A Monumental and Apparently Overlooked Memorial from Gloversville, New York

Last August, I was driving my mother around New York’s Mohawk Valley area while we pursued some leads for our family genealogy. But the most exciting find of the trip was this outstanding Civil War memorial in Gloversville, New York. I had to stop the car, investigate, and take photographs.


My wife and I have long made an informal study of what we call “our glorious fallens” – the war memorials erected by communities across the US, Canada, the UK, Russia, etc. – in which a community remembers and salutes those of its members who have gone to war. The monument in Gloversville ranks as one of the top five that we have found though it appears to have escaped wider notice in spite of its obvious quality.

The monument features three figures of soldiers – a central standard bearer, and two flankers. The one on the standard bearer’s right is on one knee and alert to the signs and sounds of battle, but the left, the man has apparently been hit and is slumping to the ground and his left hand clutching at his sack coat. This is remarkable grouping for the overwhelming majority of town/city Civil War memorials feature only one figure.

The monument itself was disappointingly short on information with regard to the sculptor, the sponsor(s), and even the date upon which it was erected and/or dedicated. Its principal inscription reads:

“IN MEMORY OF THE MEN WHO OFFERED THEIR LIVES IN DEFENSE OF THEIR COUNTRY”

The only lead was the markings to indicate that it had been cast at the Gorham Foundry – manufacturers of the work of numerous famous and less well known artists from the US and abroad. The National Gallery of American Art in Washington DC has microfilm copies of the records from the Gorham company and I was able to spend an unfortunately fruitless afternoon looking for further information there.

James Morrison, of the Gloversville Historian’s Office, sent me a copy of the story of the monument from The Morning Herald of July 12, 1917 which offered a few more bits of information. Governor Whitman of New York led the array of dignitaries present for the dedication of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Monument in Monument Square in the community of Gloversville, New York, though the occasion was marred by poor weather. Ironically, given the name, the memorial features only the three soldiers discussed above.

The only indications as to sponsorship were references to the memorial being a gift from the citizens of the city to its veterans, and to a General Committee apparently responsible for the project’s realization. Also present was the former Commander of the New York Grand Army of the Republic General Loud, and representatives of the local Ansel Denison Post, G.A.R. But again, the article gave no name for the sculptor and no definitive statement regarding the identity of the memorial’s sponsor.

So I am sharing my photos and what information I have on this splendid monument in the hopes that perhaps collectively we can illuminate the mystery and provide the recognition that this monument deserves. My next leads would appear to be in the City Records of Gloversville and possibly in the surviving records of the G.A.R. Ansel Denison Post.

"Argo F*** Yourself"

In the recent film “Argo” there is a scene as the embassy in Tehran is being stormed by the Iranian students in which an embassy security officer explains to the Marines that they are not to shoot because if any of the Iranian attackers are killed it is likely that the Marines and embassy staff would be killed in the ensuing violence or in a subsequent show trial, or they could start a war between the United States and Iran. At last someone explained the reality of protecting a diplomatic/consular mission on another nation’s soil.


Today, in the 21st Century, the United States Government is in the business of building fortresses – only we call them embassies (or consulates general, or consulates) – and we are building them around the world, more than 294 worldwide. At best they are protected by a relative handful of U.S. Marine Security Guards, agents of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security from the U.S. Department of State, a series of passive barriers of varied design, and by the police and ultimately the armed forces of the country in which the building is located.

Under Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the protection of an embassy is the responsibility of the government hosting that embassy, diplomatic, or consular mission. This responsibility has been reinforced by subsequent other international agreements reflecting the growing use of terror against diplomats by various groups around the world. In a sense, this reflects the same imbalance of capabilities noted by Nelson – no embassy in the world can hold out against a sustained and determined attack given its limited space, manpower, and defense capabilities. What security force or passive defenses any embassy has are to be used only as a stop gap measure until the arrival on the scene of the forces of the host government.

Britain’s greatest naval hero, Lord Nelson, reputedly declared that, “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” Of course, he spoke at time when the largest warships were less than a football field in length and carried a limited amount of hot for their hundred plus guns (divided into two batteries one along each side of the ship). By contrast, a fort with uninterrupted supply lines giving it access to a potentially limitless supply of ammunition for its guns, which could be both more numerous and more powerful than those carried aboard the ships of the day.

As much as I enjoy studying the works of Vauban, the master of fortification, and walking around surviving examples, the reality is that the 20th Century and aviation brought an end to the dominance of forts and fortresses. France’s Maginot Line is generally considered to be its final high water mark and proof of the folly in building and defending stone and concrete monuments. The mantra for today’s armed forces with their full arsenal of land, sea, and air assets is that if you can see it you can kill it. “Find it, fix it, kill it.”

