disease, combat-happy, gangplank fever, or shell-shock, among other labels used.

The commander, however, even during the time of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, Lee, and Grant, fights with his mind far more than with his body and individual weapons. The old pre-Nazi German army was aware of this and several senior officers offered the following commentary, though I came across it as from General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord who reportedly wrote in 1933:

“I divide officers into four classes – the clever, the lazy, the stupid, and the industrious. Each officer possesses at least two of these qualities. Those who are clever and industrious are fitted for the high staff appointments. Use can be made of those who are stupid and lazy. The man who is clever and lazy is fit for the very highest command. He has the temperament and the requisite nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious must be removed immediately.”

Notice the idea that the commander, the decision-maker, must remain calm and contrast this with the battle experience of the individual soldier who often fights with emotion or even passion when the nature of the battle demands it. In the film, “Gettysburg” it is Lee who gives in to his emotions in making his fateful decisions while the frustrated Longstreet finds that his cooler rationality cannot persuade Lee to act differently – and disaster results just as it did in the actual battle. Here, Hollywood and Michael Shaara have reflected if not fully embraced the idea that an army commander needs to avoid making decisions based upon emotion rather than cold, hard truths.

What remains to be addressed here is the further truth that while the commander needs to remain cool and collected, as a leader of soldiers he also needs to be aware of, to connect with, and even to tap that emotion found in those soldiers. That leadership role requires a connection at the personnel level, and that requires a commander who can still find his/her emotions and harness them (because as in the old joke, “it’s all about sincerity, once you can fake that you’ve got it made). I am certain that in the face of the compound strains of maintaining a cool head for command decisions and supporting the soldiers’ morale via that important emotional bond, many commanders must silently echo the wishes of Lt. Gonville Bromhead in the film “Zulu” who as he watched the approaching Zulu, said, “Right now I wish I were a damned ranker.”

A Prescient View of the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862

Charles Carleton Coffin, Army Correspondent of The Boston Journal, wrote the following letter to his newspaper from Chatham house on December 9, 1862 (excerpted from "Four Years of Fighting" by Charles Carleton Coffin):

"It is a clear, cold morning. The sky is without a cloud. Standing near General Sumner's quarters, I have a wide sweep of vision. The quarters of the veteran general commanding the right grand division are in a spacious mansion, newly constructed, the property of wealthy planter, whose estate is somewhat shorn of its beauty by the ravages of war. The fences are all gone, the forests are fast disappearing, the fine range of cedars which lined the Belleplain road are no longer to be seen. All around are the white tents of the command, the innumerable camp-fires sending up blue columns of smoke. The air is calm. You hear the rumbling of distant baggage-trains, the clatter of hundreds of axes felling the forests for fuel,--the bugle-call of the cavalrymen, and the rat-a-plan of the drummers, and mingling with all, the steady, constant flow of the falling waters of the winding stream.

Looking far off to the southeast, across the intervals of the river, you see a white cloud of steam moving beneath the fringe of a forest. It is a locomotive from Richmond, dragging its train of cars with supplies for the Rebel camps. The forests and hills beyond are alive with them. Resting my glass against the side of the building to keep it steady, I can count the men grouped around the camp-fires, turning at times to keep themselves warm. Others are bringing in wood. An officer rides along. A train of wagons is winding down the hill toward the town. All along the range of hills are earthworks with sandbag embrasures, and artillery behind,--not quaker guns, I think, but field artillery, so ranged that a movement directly across the river would be marching into the jaws of death,---as hazardous and destructive as the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava.

I know that there is a clamor for an onward movement, a desire and expectation for an advance; but I think there are few men in the country who, after taking a look at the Rebel positions, would like to lead in a movement across the stream.

Looking into the town of Fredericksburg we see but few smokes ascending from chimneys, but few people in the streets. It is almost wholly deserted. The women and children have gone to Richmond, or else are shivering in camp. Close upon the river-bank on either side face the pickets, within easy talking distance of each other. There has been no shooting of late. There is constant badinage. The Rebel picket asks the Yankee when he is going to Richmond. The Yankee asks the Rebel if he don't want a pair of boots. I am sorry to say that such conversation is mixed with profane words. Each party seems to think that hard words hit hard.

Last night the southern sky was red with the blaze of Rebel camp-fires. Far off to the southeast I see a hazy cloud, and columns of smoke, indicating the presence of a large army. I do not doubt that if we attempt to cross we shall meet with terrible opposition from a force nearly if not quite as large as our own.

If the President or General Halleck insist upon Burnside's making the movement, it will be made with whatever power, energy, determination, and bravery the army can exhibit. I am as anxious as any one can be to see a great blow given to the Rebellion; but I am not at all anxious to see the attempt made against such disadvantages as are apparent to the most casual observer from this position."

Today you can still visit Fredericksburg, Virginia, and in particular Chatham House (aka Lacey House) and find much of the same scenery and the same scenes that would have presented themselves to those present at the battle. This weekend in Fredericksburg the anniversary of the battle will be marked by reenactors and citizens retelling the story of the battle and on Sunday you will be able to follow the march of the Irish Brigade through the streets of the city to their fatal engagement on Marye's Heights and NPS historian and author Frank O'Reilly narrates.

The Universal Soldier – the mud-rain-frost-and-wind boys of the infantry

Having recently written a blog about books on tanks and armored vehicles, my more recent readings have focused on the infantry, so I will now present several postings on books on the subject. (And don’t worry tread heads and tankisti, I will return to the subject of tanks for I am also fond of the great metal monsters myself.)

Ultimately, every individual who goes to war is an infantryman (or infantrywoman where applicable and accepted) for the individual soldier and his personal weapon is the fundamental building block of the military. The lot of an infantry soldier of any army of any period of history is recognizable to any of his counterparts, comrades, or foes who are also infantry. Some years ago, a colleague shared a text that illustrates this point as it describes the lot of an Egyptian infantryman (it was reportedly used as a practice text for Egyptian scribes learning their art and perfecting their craft):

Come, [let me tell] you the woes of the soldier, and how many are his superiors: the general, the troop-commander, the officer who leads, the standard-bearer, the lieutenant, the scribe, the commander of fifty, and the garrison-captain. They go in and out in the halls of the palace, saying: "Get laborers!" He is awakened at any hour. One is after him as [after] a donkey. He toils until the Aten sets in his darkness of night. He is hungry, his belly hurts; he is dead while yet alive. When he receives the grain-ration, having been released from duty, it is not good for grinding.

He is called up for Syria. He may not rest. There are no clothes, no sandals. The weapons of war are assembled at the fortress of Sile. His march is uphill through mountains. He drinks water every third day; it is smelly and tastes of salt. His body is ravaged by illness. The enemy comes, surrounds him with missiles, and life recedes from him. He is told: "Quick, forward, valiant soldier! Win for yourself a good name!" He does not know what he is about. His body is weak, his legs fail him.

When victory is won, the captives are handed over to his majesty, to be taken to Egypt. The foreign woman faints on the march; she hangs herself [on] the soldier's neck. His knapsack drops, another grabs it while he is burdened with the woman. His wife and children are in their village; he dies and does not reach it. If he comes out alive, he is worn out from marching.
Be he at large, be he detained, the soldier suffers. If he leaps and joins the deserters, all his people are imprisoned. He dies on the edge of the desert, and there is none to perpetuate his name. He suffers in death as in life. A big sack is brought for him; he does not know his resting place.

The American GIs, whom Ernie Pyle referred to as “the mud-rain-frost-and-wind boys,” would recognize themselves and their lot in the lament of this ancient predecessor. Ernie was with and reported on the GIs in North Africa, Italy, and France and then moved on to report on the war in the Pacific. He was killed on April 18, 1945 by a Japanese machine gun on the small island of Ie Shima near Okinawa. Perhaps the most indicative comment on how well Ernie Pyle told the story of the American infantryman of World War II came from the soldiers themselves for they posted a sign board on Ie Shima bearing the following words: “At this spot, the 77th Infantry Division lost a Buddy, Ernie Pyle, 18 April 1945.”

You can read what Ernie Pyle wrote about the American soldier in the two published collections of his wartime columns. Since these were meant for newspaper syndication, Ernie did clean things up a little bit for the home front audience but you can still get a sense of what it was like from his writing and I highly recommend them.

This presents Ernie’s columns from the North African campaign, Algeria to Tunisia.

Here is Your War by Ernie Pyle, Consolidated Book Publishers, Chicago, 1944 © 1943, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York

The second volume presents Ernie’s columns from Sicily (June-September, 1943), Italy (December, 1943-April, 1944), and France (June-September, 1944) including a column actually written while he was in the Pacific as the war in Europe ended but that was not published. It was found when he was killed and not printed because its tone was considered too depressing at the time.

Brave Men, by Ernie Pyle, Bison Books Edition, University of Nebraska Press, © 2001, University of Nebraska Press (originally published 1944, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York)

There are other memoirs relating experiences of GIs that should be easy to track down. However, one of the best and now a classic standard work for those studying the WWII GI was written by an infantry officer:

Company Commander, Charles B. MacDonald, Ballantine Books, New York, © 1947 Charles B. MacDonald.

In September, 1944, at the age of 22, the author took command of Company I, an infantry company of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division. He was wounded in January, 1945 and after two months convalescence was placed in command of a different infantry company, which he led until the end of the war in Europe. He received the Silver Star and the Purple Heart. His memoirs describing this experience were first published in 1947 but have remained available ever since. This book is widely considered a classic text for the study of command in the 20th Century and especially the American Army of the Second World War. After the war, MacDonald would rise to become Deputy Chief Historian at the Army Center for Military History at his retirement in 1979. Highly recommended.

Roll Me Over, An Infantryman’s World War II, by Raymond Gantter, Ivy Books, New York, © 1997 The Estate of Raymond Gantter.