In 1531 Machiavelli wrote that fortresses “are not needed by those that have good armies…but fortresses without good armies are incompetent for defense.” The problem hasn’t gotten any better over the last five centuries. George Patton reminded us of this in 1944 looking at Germany’s Siegfried Line (the West Wall). He declared “it a monument to human stupidity. When natural obstacles—oceans and mountains—can be so readily overcome, anything that man makes, man can overcome.” Embassies, however, have no armies to defend them other than the police and troops of the government hosting them.

We need embassies to maintain the ties that prevent us from needing to use armies, but we need to recognize that the protection of these buildings and the personnel within them are in fact the responsibility of the government to which they are accredited. The U.S. spent $187 million on its new embassy in Rabat while it spent $247 million in Kiev. And yet it is impossible for the United States to build an impregnable embassy. Governments that fail to fulfill that responsibility must be held to account for their failure. That is the way to defend these buildings and these personnel.

General Wavell Speaking Generally on Generals

My library includes titles on the general subjects of war, warfare, military science, the art of war, strategy, tactics, leadership, and the art of command, among related subjects. The arts of leadership, command, generalship are a long time study, for professional and personal interest. I have had the pleasure of knowing and even working for a few leaders over the years, but it is a rare pleasure and most of the time the best you can hope for is a boss who at least grasps the concepts of good management.

I was delighted last year to add a slim little 63 page paperback to my library. This was the Penguin Special paperback edition (1941) of General Archibald Wavell’s three lectures on Generals and Generalship. This wartime edition looks great among the other paperbacks of similar vintage that I place on display to support my portrayal of a somewhat overage British Army captain during World War II.

Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell was certainly someone in a position to write knowledgeably on the subject, having by 1941 spent almost 40 years as an officer - first in his regiment, The Black Watch, and then in higher command positions. These lectures were first given at the Royal United Services Institution beginning in 1936 and, as presented in this volume, were delivered at Cambridge in early 1939.

Wavell admits that in preparing for these lectures, he sought out what all of the great captains and military thinkers had said on the subject and yet found only one that he thought worth sharing, from Socrates, which appealed to his own views about a general’s need to be practical, energetic, and adaptable.

“The general must know how to get his men their rations and every other kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd; kindly and cruel; simple and crafty; a watchman and a robber; lavish and miserly’ generous and stingy; rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army that a heap of building material is a house.”

The future Field Marshal rather diminishes the importance of physical characteristics that might be desirable in a general, but did identify the essential moral qualities (which he clearly rated as more important):

• Character – in “that he knows what he wants and has the courage and determination to get it.”

• A genuine interest in and real knowledge of humanity, which is “the raw material” of his trade in the form of the officers and men under his command.

• Fighting spirit – i.e., the will to win.

• A spirit of adventure, a touch of the gambler – citing Napoleon, “If the art of war consisted merely in not taking risks glory would be at the mercy of very mediocre talent,” for “the general who allows himself to be bound and hampered by regulations [in waging war] is unlikely to win a battle.”

With regard to intellectual or mental qualities, Wavell emphasized the need to have a sense of what is possible to do in battle, especially with regard to the administrative and logistical aspects of warfare. He noted that the lack of this sense was where most critics of warfare and of generals (as well as most generals who fail) go wrong.

Wavell offered two simple rules for every general:

1) never try to do your own staff work, and

2) never let your staff get between you and your troops.

A general should also know his subordinate commanders and their key characteristics – does one need to be restrained and perhaps another pushed, which of them can be used effectively and decisively in an independent role?

He also discussed whether, and how, a general should address the troops under his command, including whether he should do so collectively or individually. In either situation, Wavell noted, each officer will have to find his own way and manner of doing either but always risks leaving behind an impression other than the one sought. He also notes that a certain of show of temper is not automatically received unfavorably but that sarcasm is “always resented and seldom forgiven.”

Having worked for superiors at various times who used sarcasm, I agree completely with Wavell’s elaboration that “sarcasm…is being clever at someone else’s expense” but believe he might have gone even further to note that a superior thus exercising his (or her) sarcasm upon a subordinate is in reality simply abusing their position of authority and targeting someone who has no recourse or response other than to stay silent and “take it” – but they will remember and resent that moment.

The General concluded his final lecture with a last admonition. He called to mind “the pious Greek” who erected altars to all the known great gods and then added one more, enscribing it “To the Unknown God.” Wavell asked that we add one further military altar to those already erected to Hannibal, Marlborough, Napoleon, et al, and upon this one enscribe “To the Unknown Leader” – understanding this to mean the “good company, platoon, or section leader who carries forward his men or holds his post, and often falls unknown.”

Amen.