Ray Gantter was a 30 year old draftee, after turning down his third draft deferment. As a result, he his jobs playing jazz piano and working as a program manager for a Syracuse New York radio station to join the army as a private, becoming an acting squad leader, and then acting buck sergeant, serving with the 1st Infantry Division where he earned the Silver Star and a battlefield commission. This book is based upon the wartime journal he kept from September 1944 to the end of the war and which he turned into a book manuscript in June 1949. The author’s wartime experiences covered northern France, Belgium, the Bulge, Germany, and finally Czechoslovakia. He also intersperses his descriptions of combat with discussions of the soldier’s daily life and its more mundane and less dramatic aspects. Recommended.

Night Drop, The American Airborne Invasion of Normandy, S.L.A. Marshall, © 1962 S.L.A. Marshall, published in 1962 by The Battery Press, Inc, Nashville, and in 1984 by Jove/The Berkeley Press, New York.

This work differs from the others discussed because it is neither a memoir nor autobiographical, and covers only one single combat operation rather than a longer period of the war. Noted military historian S.L.A. Marshall, Brigadier General, USAR, (ret.), based this book on the after action reports and his interviews with participants in the operation to tell the story of the American Airborne (parachute and glider) assaults in Normandy. Critics and scholars have found fault with some of Marshall’s work and you can find a great deal of material on that debate elsewhere on the internet and in the academic journals. Nevertheless, this is still a harrowing account of the confusion, chaos, courage, and desperation that surrounded the American paratroopers and glider troops in the D-Day operation. Recommended, with a caveat that Marshall’s methods as used in researching for this work have been challenged in connection with other books by him.

Tanks for the Memories -

While humans have toyed with armored vehicles of one kind or another it seems since they first invented vehicles, the tank as a modern armored vehicle is only now approaching its centenary. So, with that 100th anniversary to look forward to, I have pulled a few of my own favorite books on tanks off the shelves and compile this list of recommended volumes on those marvelous machines. [Not all of the books on my shelves relating to tanks made the cut, but that is a reflection of just how many books on the subject there are, so I hope that at least some of you will find my contributions and comments useful.]


Tank Facts and Feats, A record of Armoured Fighting Vehicle Achievement, edited and compiles by Kenneth Macksey. © Guinness Superlatives Limited 1973. New York, The Two Continents Publishing Group, Ltd. ISBN 0-8467-0006-9.

Although a bit dated by its 1973 publication date, this remains one of the most useful single volume references on the history of tanks and armored fighting vehicles, so I recommend you seriously consider picking this up if you are interested in the subject. Also, if anyone knows of a more recent similar volume, I would be glad to hear of it – and if they don’t, then a shout out to aspiring experts on the subject to get cracking on a modern equivalent work!


King of the Killing Zone, by Orr Kelly. (c) 1989 by Orr Kelly. Berkley Books, New York. ISBN 0-425-12304-9.

The King of the Killing Zone refered to in the title is the M-1 Abram Main Battle Tank, and herein the author tells the tale of the two decades spent by the US to get it. This includes the wrong turns, bad decisions, and how it finally turned out a right. A tour-de-force description of how the USG's defense procurements can go wrong and can go right.


Death Traps, The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II, by Belton Y. Cooper. © 1998 by Belton Y. Cooper. Ballantine Books, New York. ISBN 0-89141-814-8.

The author, Belton Y. Cooper, served with the 3rd Armored Division Maintenance Battalion as a liaison officer whose duties took him back and forth across the battlefield to identify and arrange the recovery of damaged tanks and other vehicles belonging to 3rd Armored. As a result he saw a great deal more of both the results of front line combat and of how US tank crews responded to the conflict and to the challenges of meeting German veterans in the vulnerable Shermans. This is an outstanding book and a must read for anyone wanting to know how tanks actually functioned in World War II Europe. This was originally published in hardback by Presidio Press.


Flame Thrower, by Andrew Wilson. © 1956 by Andrew Wilson. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-24533-3.

I believe that this is possibly a unique account of the British Army’s Churchill Mk VII Crocodile flamethrower tanks of World War II. Andrew Wilson was an officer and Crocodile tank commander with the 141st Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps (The Buffs), serving in Normandy up to the end of the war along the Rhine.


With Pennants Flying, The Immortal Deeds of the Royal Armoured Corps, David Masters. 1943, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London.

As you can see, this 1943 volume focuses upon the early war experiences of British tank crews first in France, then Greece, Crete, Burma, the Dieppe raid, and in North Africa. Since it is the story of the whole of the Royal Armoured Corps, it includes information on various British tank units during this part of the war and a great many insights on the early lessons of tank warfare.


The Gods Were Neutral, Major Robert Crisp. © 1960 by Robert Crisp. Ballantine Books, New York.

Brazen Chariots, An Account of Tank Warfare in the Western Desert November-December 1941, by Robert Crisp. © 1959 by Robert Crisp. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-24163-X

Although the latter work was published first, together these two volumes cover Robert Crisp’s war service in the 3rd Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment in North Africa, Greece, Crete, and again in North Africa from January 1941 to the end of the year. He began this interval in the A-10 and then A-13 Cruiser tank s and ended it in the M3 Light Cavalry Tank popularly called Honeys or Stuarts. Both books abound with excellent tactical level details and insights into the tank fighting of this period.

The Golden Carpet, Somerset de Chair. © 1945 by Somerset de Chair. Bantam Books, New York. ISBN 0-553-29580-2.

This is a firsthand account of the little known (at least in the US) and oft-forgotten 1941 invasion of Iraq via Syria, by 750 men of His Majesty’s Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards and of the Arab Legion under John Glubb Pasha – already becoming the stuff of legend. This mixed force traveling in heavy and light trucks, armed at most with machine guns, escorted by eight Royal Air Force Rolls Royce armored cars, supported by 2 pounder anti-tank guns, bested Iraqi police elements and a German supported Iraqi Army of 40,000 troops defending Baghdad in a one month campaign. The author was a Royal Horse Guards 2nd Lieutenant serving as intelligence officer to Brigadier Joe Kingstone who commanded “Kingcol” as the entire force was called. After taking Baghdad, they then turned back to take on French and Syrian troops at Palmyra, Syria that were loyal to Vichy France.

By Tank into Normandy, A Memoir of the Campaign in North-West Europe from D-Day to VE Day, Stuart Hills. © Stuart Hills 2002. Cassell, London. ISBN 0-304-36640-4.

The author served as an officer in the Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry from the D-Day landings on Gold Beach to VE Day which found him across the River Wesser heading for Hamburg. Stuart Hill was a crewmember and tank commander on Sherman tanks, including the Sherman DD (Duplex Drive) swimming tanks built specifically for the invasion. From this vantage point, he offers a good many tactical and technical insights into the challenges facing Allied Sherman tanks confronted by superior German Mark V Panthers and Tiger tanks, as well as the deadly 88 mm guns frequently deployed in anti-tank roles.

Walking the Battle Ground -The Modern Staff Ride

During the 19th Century, the Prussian Army led the way in the field of military education for its officers and future commanders. The Prussians introduced institutions of formal higher military education, the use of map or terrain table based war games to hone decision-making skills, and they introduced the staff ride – a guided tour of an historical battlefield to included examination and discussion of what happened during the battle fought on that ground and why. This practice is one of the reasons for the existence today of our own National Battlefield and National Historical Parks and Sites maintained by the underfunded National Park Service. Originally intended for the training of America’s military officers, these parks are now part of a larger system intended to introduce the American people and others visiting the United States to the complicated history that created and shaped this nation.

Officers on a military staff ride would be expected to have read about and studied the battle before the ride. During the actual staff ride, the director of the ride might challenge one of the participating officers with a question about what actions he might take to attack or defend a given position on the battlefield, or whether the original attack might have been better executed or supported perhaps resulting in a different outcome. In my experience, there is still no better way to really understand a battle than to visit and walk over the ground upon which it was fought. I am happy to say that I have had the good fortune to be able to personally visit many battlefields, fortifications, castles, etc. during my travels and have been cataloging my collection of such visits on Google Maps: Battlefields, Castles, and Forts I Have Visited.

The importance of terrain and its impact on a battle is an aspect of warfare not often explained to the general public and not easily accessible to those not professional soldiers. Jeff Shaara’s “Killer Angels” included several references to the importance of “good ground” and how it shaped the battle of Gettysburg – highlighted by General George Meade’s question (as a new and still nervous commander of the Army of the Potomac) arriving at the battlefield during the night, “Is this good ground?” meaning, can this army fight and possibly win here against Robert E. Lee? He was quickly assured that, “This is good ground!” There are today a few books that explain how terrain and climate affect military operations, historically and today. These include:

"Military Geography for Professionals and the Public" by John M. Collins (ISBN 1-57906-002-1),

"Battlegrounds, Geography and the History of Warfare" edited by Michael Stephenson (ISBN 0-7922-3374-3), and

"Battling the Elements, Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War" by Harold A. Winters (ISBN 0-8018-5850-X).

I recently viewed a cable TV documentary program on the battle of Antietam that did succeed in illustrating the importance of terrain on a battle and upon the men who are fighting it. A couple of participating researchers and a cameraman stood in the sunken lane position held by Confederate troops. As they watched from this vantage point, a second group of researchers walked towards them along the route followed by Thomas Francis Meagher’s Irish Brigade during its original attack on the lane. Viewers clearly saw the approaching researchers appear and disappear in the undulations and irregularities of the ground which would have protected the advancing Irish from much of the Confederate fire until they were very close. This meant that despite the distance of the open ground they had to cross, the men of the Irish Brigade were actually protected in great degree against Confederate fire by the undulating nature of the ground leading up to the Confederate position in the sunken lane. Such insights into why a battle was fought or ended in a particular way can only be obtained on the actual ground.

The modern day equivalent of the Staff Ride can be achieved with a good guide book or a good guide and some preparation before you visit the battlefield. It is also possible to download complete staff ride guides for a number of U.S. battlefields that have been prepared by the Center for Military History. You can start with a booklet that explains the Staff Ride itself and what goes into the planning of a staff ride called "The Staff Ride." You can also download Adobe pdf versions of the staff ride guide books to several battlefields in the United States from the Army Command and General Staff School website.

The available ones include:
The Battle of Cowpens (South Carolina)

First Bull Run (Virginia)

The Battle of Antietam (Maryland)

The Battle of Balls Bluff (Virginia)

You can also find useful maps for visiting Civil War battlefields at the website of The Civil War Preservation Trust which hosts a collection of maps prepared by the organization. A number of these are even presented on the website with animation and discussion of the battle. The Osprey Campaign Series of books published in the UK and the US are a series of books on wars, campaigns, and battles that include good maps and information useful in walking a battlefield. Also from the UK comes the publication After The Battle “Then and Now” which publishes books and magazine collections of photos showing many battlefields as they appeared in period photographs and images alongside photos of how they appear today (or at least as of the date of publication given how long this magazine has been around).

In addition to the research and reading before the battle, you will want to make sure that everyone dresses appropriately, wears good walking shoes, and has easy access to plenty of water. Many successful staff rides include a planned picnic and/or an evening dinner over which the day’s trip can be discussed further. Optional but often useful items would also include binoculars (or a telescope if you want an idea of how an 18th and many 19th Century generals viewed a battlefield), a compass or handheld GPS receiver that will also give you compass points and bearings.

So, got everything you need? En avance!

Ernie Pyle and the mud-rain-frost-and wind boys – The Poor Bloody Infantry

This past week I had one of those travel experiences that seems to happen all too often with modern airline travel. However, the fifteen hours I spent shuttling between four airports and two different airplanes gave me an opportunity to read “Ernie’s War: The Best of Ernie Pyle’s World War II Dispatches” compiled and edited by David Nichols. I picked up this book as I left the house for this trip because I had just seen the bio-pic made about Ernie during World War II – “The Story of G.I. Joe” starring Burgess Meredith as Ernie Pyle (based upon Ernie’s first World War II book, “Here is Your War”). I can only say that if you really want to find some insight into the world and the experiences of the infantry soldier, you have to read Ernie’s columns. His World War II writings were compiled into two books – the already mentioned “Here is Your War” recounting his experiences and those of the American G.I.s in North Africa, while “Brave Men” was based upon his reports from his time in Europe. (And by the way, reading of their experiences in war makes the obstacles and challenges of modern air travel fade into at worst minor annoyances!)

I feel a close kinship with the infantry, even though my own limited military training was as an armored scout observer. However, my training company captain may have known something more about the subject than I did at the time. I once in jest asked him why in the age of mechanized infantry (such as my home National Guard unit) we had to walk so much. He explained that in the U.S. Army, being mechanized infantry meant that you got to carry a P-38 (this P-38 being the Army issue can opener essential to opening the tins that our C-rations came in). Having come relatively late in life to reenacting, I find I have come home to the infantry whether it be Billy Yank, Johnny Reb, Tommy Atkins, or G.I. Joe.

Ernie Pyle wrote that “I love the infantry because they are the underdogs. They are the mud-rain-frost-and wind boys. They have no comforts , and they even learn to live without the necessities. And in the end they are the guys that wars can’t be won without.” Ernie Pyle spent much of his time as a war correspondent during World War II with the infantry in Europe and in the Pacific (with the Marines). While he spent time with the other services and branches of our armed forces, his writings make evident his bond with and affection for “the poor bloody infantry” whether G.I.s or Marines.

Years ago, a friend shared with me a short text he had found that also spoke of the infantry that I was reminded of while reading Ernie’s columns. The links between its words and those of Ernie seemed to speak of the universal and eternal experience of the infantry soldier. It was reportedly written as a practice piece for Egyptian scribes learning the art of writing in hieroglyphics, while also serving as a warning of what might befall them if they were not diligent in that practice and failed to win a scribe’s position.

“Come, [let me tell] you the woes of the soldier, and how many are his superiors: the general, the troop-commander, the officer who leads, the standard-bearer, the lieutenant, the scribe, the commander of fifty, and the garrison-captain…..He is awakened at any hour…..His march is uphill through mountains. He drinks water every third day; it is smelly and tastes of salt. His body is ravaged by illness. The enemy comes, surrounds him with missiles, and life recedes from him. He is told: "Quick, forward, valiant soldier! Win for yourself a good name!" He does not know what he is about. His body is weak, his legs fail him…..Be he at large, be he detained, the soldier suffers. If he leaps and joins the deserters, all his people are imprisoned. He dies on the edge of the desert, and there is none to perpetuate his name. He suffers in death as in life. A big sack is brought for him; he does not know his resting place.”

Even in the 21st Century, the poor bloody infantry (in a phrase whose origin is almost as ancient and obscure) constitute the sub-atomic particles of the military machine. Ultimately, each and every individual in uniform with their personal weapon is an infantryman. Any armed force that fails to remember this will find itself at a serious disadvantage when confronted by another force that did not thus fail.

It's Not Just Art Historians That Plague Museums

I may have left the impression in my last posting that the only problems museums have are with art experts and historians who fail to do proper research on military and war related exhibits. However, the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of American History has had a similar problem now for several years. In the year before it closed for renovations, the Museum unveiled an exhibition called "The Price of Freedom: Americans at War, this presents a survey of America's conflicts and their costs. This exhibition is again on display, unchanged, after these renovations.

An obvious element in such an exhibit would be the American Civil War, described by many historians as the conflict that defined America. The photo included with this article is one that I took earlier this year after the museum was re-opened. I took an almost identical photo before the closure for renovation and attempted to alert museum curators to the errors thus illustrated. Whoever placed the equipment upon the mannequin did it backwards - a fact that as an active reenactor of a Civil War Union soldier immediately struck me when I first visited the exhibit.

The most visible item of equipment is the canteen covered in brown blanket cloth. This is resting on the mannequin's left leg when it should be resting on top of the oilskin cloth haversack and both lying atop the left hip, out the way yet still accessible. The haversack on this mannequin has been reversed from its proper position and can be made out hanging close to the body at the right front.

On the mannequin's left hip, resting approximately where the haversack should be is the black leather cartridge box which would have carried the soldier's rounds of ammunition. This should be resting on the right hip where the soldier can easily use his right hand to reach back, open the pouch, and pluck out a single paper cartridge containing both one bullet and the black powder that when the weapon is fired would propel the bullet towards the chosen target.

The next most important accessory is the cap pouch, a small coin purse sized leather pouch that contains the soldier's percussion caps. After the soldier has poured the black powder down the barrel of his musket, dropped in the bullet, and then used his ramrod to force all of this down to the bottom of his weapon's barrel, he would hold the musket in his left hand while his right hand would reach down to remove a single cap from this pouch which should be just the right side of the buckle of his waist belt. This cap is placed upon the cone or nipple of the musket where it will be struck by the weapon's hammer when the trigger is pulled. The hammer's blow should set off the fulminate of mercury contained in the percussion cap which should create enough of a spark to ignite the black powder already poured down the barrel, firing the weapon. In this instance, the mannequin's pouch is in approximately the right position though the haversack being incorrectly placed just below it makes it difficult to reach.

It would be reasonable to surmise that neither the mannequin nor the curator or individual who kitted out this mannequin was ever dressed down by a sergeant major or any kind of sergeant for being a "slovenly soldier" because their kit was all a scramble. It is not impossible that the individual was using an original image of an actual Civil War Union soldier as a reference aid when placing the equipment on the mannequin. If this is the case, the individual was either unaware or had forgotten that in some forms of photographs or images from this period, the image is in fact a mirror image of the original subject, i.e., backward or reversed so that the real person's right side is on the leftside of the image. The sad result is that the exhibition misinforms the public and leads knowledgable visitors to conclude that the museum is ignorant on this subject and reluctant to admit that fact.

Military Art and the Art of War: Can We Get Art Historians to Study Military History?

One of my favorite past-times at home or on the road is to visit art galleries in search of artwork that might offer some insights about war, warfare, and its practioners. However, I have learned that these excursions also present the risk of coming within earshot of art museum docents, guides, and experts as they explain the military scenes and subjects depicted, all too often exposing gaps in their knowledge of military history, war, and warfare.

One my first such experiences was at the National Gallery of Art exhibition Winslow Homer in the National Gallery of Art. This exhibit brought together a small selection of works tracing the career of this American artist, including some of his Civil War drawings and paintings. Of particular interest to me was “Home Sweet Home”, depicting two Union Army soldiers in a moment or relaxation in camp. Also in this exhibit was “The Sharpshooter on Picket Duty”. This image first appeared as an engraving in Harper’s Weekly, November 15, 1862. It depicts a Union Army sharpshooter in a tree drawing a bead on a long-range target, a scene captured during McClellan’s Peninsular campaign which sought but failed to capture the Confederate capitol of Richmond, Virginia.

As I was studying the two paintings, a National Gallery guide led a group of visitors into the small gallery. The guide presented a general and not inaccurate description of the two paintings, though he skipped over a number of details that I had found particularly interesting and was clearly not as immersed in the Civil War. He was apparently unaware that the sharpshooter in the painting was an image from the Peninsular campaign and insisted on linking it to the later Battle of Antietam fought in western Maryland, apparently not knowing that Winslow Homer was actually present during the former campaign. As for the campfire scene in the first-named painting, my examination of the canvas quickly convinced me that one of the soldiers had placed his tin cup on the fire to make himself a cup of coffee – something I had myself done as a Civil War Reenactor and Living Historian. I also knew from my study and from my reenacting experience that the Union Army (and most modern reenactors) almost literally ran on coffee.

As the guide continued to examine “Home Sweet Home,” he referred to the tin cup on the fire as a small pot and declared that the soldiers were making stew. At this point I was unable to restrain myself and said loudly enough to be heard by the guide and the small group of visitors that actually the soldier was making himself some coffee in his tin cup. The guide ignored my comment even when I repeated it more briefly, refusing to even acknowledging my existence. I listened a little longer to his discussion of the paintings before leaving the room unacknowledged and apparently unheard, though I surrendered enough to impulse to tell one of the museum guards that “this fellow may know art but he knows next to nothing about the Civil War.”

The National Gallery’s web site presents this painting for online viewing (link above) with a zoom feature that allows the viewer to enlarge details of the image for closer examination. Using this feature I have found that you can actually make out the curve of the top of the handle of the tin cup just above the rim at the back of the cup as it sits on the fire. You can take advantage of this capability to conduct your own examination of the image and draw your own conclusion. I should add, however, that in the catalog for the 1988 San Francisco exhibition Winslow Homer: Paintings of the Civil War there are citations from a number of critics’ comments upon “Home Sweet Home” dating from its first public showing in 1863. Among these, T.B. Aldrich wrote in The New York Illustrated News (16 May 1863) that this work:

“…shows a Federal camp at supper time. The band in the distance is playing ‘Home Sweet Home’ in the immediate foreground are two of the boys, one warming the coffee at the camp fire, and the other dreamily watching the operation….”

More recently I found myself in similar circumstances at the Seattle Arts Museum where I went to see the traveling exhibit Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness: American Art from the Yale University Art Gallery. This is a great exhibit of selected works from the Yale University collections that have been put on the road instead of into storage while their permanent home is undergoing renovations. The exhibition included two works of particular interest: “The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker's Hill,” painted by John Trumbull, and a photograph of unfinished pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg, Virginia, taken during the American Civil War. Examining the placard describing the photograph of the pontoon bridges I found that it referred to the “unsuccessful siege of Fredericksburg,” described as unsuccessful because the bridges were never completed – according to the caption writer. Unfortunately for the Union troops involved, the “siege” actually did succeed as the bridges were completed, the Army of the Potomac crossed the river, and on December 13, 1862, engaged the Confederates entrenched on the heights beyond the town of Fredericksburg. The Civil War Preservation Trust website hosts an excellent presentation on the campaign and battle that goes into detail both on the bridges and the resulting battle.

As disappointing as I found the erroneous caption, it wasn’t until I returned to examine the photo again that I had another of those encounters with a guide. A Seattle Art museum guide was discussing John Trumbull’s painting “The Death of General Warren” (aka “The Battle of Bunker’s Hill”) depicting the battle fought on Breed’s and Bunker’s Hills in Charlestown opposite the city of Boston on 17 June 1775. At the approximate center of the canvas, the American patriot General Warren is lying in the arms of a comrade who is pushing away the bayonet of a British soldier attempting to thrust it into the dying American’s body. That soldier is also restrained by a British officer, Colonel John Small, who reportedly recognized the prominent American rebel and actually called out to him to surrender to avoid being killed in the final moments of the battle.

The guide attributed the British colonel’s act of restraint to a sense of community and kinship between the British and the American colonials. However, other accounts of the battle make it clear that such a sense of kinship was not universally shared among the British. As the leader of the Massachusetts Committee of Public Safety, Warren was a recognized leader among American patriots and his death was welcomed by many British officers. General Gage is reported to have said Warren’s death alone was worth the death of 500 other rebels. Another British officer, Captain Lane, who had been engaged in the running battle between Concord and Lexington and Boston before participating in the repeated assaults on the American positions, boasted that he had happily buried Warren in an unmarked common grave and hoped that he would never be found and identified. Finally, while elaborating on this point, the guide never chose to mention that the artist John Trumbull actually painted this work while in London, England a few years after the revolution and while studying there under the British artist Benjamin West – known for his own dramatic portrayals of British Army victories – a fact that can reasonably be concluded to have had some influence on how John Trumbull chose to portray the British Army on his own canvas.

These experiences have not totally dampened my enjoyment of these military scouting trips in the world of the fine arts. Just recently I toured a now closed National Gallery of Art exhibition – Dutch Cityscapes of the Golden Age – which brought together a collection of 17th century Dutch works focused upon the cities and urban scenes of the then newly independent United Provinces. These presented great views of the extensive fortifications that protected many of these cities from the forces of Spain during their independence struggle. There were also several canvases that presented the Dutch soldiers and militia in full regalia and kit, offering excellent information regarding their armaments, uniforms (such as they were), and even their level of drill and military training. But the sum total of my experience in such excursions is to tread warily when an art expert or even art historian describes for you the details of military history, war, warfare, etc. based upon the art work presented by that expert. Try doing some research of your own or find a military historian or expert on the war or period presented and compare the museum works to what these experts can tell you about the relevant military art.

Note: For the works of Winslow Homer, I have found two especially good sources: Winslow Homer, Paintings of the Civil War, by Marc Simpson with contributions by others, published by The Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco and the publishers Beford Arts, to accompany the 1988 exhibit of the same name (ISBN 0-88401-060-0 paper/ISBN 0-938491-15-6 cloth). For his engravings, I have The Wood Engravings of Winslow Homer, edited by Barbara Gelman, published in 1969 by Crown Publishers (LoC 73-75096).

A Napoleonic Hat Trick: Three Basic Readings on the Life and Career of Napoleon Bonaparte, Europe’s Greatest Soldier

Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography by Vincent Cronin

The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History’s Greatest Soldier by David G. Chandler

A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars prepared by Brigadier General Vincent J. Esposito and Colonel John Robert Elting


I recently finished reading Vincent Cronin’s Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography and realized that having done so, I now had the answer to a common question of what should you read if you don’t know anything about Napoleon. This biography in combination with the two other works listed above would provide the reader with a basic knowledge of who Napoleon was, what he tried to accomplish in his political and military careers (and personal life), and why in the end he failed.

Published in the early 1970s, I long resisted reading Vincent Cronin's biography because of the work's reputation as too sympathetic to the subject. However, as part of an ongoing reading program on military history I finally picked up Cronin's volume as the first of a series of biographies of Napoleon that I will be reading. Having completed it, I really wonder now how well the others will match up against this book. Cronin is sympathetic to his subject but he does not hide this from the reader and only in the later chapters did I find myself in disagreement or at least questioning his account of Napoleon's intentions, thoughts, and/or feelings.

The author subtitled this "An Intimate Biography" and in a general way he meant it. The work is not limited to or even focused solely upon Napoleon's military career nor to his entanglements with women, but touches upon all aspects of the life of a man who in his 52 years was a soldier, general, head of state, statesman, lawmaker, lover, pater familias to an extended family, and a father several times over. No one aspect of Napoleon's life dominates the narrative but instead each in turn is made the central focus of the story as that part of his life comes to the fore. This is an especially appealing element of Cronin's book given these many varied roles filled by Napoleon.

And yet the word "intimate" does not offer either empty titillation nor guarantee that we are really and completely inside this man's head at any moment. I believe that this reflects the above-mentioned flaw of being too sympathetic to Napoleon Bonaparte. The author often steps forward to declare what Napoleon thought or felt at a particular moment or about a specific subject, issue, or event and yet I found myself resisting these claims. Vincent Cronin provides neither footnotes nor endnotes, though he does offer a section on Sources and Notes that goes chapter by chapter to identify and explain the basis for his statements and conclusions in the text. There is also an interesting and not un-useful essay "Memoir-Writers and Napoleon" that reviews the background and history of the most important and/or frequently used first-person memoirs from Napoleon Bonaparte's contemporaries.

If you are not a military historian and really only wish to read one book about Napoleon Bonaparte, this biography would be an excellent choice - with the understanding up front that you will find herein a favorable and even sympathetic image of a man who during his life inspired bitter and prolonged opposition and even hatred among Frenchmen as well as others in Europe and the world.

. . . . . .

David Chandler’s book is the best single volume English-language military history focused upon Napoleon’s military career. He begins with an introductory essay “Napoleon – The Man and the General: Qualities and Defects” in which the author presents a summary view of Napoleon and sets the stage for the complete work. The rest of the book is a generally chronological account and review of Napoleon’s military career. Chandler starts with Napoleon Bonaparte’s education and early military career, capped by his service in Italy. The chronological narrative is then interrupted by a section presenting Napoleon’s “philosophy of war” and his methods of making war at both the tactical and strategic level including a discussion of the sources and inspirations for these. The author then proceeds to present Napoleon’s entire military career, devoting a section to each conflict or major campaign – always focused upon those theatres in which Napoleon was personally active. (Therefore, theatres such as the Peninsula receive significant attention only for the period in which Napoleon was present.)

The narrative of Napoleon’s military career is rounded out via 10 appendices addressing the orders of battle for the Army of Italy and the Grande Armée of successive campaigns among others, as well as notes on various battles and on the Empire’s aristocrats and a Glossary of Military terms. There are also over 15 pages of end notes and a five page bibliography.

In his treatment of Napoleon Bonaparte, Chandler is not unsympathetic to his subject but is not as uncritical perhaps as Cronin is in his biography. Perhaps this is because a discussion of Napoleon’s military activities is always founded as much on what he actually did and what happened as it is on Napoleon’s explanations of his intentions. This allows both the author and the reader to more readily draw conclusions from the facts rather than from the he-said and then he-said of after the fact memoirs
.
. . . . .

The final contribution to this triad is A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars which presents both a military history and some 169 maps of the campaigns and battles that occurred between France and the other nations of Europe during this period – 1796-1815. This work is focused upon the strategic and what today we call the operational levels of war and therefore its maps only present the engaged armies down to the Corps, division, and occasionally brigade level. However, its comprehensive treatment of Napoleon’s campaigns and battles makes this a unique work in English.

This atlas has appeared in a modified form in more recent years whereas my copy is one the original 1965 edition (Second Printing) examples. However, both versions are in a 13 inches by 10 inches landscape format which gave the editors a good canvas upon which the sketch out the movements of the armies across Europe’s battlefields. The atlas includes a set of biographical sketches of the major military and political figures of the Napoleonic era. There is also a 10 page list of recommended readings in various languages, each accompanied by a one sentence description of that work’s contents and thrust. Although a bit dated today having been compiled in 1965, this list is a useful resource for any scholar, student, or even casual reader who wants to know more about a particular individual, battle, or campaign.